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Abstract
In the first chapter of this dissertation I investigate the extent to which firm cash hold-
ings are affected by credit default swap (CDS) coverage of their product market peers.
Using a sample of firms incorporated in the US, and defining peer groups using the text-
based industry classification of Hoberg and Phillips (2016), I find that firm cash-to-asset
ratios and relative-to-peer cash ratios are positively related to peer CDS coverage. The
marginal effects are meaningful at approximately 2 and 9 percent of the sample medi-
ans respectively. Decomposing peer firm CDS coverage by relative financial constraints
suggests that the effects are due to predatory motives.
In chapter two, I examine whether obtaining a foreign presence through sub-advisors
affects fund performance and management behaviours of international equity mutual
funds sold in the US. I find no evidence that international sub-advisors exploit informa-
tion in a way that improves fund performance. Moreover, funds that hire outsourced
international sub-advisors are found to underperform on a risk-adjusted basis by up
to 126 basis points (bps) annually. The underperformance of outsourced international
sub-advisors is concentrated in their local holdings and can be partly explained by lower
activeness and greater risk shifting. These effects are alleviated in funds with multiple
sub-advisors as they are more likely to be terminated following poor performance.
In the final chapter, I investigate the extent to which competition from low-cost index
funds affects fees, performance, and survival rates of actively managed funds. I mea-
sure the intensity of competition using the market value of holdings overlap between
the portfolios of index entrants and active incumbents. Disentangling the competitive
effects of traditional index funds (market index) from smart-beta index funds (factor
index), I find that future changes in actively managed net fees are negatively related
to factor index fund entry but unrelated to market index fund entry. Additionally, I
find that both factor and market index entry are negatively related to active incumbent
survival rates and that this effect is most pronounced for relatively expensive active
incumbents. Lastly, I find evidence that factor index entry has had an attenuating effect
on active incumbent future performance.
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Chapter I
Corporate Liquidity Management in
Response to Peer CDS Initiation
Michael Densmore1
1 Introduction
Although only a small proportion of firms are referenced by credit default swaps (CDS)
– 503 (14.5%) of my sample firms in 2008 – they have been a subject of hot debate
since they were first engineered. The collapse of major banks and insurance companies
like Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, and the government takeover of AIG at the onset
of the US subprime crisis in 2007-2008 were, for the most part, due to large positions
in credit derivative markets.2 More recently, lawsuits have been filed against major
US banks regarding profiting from anti-competitive price setting in the CDS market.3
Regulatory bodies have attempted to address various deficiencies by implementing reg-
ulations surrounding CDS trading (e.g., Dodd-Frank, Basel Accord and the Big Bang
Protocol). Given that only a small proportion of firms are referenced by CDS, it is
natural to question whether they influence management decisions of firms that are
not themselves referenced by CDS. In this paper, I empirically investigate whether cash
holdings decisions of non-referenced firms are affected by CDS coverage of their closest
peers.
I concentrate on the impact on cash holdings for several reasons. CDS contracts
1I am grateful for the comments of Melanie Cao, Ambrus Kresckes, Fabio Moneta, Aleksandra Rzeźnik,
Ben Sand, Pauline Shum Nolan and participants at the Schulich School of Business research seminar.
2AIG for example, had a net short position in CDS valued around $546 billion in 2007 (Augustin




provide a simple means for lenders to transfer credit risk and have been shown to al-
ter renegotiation policies and credit availability for the underlying firm. Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) and Morrison (2005) provide theoretical evidence that the introduc-
tion of CDS trading increases the cost of debt, particularly when the referenced firm
is financially constrained. The rationale being that creditors who have hedged their
position are tougher during debt renegotiation processes and more likely to reject out-
of-court restructuring. Indeed, if the CDS payoff is sufficiently high then over-insured
lenders, often referred to as empty creditors (Black and Hu, 2008), will have incen-
tive to induce bankruptcy.4 The empirical evidence generally supports these theories.
For example, CDS coverage is positively related to credit and loan spreads (Ashcraft
and Santos, 2009), reductions in credit quality (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014) and in-
creased default probabilities (Peristiani and Savino, 2011; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014;
Arentsen et al., 2015), particularly for financially distressed firms. In sum, a large body
of theoretical and empirical research stipulates that firms experience credit rationing
or other financial constraints following CDS initiation, and that the effect is most pro-
nounced for firms that are ex-ante financially constrained.
Next, extensive literature has shown that corporate liquidity management policies,
and ultimately the success of a firm, can be influenced by the actions, and character-
istics, of its immediate peers. In particular, firms facing financial frictions or credit
constraints can be the target of predatory pricing or advertising strategies from uncon-
strained peers (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Campello, 2006). This predatory pressure
can lead constrained firms to suffer diminished cash flow due to reduced sales, which
can further lead to under-investment and ultimately a loss of market share (Benoit,
1984). At the extreme, the constrained firm may be driven out of the market. As
documented by Fresard (2010), cash reserves, and particularly industry adjusted cash
reserves, are a plausible vehicle for predation. That is, firms can strategically use large
relative-to-peer cash reserves to increase their market share at the expense of their
peers as they are better situated to engage in predatory strategies. Given the evidence
of credit rationing or other financial constraints associated with CDS coverage, I conjec-
ture that CDS coverage signals that the referenced firm is a prime target for predation.
Formally, under the predatory hypothesis I expect that non-referenced firm cash hold-
4The term empty creditor highlights the fact that the lender has hedged its credit risk while retaining
control rights.
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ings are positively related to the portion peer firms referenced by CDS. Moreover, this
relationship should be restricted to CDS coverage peers that are relatively financially
constrained as they are the firms most likely to experience a deterioration in credit
availability following CDS coverage.
Alternatively, intra-industry credit contagion (Jorion and Zhang, 2007) and spillover
effects from CDS trading (Darst and Refayet, 2018) might lead to increased borrowing
costs for firms without traded CDS. Under this alternative firms are expected to in-
crease cash holdings following peer CDS coverage due to contagion concerns rather
than for predatory reasons. This alternative hypothesis follows Subrahmanyam et al.
(2016) who show that firms respond to the increased bankruptcy risk of CDS coverage
by increasing cash holdings. The rationale is based on the precautionary motive which
posits that firms facing borrowing constraints can use cash reserves to smooth invest-
ment during market downturns (Kenneth Froot and Stein, 1993; Haushalter et al.,
2007). As with the predatory hypothesis, the relationship between cash holdings of
non-referenced firms and peer CDS coverage is positive; however, under the precaution-
ary motive non-referenced firms are expected to be relatively financially constrained.
Lastly, lenders may use CDS to shed credit risk in an effort to reduce exposure,
or to improve their capital ratio which can enable them to extend additional credit
to referenced firms (Guest et al., 2016; Shan et al., 2014). Similarly, creditors who
transfer credit risk may expend less resources on monitoring their borrowers, which can
also lead to a reduction in financing constraints and increased debt capacities for CDS
referenced firms (Guest et al., 2016; Che and Sethi, 2015). In this case, the relationship
between firm cash holdings and peer CDS coverage is unclear.
In order to examine how cash holdings are affected by peer CDS coverage, an ap-
propriate set of peer firms must be determined. Fixed industry classifications (e.g., SIC,
NAICS or GICS) provide a simple, and easy to implement, approach. The drawback is
that mangers tend to focus on only a small number of their most relevant peers (Kaustia
and Rantala, 2015). Thus, groups formed using standard fixed industry classification
codes lack the precision necessary to properly examine peer effects. In addition, the
product market in which a firm operates evolves over time, and in some cases, inno-
vation can lead to newly created product markets. Fixed industry classifications are
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slow to re-classify firms and fail to capture these important features of product market
competition. I circumvent these issues by constructing peer groups using the text-based
industry classification (TNIC) data from Hoberg and Phillips (2016) (HP). The struc-
ture of HP’s product market data allows for a more more precise identification of the
set of most relevant peers relative to common industry classification codes. Moreover,
it provides a measure of the degree to which pairs of firms compete via their product
market. Put differently, the TNIC data provides information regarding the economic
distance between two firms product market and therefore allows one to concentrate
on, and/or overweight, the more important peers rather than treating all peers equally.
In line with prior literature (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Saretto and Tookes,
2013; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2016) I consider a firm to be referenced by CDS
once Markit data services (my source of CDS data) reports a non-missing CDS price.
In particular, I define a CDS coverage dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is
referenced by CDS and zero otherwise. Next, I utilize HP’s similarity scores to construct
measures of peer CDS coverage, as well as to control for peer characteristics. I consider
a variety of methods for selecting the subset of the most relevant peers, but report
results using the 5, 20 or 50 most similar peers in the bulk of my empirical tests. In
particular, firm i’s peer group contains the 5, 20 or 50 firms that are most similar to firm
i in terms of product market (i.e., the 5, 20 or 50 peer firms have the highest pairwise
TNIC similarity score). I then compute peer CDS coverage, and peer characteristics,
using similarity score weighted averages. That is, peer CDS coverage is equal to the
TNIC similarity score weighted proportion of peers that are referenced by CDS. Unlike
an equally weighted measure, the similarity score weighted measure ensures that the
most relevant peers receive higher weights than the least relevant peers.
Regressing firm cash-to-assets on the similarity score weighted peer CDS coverage
variable shows that firm cash ratios are significantly higher when a larger propor-
tion of its closest peers are referenced by CDS. The magnitude is also meaningful –
the marginal effect is approximately 2.23% of the sample median. Replacing cash-
to-asset ratios with relative-to-peer cash ratios yields similar results. In particular, a
one-standard deviation increase in peer CDS coverage is associated with relative-to-
peer cash ratios that are approximately 0.05 higher, which is about 9% of the sample
median. Subrahmanyam et al. (2016) find that cash-to-asset ratios are about 10%
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higher following the introduction of own-firm CDS trading which suggest that the ef-
fects of peer CDS coverage on firm cash ratios are meaningful. The fact that firm cash
ratios, and particularly relative-to-peer cash ratios, are positively related to peer firm
CDS coverage also offers initial support of a competitive, and likely predatory, channel.
The literature examining peer group effects shows that certain peer firm character-
istics and actions are likely to influence corporate decisions.5 Although prior research
indicates that CDS markets provide information not captured by other observable met-
rics, I include an exhaustive list of peer controls to alleviate concerns that CDS coverage
is indeed proxying for other observable peer characteristics. The marginal effects are
numerically similar and continue to be statistically significant. Importantly, the effects
of peer CDS coverage are not diminished when controlling for other observable mea-
sures of peer firm credit constraints such as Altman’s Z-Score or S&P credit ratings.
Next, I show that the results are robust to alternative specifications. In particular,
replacing the weighted average peer CDS coverage variable with individual CDS cov-
erage dummy variables does not substantially alter the results. Additionally, I find that
the positive effect on cash, and relative-to-peer cash, is generally subsumed by CDS
coverage of a firms two closest peers. CDS trading on a firm is arguably an exogenous
event to its peers, which typically do not trade CDS. Moreover, it is unlikely that firms
select their product market space based on the number of peers that are covered by
CDS. Nonetheless, I address the potential selection bias by confirming that the positive
relationship between peer CDS coverage and firm cash holdings remains significant
when using a propensity score-matched sample.
Having established a robust, positive relationship between peer CDS coverage and
both firm cash ratios and relative-to-peer cash, I investigate potential mechanisms. In
particular, I decompose peer CDS coverage variables based on Altman Z scores in an ef-
fort to separate the effects of CDS coverage of financially constrained from coverage of
financially unconstrained peers. This is important since the impact of CDS coverage on
the reference firm has been shown to differ based on ex-ante financial constraints. My
evidence is consistent with a predatory motive: the positive effect of peer CDS coverage
5For example: Bizjak et al. (2008) study how benchmarking in CEO compensation affects pay levels,
Kaustia and Rantala (2015) show that a firm is more likely to split it’s stock if it’s peer have recently done
so, and Leary and Roberts (2014) examine how peer behaviour affects firm financing decisions.
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on firm cash holdings is confined to peers who are already financially constrained, and
is insignificant for CDS coverage of firms that are financially unconstrained. Decom-
posing peer CDS coverage by relative financial constraints offers additional support –
the positive relationship is restricted to firms that are less financially constrained than
their CDS covered peers.
Lastly, I test whether the presence of empty creditors impacts the results. Empty
creditors will prefer that their borrowers declare bankruptcy and reject any out-of-
court restructuring when the payout offered by the CDS is greater than the payoff from
restructuring. This situation is most likely to arise under ex-restructuring (XR) CDS con-
tracts since debt-restructuring does not trigger a payout. In contrast, debt restructuring
qualifies as a credit event under cum-restructuring (CR), modified restructuring (MR)
and modified-modified restructuring (MM) contracts. Naturally, creditors have greater
incentives to induce bankruptcy and to fight debt-restructuring when they insure their
positions with XR CDS contracts as they are only triggered by bankruptcy. My evidence
offers some support that empty creditors are driving the results. Cash ratios are signifi-
cantly higher for firms that have peers covered by XR CDS relative to firms whose peers
are covered by CR, MM or MR CDS. However, the results for relative-to-peer cash ratios
are inconclusive.
This paper contributes to three broad fields. First, I contribute to the sparse liter-
ature on the spillover effects of CDS trading. To the best of my knowledge, the only
research directly examining spillover effects of CDS initiation is by Li and Tang (2015),
who examine how CDS coverage of customers impacts supplier leverage. The perspec-
tive in my paper differs in that I investigate spillover effects through product market
peers rather than through a customer supplier channel.
I also supplement the vast literature on the determinants, and use, of cash reserves.
Most relevant to this paper is the research on the strategic use of cash reserves. For
instance, firm cash holdings have been shown to be positively related to industry cash
flow volatility (Opler et al., 1999), which has led to the theories about the precautionary
motive for corporate cash holdings (Han and Qui, 2007). Similarly, firms facing high
levels of competition have been shown to hold more cash (Morellec et al., 2014) while
firms with large relative-to-rival cash reserves tend to gain future market share at the
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expense of their cash poor rivals (Fresard, 2010). I contribute to this debate in that
I offer a new angle through which firms obtain relevant information regarding peer
credit constraints. In particular, my evidence suggests that peer CDS coverage provides
a signal of credit constraints not provided by standard measures and that firms act on
this information by holding higher levels of cash reserves. Importantly, these findings
hold when replacing cash-ratios with relative-to-peer cash, and the latter have been
shown to influence product market outcomes.
Lastly, I contribute to the ever growing research on peer effects. For example, firm
decisions have been shown to be influenced by peer firm decisions and characteristics.
For instance, firm financing decisions and stocks splits are positively related to peer
financing decisions (Leary and Roberts, 2014; Harvey and Harvey, 2001) and peer stock
splits (Kaustia and Rantala, 2015), respectively. Similarly, firms have been shown to
use peer firm compensation in setting executive pay (Bizjak et al., 2008) and peer firm
valuations in making investment decisions (Foucault and Fresard, 2016). Most similar
to my research is YiWen Chen and Chang (2019) who find that firm cash holdings
decision are influenced by peer firm cash holdings decisions. My research differs in that
I focus on the extent to which outside information about peer firm credit constraints,
rather than peer characteristics or actions, affects firm cash management decisions.
Importantly, I show that the effects hold when controlling for peer characteristics found
to be relevant in predicting firm cash holding, e.g., peer cash holdings. In addition, my
methodological approach differs in that I explicitly account for the fact that managers
pay attention a relatively small number of their most relevant peers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the
methodology, data selection and variable construction. The results are presented in
Section 3 and Section 4 offers a conclusion.
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2 Methodology and data
2.1 Defining peer groups
The issue of empirically identifying the most relevant set of peers has been thoroughly
discussed in both the finance and economics literature.6 Classifications in the finance
literature typically involve fixed industry classification codes: SIC, GICS and NAICS.
For example, Leary and Roberts (2014) define peer groups using 3-digit SIC industries,
Seo (2020) uses 6-digit GICS industries, and YiWen Chen and Chang (2019) restrict
their analysis to firms classified as manufacturing firms – SIC codes between 2000 and
3999.
Unfortunately, fixed industry classifications (FICs) suffer from a number of deficien-
cies. First, a firm’s product market evolves over time. Since FICs are slow to re-classify
firms they do not necessarily capture this important feature of product market com-
petition. Similarly, innovation can lead to new product markets being formed, which
FICs fail to incorporate. Moreover, the broad nature of FICs does not allow one to
directly identify the most suitable set of peers. This subtle, yet important shortfall is
highlighted by evidence showing that managers pay attention to only their most rel-
evant peers (Kaustia and Rantala, 2015). Kaustia and Rantala (2015) addresses this
issue by identifying peers using the number of common analysts covering a pair of firms
given sell-side analysts tend to concentrate on a specific industry. Although novel, this
approach suffers from a selection bias as it explicitly removes firms that have insuffi-
cient analyst coverage. Moreover, firms with negligible analyst coverage are typically
defined as opaque and CDS coverage of opaque firms will provide more information
than coverage of transparent firms.
I overcome these issues by identifying competitors through HP’s text-based net-
work industry classification (TNIC) (see Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016). Hoberg
and Phillips (2016) describe the methodology in detail, so here I provide only a brief
description and concentrate on arguing why their data, and methodology, is most ap-
6Examples in the economics literature include Xu and Lin 2010 who examine how peer groups using
friends to study the impact on school achievement and Ioannides and Zabel (2003) who use neighbor-
hood characteristics to study housing demand and consumption decisions.
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propriate in my empirical setting in comparison to other proposed methodologies.
The text-based industry classification from HP provides pairwise scores that mea-
sures how similar two firms are with respect to their product market space. Scores
are constructed from the text in the business description section of firm’s annual 10-K
reports filed with the SEC, which as they note, provides details on the products that a
firm offers. In specific, HP compute similarity scores for each pair of firms, and for each
fiscal year, based on the number of words shared by the pair of firms when describing
their product market. Scores are bounded between 0 and 1 with higher values indi-
cating a higher level of similarity in the product market space. HP choose a minimum
similarity threshold such that they produce the same fraction of industry pairs as the
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industries.
Importantly, HP’s methodology for identifying firm peers alleviates many of the defi-
ciencies that arise from using fixed industry classifications. For example, HP’s measure
is updated on an annual basis and therefore accounts for the fact that firm product
markets evolve over time. Along the same vein, their methodology allows for newly
created product markets that arise from innovation. Since similarity scores provide a
measure of economic distance between two firms product market space, they allow for
over-weighting CDS coverage of peers that are most relevant and under-weighting of
less relevant peers. Fixed industry codes explicitly treat all peers as equally important
which fails to account for the fact that managers concentrate on only a small number
of their most relevant peers. Lastly, peer groups formed using HP’s similarity score data
produce substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in peer group sizes as well
as heterogeneous groups.
My empirical approach for measuring peer CDS coverage, and characteristics, is
similar to that of Foucault and Fresard (2016) but differs along two levels. First, I
restrict my attention to the most relevant set of peer firms. I examine various cutoffs
but find generally similar results when using between 5 and 50 of the most similar firms
(highest TNIC similarity scores). In cases where the number of related firms is less than
the cutoff, I include all related firms.7 Next, I exploit the fact that higher pairwise scores
indicate higher levels of product market similarity by weighing peer CDS coverage, and
7The main results are numerically similar if I instead include only peers that surpass a minimum
similarity score threshold.
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characteristics, by the associated similarity score. In specific, individual peer weights
are calculated by dividing each peer’s similarity score by the sum of similarity scores
across firm i’s peers. My results are generally similar if I instead use equal weights, as
in Foucault and Fresard (2016); however, the ability to over-weight the most relevant
peers while under-weighting the least relevant peers is one of the primary benefits of
using HP’s data over fixed industry classification codes.
2.2 Data
I start by collecting annual firm characteristic data collected from Compustat from 2000
to 2015. Since my focus is on US firms, I remove firms that are incorporated outside of
the US. In addition, I exclude observations where cash holdings are missing or greater
than total assets. In the bulk of my tests I include firms in the financial and utility
industries, but replicate all tests with the sub-sample of firms that excludes these two
industries. I obtain equity data from CRSP, which I merge to Compustat using CUSIP
identifiers.
The daily CDS data is from Markit data services. Markit provides daily data on
CDS pricing starting in 2001 and has been frequently used as a primary source of CDS
coverage in prior literature (e.g., Guest et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2015; Peristiani and
Savino, 2011; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). In line with prior literature, I identify the
initial date of CDS coverage using the first date that Markit reports a CDS price for
each firm eventually covered by CDS. Due to Markit’s stringent data cleaning tests, a
small number of firms covered by CDS do not appear on this database. While this does
introduce noise as some firms with CDS coverage may enter my sample as uncovered,
this bias works against finding significant results. I proceed by collecting all single
name corporate CDS traded on US firms and include all types of restructuring clauses:
CR, MM, MR and XR. I do not differentiate between restructuring clause in the bulk
of my empirical tests since many firms are covered by multiple types of CDS contracts
simultaneously and because my objective is to identify peer firm CDS coverage. The
CDS data is merged to the CRSP-Compustat dataset by CUSIP number, which results in
959 CDS referenced firms.
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The TNIC data is downloaded from HP’s website8 and is merged to the Compus-
tat/CRSP/Markit dataset by firm GVKEY. The size of peer groups can be quite large as
HP impose a minimum product market similarity threshold that generates industries
with the same fraction of membership pairs as the 3-digit SIC industries. For the ma-
jority of my empirical tests I restrict my focus to CDS coverage of the 5, 20 or 50 most
similar set of peers since these are the peers that managers are most likely to pay atten-
tion to. After merging all datasets, and removing firms that have missing outcome or
control variables, I obtain a dataset that contains 5495 unique firms, 574 of which are
covered by CDS at some point between 2001 and 2015.
2.3 Outcome variables
I employ two measures of firm cash holdings. The first, Cashi,t, is equal to total cash
and marketable securities scaled by total assets, as of fiscal year t. As argued by Fresard
(2010) and Mackay and Phillips (2005), a firm’s cash position relative to its peers is
more important than a firm’s raw cash-to-asset ratio in the context of competition. For
this reason, I also consider firm cash ratios that are standardized within a firm’s peer
group-year. In specific, I compute relative-to-peer cash (zCashi,t) by subtracting the
average cash-to-asset ratio of firm i’s TNIC peers and then divide this difference by the





where Cashi,t denotes firm i’s cash-to-asset ratio in year t, Cash−i,t denotes the average
cash-to-asset ratio of firm i’s peers (excluding firm i) in year t and Std.Dev.(Cash−i∗,t)
equals the standard deviation of cash holdings in firm i’s peer group (including firm i)
in year t.




To avoid the process of disentangling the effects of own firm CDS coverage from peer
firm CDS coverage, I follow Li and Tang (2015) and focus on the sample of firms
that are not referenced by CDS. This ensures that own-firm CDS coverage does not
contaminate any effects of peer firm CDS coverage. In the appendix, I show that the
main results are robust to relaxing this restriction and controlling for own firm CDS
coverage with a binary variable that is equal to one if a firm is covered by CDS and zero
otherwise. I estimate the effect of peer firm CDS coverage on firm cash reserves using
the following panel regression:
Cashi,t = αi + βCDS−i(m),t−1 + γXi,t−1 + θX̄−i,t−1 + νi + µt + εi,t (I.2)
where Xi,t−1 is a vector of firm level control variables and X̄−i,t−1 is a vector of similarity
score weighted average peer group characteristics. The −i is used to emphasize the
fact that these calculations exclude firm i. The variable of interest, peer CDS coverage
(CDS−i(m),t−1) is defined as the similarity score weighted average number of peers that
are referenced by CDS at time t − 1. The subscript m is used to denote the number of
peer firms used in the calculation. Measuring the effects of own firm CDS coverage
vis-à-vis a dummy variable is common in the literature9 while literature examining the
spillover effects of CDS coverage has used the proportion of related firms covered by
CDS.10 Rather than using a simple average, I exploit the nature of HP’s similarity score
data by weighting CDS coverage of each peer firm by its similarity score. I let m vary
from 5 to 50 but report results using the 5, 20 and 50 most similar peers for brevity.
νi captures firm level fixed effects while µt captures time trends. Firm fixed effects are
necessary to control for fundamental information relevant to optimal levels of the cash
reserves. Time fixed effects capture trends in average cash holdings over time.
The vectors of firm characteristics (Xi,t−1) and peer characteristics (X̄−i,t−1) contain
variables deemed relevant for predicting cash holdings by prior literature (for exam-
ple: Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Haushalter et al., 2007; Bates et al., 2009;
9For example see: Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013), Subrahmanyam et al.
(2014) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2016).
10For instance, Li and Tang (2015) use the proportion of customers covered by CDS to investigate
spillover effects to suppliers.
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Subrahmanyam et al., 2016). Firms with strong investment opportunities can avoid
giving up profitable projects by holding sufficient cash reserves which I proxy for us-
ing market-to-book ratios. Next, firms who have poor access to capital markets have
incentives to hold more cash which I proxy for using an indicator variable that is equal
to one if a firm has a credit rating and zero otherwise. I include firm size, defined as
the logarithm of total assets, since larger firms may hold less cash if economies of scale
exist with liquid assets. Profitable firms are better able to finance investments internally
which reduces the need to hold excess cash. In contrast, managers of profitable firms
have more of an opportunity to hoard excess cash. The expected relationship between
firm profitability and cash holdings is therefore ambiguous. Nonetheless, I control for
firm profitability using operating income after depreciation. I control for firm payout
policies using a binary variable that equals 1 if a firm paid dividends over the previ-
ous year and zero otherwise since firms who pay out a large portion of profits in the
form of dividends (low retention ratio) reduce the pool of funds available for holding
and therefore are expected to have lower cash reserves. Cash shortfalls can lead to a
contraction in firm investment activities, thus, one might expect that firms with higher
levels of capital expenditures and R&D hold more cash reserves. Similarly, certain in-
dustries require more (or less) cash holdings by design; I therefore include the average
industry cash volatility and the weighted average of lagged peer cash holdings. With
the exception of market-to-book ratios, indicator variables and size, all balance sheet
items are scaled by total assets. Formal definitions of the variables used throughout this
paper are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3 Peer CDS coverage and firm cash holdings
3.1 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides a breakdown of CDS coverage by year and restructuring clause. The
four types restructuring clauses: cum-restructuring (CR), no restructuring (XR), modi-
fied restructuring (MR) and modified-modified restructuring (MM), differ based on the
type of credit event that triggers CDS payment and the type of debt obligation that can
be used for delivery. For example, CR, MR and MM CDS are triggered by any type of
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credit event (bankruptcy, failure to pay and debt restructuring) and differ only by the
type of debt obligations available for physical delivery. In contrast, debt-restructuring
is not considered a credit event under XR CDS contracts. The “modified modified re-
structuring” clause (MM) was introduced in June 2003 which is why it there is no value
for 2002. Table A.5 in the appendix provides additional details about the differences
in deliverable obligations under different restructuring clauses. Consistent with pre-
vious literature, the total number of firms is decreasing over time. Furthermore, CDS
coverage peaks around 2007-2008 and subsequently declines following the Financial
Crisis.
[Table 1]
Table 2 summarizes the variables used throughout this paper. I present statistics
for the sub-sample of firms that are not themselves referenced by CDS since this is the
sample used in the bulk of my empirical tests. All balance sheet items are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles. The outcome variables, cash-to-assets (Cash) and relative-
to-peer cash-to-assets (zCash), are shown in the first panel. The median firm holds
approximately 15% of it’s net assets in cash11 and has a median relative-to-peer cash
(zCash) equal to approximately -0.5.
The mean of the CDS coverage variable is approximately 0.09, regardless of the
number of peers included in the calculation. The medians are closer to zero highlighting
the positive skewness of these variables. Importantly, there is both substantial cross-
sectional variation (as can be seen in Table A4 in the Appendix) in the number of peers
covered by CDS but also substantial time-series variation (highlighted by Table 1). In
addition, due to the time-varying nature of HP’s TNIC data, a firm’s peer group can
evolve over time. Put differently, the relevance of a given peer, and the set of most
relevant peers, varies over time which further adds to variation in peer CDS coverage.
[Table 2]
The typical firm has an Altman’s Z-Score of about 4.4 indicating a relatively low
probability of financial distress. That said, there is substantial variability – more than
11Consistent with prior literature, this value is significantly lower for firms that are referenced by CDS
at about 6%.
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25% of firm-year observations would be deemed to be financially constrained. The
average S&P credit rating of BB (11) seems to contradict the Altman’s Z-Scores; how-
ever, a large portion of firm-year observations (approximately 75%) have no S&P credit
rating. This number is significantly lower for firms eventually referenced by CDS at
around 6%. The statistics for the remaining firm characteristics are comparable to
those in prior literature (e.g., Li and Tang, 2015; Chi and Su, 2016). The average firm
has a market-to-book ratio close to 2, book leverage of approximately 0.18, annualized
returns of approximately 12% and only 26% of firms pay dividends. Peer group char-
acteristics, calculated as the similarity score weighted average across the most similar
50 peers, are generally comparable to the corresponding firm characteristics.
3.2 Empirical results
In this section I investigate how peer CDS coverage affects firm cash holding decisions
by estimating Equation I.2. The results, displayed in Table 3, include fund and year
fixed effects with standards errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level.
I present regressions using the sample of firms who are not referenced by CDS but
obtain numerically similar results when including these firms and controlling for own-
firm CDS coverage. Additionally, Table 3 includes financial firms and utility firms since
they make up a significant portion (149) of CDS covered firms (see Table A3 in the
Appendix). Nonetheless, my results are robust to excluding these firms.
The impact of peer firm CDS coverage on firm cash-to-asset ratios is provided in
columns (1), (2) and (3). The results show that firm cash ratios are positively related
to peer firm CDS coverage and that the effect is robust to the number of peers used in
constructing the peer CDS coverage variable. For example, the estimated coefficients
on CDS−i(5),t−1 and CDS−i(20),t−1 are 0.0167 and 0.0229 respectively, both of which are
both significant at the one-percent level. The effects are also economically meaningful
– the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in CDS−i(5),t−1 (CDS−i(20),t−1) on cash-
to-asset ratios is approximately 1.9% (2.23%) of the sample median or about 2.65%
and 3.09% of difference between the 25th and 50th percentiles.
[Table 3]
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Columns (4), (5) and (6) display the effects of peer firm CDS initiation on relative-
to-peer cash holdings. As with cash-to-asset ratios, the effect of peer CDS cover-
age on relative-to-peer cash is positive and significant. The estimated coefficients on
CDS−i,(5),t−1, CDS−i,(20),t−1 and CDS−i,(50),t−1 are positive and significant. In terms of
economic magnitude, a one-standard deviation increase in peer CDS coverage is as-
sociated with relative-to-peer cash holdings that are between 0.044 and 0.069 higher.
zCashi,t is highly skewed – the mean is close to zero while the median is approximately
-0.5 – I therefore discuss various measures of economic magnitude. A effect of one-
standard deviation change in peer firm CDS coverage on zCashi,t is about 8.84% and
13.8% of the sample median. Alternatively, this represents between 3.88% and 6.09%
of the difference between the 25th and 50th percentiles of z-scored cash. Panel A of
Table A5 in the Appendix shows that effects are robust to including firms referenced
by CDS while controlling for own-firm CDS coverage (CDSi,t−1).12 Panel B in Table A5
shows that the effects are robust to excluding firms operating in the financial or utility
sectors.
3.3 Robustness
The spillover effects documented in the previous sub-section are consistent with CDS
coverage providing a negative signal with respect to peer credit constraints, and the
conjecture that firms act on this information by strategically increasing cash holdings.
One potential concern is that peer CDS initiation might reflect information available
from other observable measures of credit risk. For instance, a widely used metric of firm
credit risk is its credit rating, which incorporates both the probability of bankruptcy
and restructuring (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Firms referenced by CDS – who by
definition have outstanding debt and typically in the form of corporate bonds – tend
to have their corporate debt rated by one of the major rating agencies. Indeed, 97.2%
of the firms covered by CDS in my sample also have a long-term credit rating issued
by Standard and Poor’s (S&P). In contrast, the proportion of unreferenced firms that
have a credit rating is significantly lower, at around 25%. Thus, I control for peer credit
12The effect of own-firm CDS coverage is positive and significant at the one-percent level. The magni-
tude is smaller than reported in Subrahmanyam et al. (2016) at approximately 4%. Possibly reasons for
this difference include differences in sampling periods and the data sources used to define CDS coverage.
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ratings to ensure CDS initiation is not simply capturing information contained in credit
ratings. In particular, Credit Rating−i,t−1 is equal to the average S&P credit rating of firm
i’s peers at t − 1.
The results, displayed in Panel A of Table 4, suggest that the positive effect of peer
CDS initiation on firm cash holdings is not explained by peer firm credit ratings. As
with prior regressions, I adjust standard errors for clustering along the firm dimension
and include both year and firm fixed effects. The magnitudes, and significance, of the
peer firm CDS coverage variables are slightly larger relative to the baseline results from
Table 3.
[Table 4]
Credit ratings are updated rather infrequently; therefore, I also draw from the large
literature showing that Altman’s Z-Score (AZ-Score) performs quite well as a measure
of a financial distress and bankruptcy predictor (Edward Altman and Laitinen, 2017
provide a comprehensive review). In particular, I control for the average AZ-Score of
firm i’s peer group at time t − 1, denoted by AZ−i,t−1. That is, I first compute AZ, as
defined in Equation I.3, for each of firm i’s peers. AZ−i,t−1 is then equal to the TNIC
similarity score weighted average AZ score across firm i’s m closest peers.
AZ = 1.2 × WCAP
AT
+ 1.4 × RE
AT
+ 3.3 × EBIT
AT





where: AT equals total assets, WCAP denotes working capital, RE is retained earn-
ings, EBIT equals earnings before interest and taxes, SALES denotes sales, CHSO is
the number of shares outstanding and PRCC is the associated share price.
The results, provided in Panel B of Table 4, confirm that the positive relationship
between cash reserves and peer firm CDS coverage is not explained by peer AZ scores.
The marginal effect on firm cash-to-asset ratios, shown in columns (1) and (2), is larger
than the baseline effect. In contrast, the marginal effect on z-scored cash, columns (3)
and (4), is nearly identical to the baseline effect.
As a further test of robustness, I re-estimate Equation I.2 using an alternate specifi-
cation of rival coverage. In specific, I collect firm i’s 20 most similar peers in each year
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based on ranked TNIC scores. Next, I compute an indicator for each of the 20 most
similar peer firms that is equal to one if it is covered by CDS and zero otherwise. I then
regress firm i cash, and z-scored cash, on the CDS indicators for the most similar 1, 5,
10, and 20 peers.
The results, reported in Panel C of Table 4, show that the effect of peer CDS coverage
is robust to this alternate specification. To preserve space, I report results using the
closest 1 or 5 peers but note that the results are numerically similar when extending
the analysis to the 10 or 20 most similar peers. Unsurprisingly, the positive effect is,
for the most part, absorbed by the two most similar peers, CDS(1),t−1 and CDS(2),t−1.
For example, the effect of CDS coverage of a firm’s closest peer is associated with an
increase in cash-to-assets, Columns (1) and (2), of between 0.0062 and 0.0071 and is
significant at the one-percent level. The economic magnitudes are also quite large as
they amount to 4.1% and 4.7% of the median cash-to-asset ratio respectively. Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 4 show that the effect on z-scored cash-to-assets confirms that: i)
the effects are robust to this alternative specification and ii) the effects appear to be
largely driven by CDS coverage the two most similar peers.
CDS trading on a firm is most likely an exogenous event to its unreferenced peers.
Moreover, firms presumably do not select their product market based on the number
of potential peers that are referenced by CDS. Put differently, it is improbable that the
proportion of peers covered by CDS is jointly determined with a firm’s cash holdings.
In any event, I address potential selection issues using a propensity score matching
methodology. While this will not solve a fundamental endogeneity problem, it does
offer a convenient, and simple, robustness test (Roberts and Whited, 2013; Subrah-
manyam et al., 2014).
I estimate the probability of having CDS referenced peers as a function of lagged
size, sales, cash, 2-digit SIC code, leverage and peer group AZ-score. For each firm that
has a CDS referenced peer, I select one firm that has no peers referenced by CDS using
the nearest propensity score. I re-estimate Equation I.2 using the matched sample in
Panel D of Table 4. The coefficient estimates for peer CDS coverage are positive and




3.4.1 Financially distressed peers
Prior CDS literature suggests that the borrowing conditions of opaque and financially
constrained firms deteriorate following CDS coverage (e.g., Ashcraft and Santos, 2009;
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Thus, under a predatory motive, the positive relationship
between firm cash holdings and CDS coverage of its peers is expected to be largely
restricted to CDS coverage of peers that are financially constrained prior to the initi-
ation of CDS coverage. In contrast, CDS coverage of unconstrained peers is likely to
be indicative of a lender shedding credit risk for reasons other than firm credit worthi-
ness13 and can lead to improved borrowing conditions for the referenced firm (Ashcraft
and Santos, 2009; Shan et al., 2014; Guest et al., 2016).In this case, the relationship
between firm cash holdings and peer CDS coverage is ambiguous. A firm might be sub-
ject to increased predation risk if its peers experience improved borrowing conditions.
As documented by Haushalter et al. (2007) firms may strategically benefit from using
cash holdings to manage predation risk. Alternatively, unreferenced firms may also ex-
perience improved borrowing conditions from spillover effects of CDS trading on their
most relevant peers (Darst and Refayet, 2018) which would reduce the need to hold
additional cash.
To test these conjectures, I re-calculate peer CDS coverage variables separately for
the subset of the 20 (50) most similar peers that are financially constrained and for the
subset that are not. I proxy for financial constraints using the AZ-Score. In particular,
I consider a firm to be financially constrained if it has an AZ-Score that is less than or
equal to 1.8 in the year prior to CDS initiation. The remaining firms, who have a Z-Score
greater than 1.8, are defined as financially unconstrained. I then re-calculate the peer
CDS coverage variables separately for these two sub-samples. In specific, Constrained
CDS−i(20),t−1 is the weighted proportion of peer firms that are covered by CDS in year
t− 1 conditional on having an AZ-Score that is less than or equal to 1.8. Unconstrained
CDS−i(20),t−1, is calculated analogously but for the subset of peer firms that have an
AZ-Score that is above 1.8.
13For example, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) show that CDS coverage is positively associated to lender’s
tier 1 capital ratio and foreign exchange hedging.
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The results from re-estimating Equation I.2 with peer CDS coverage decomposed by
financial constraints are shown in Panel A of Table 5. To conserve space, I report only
the coefficient estimates on the peer CDS coverage variables, but include the full set of
firm and peer controls used in Table 3. I also include year and firm fixed effects and
estimate standard errors that correct for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clus-
tering. The results generally support the predatory motive. The estimated coefficients
on CDS coverage of financially constrained peers (Constrained CDS−i(20),t−1 and Con-
strained CDS−i(50),t−1) are positive and significant while the estimated coefficients on
CDS coverage of unconstrained peers are positive but only marginally significant. The
difference between these coefficients is also statistically significant for relative-to-peer
cash.
[Table 5]
As a further test of the predatory motive, I investigate the role of relative finan-
cial constraints. My conjecture is that, under the predatory hypothesis, the effects will
be strongest for firms that are less financially constrained relative to their CDS refer-
enced peers. Alternatively, if the effects are strongest for firms that are more financially
constrained than their CDS referenced peers, then the results are likely explained by
precautionary savings due to industry credit contagion.
I proceed by decomposing the peer CDS coverage variables by relative AZ-Scores.
In particular, High Relative AZ CDS−i(20),t−1 is the peer CDS coverage variable calculated
from the subset of the 20 closest peers that have an AZ-Score below that of firm i.
Low Relative AZ CDS−i(20),t−1 is computed using the remaining subset of peers – i.e., the
subset of peers that have an AZ-Score greater than firm i’s. In computing High and Low
Relative AZ CDS coverage variables, I recompute the TNIC similarity weights within
each subset of peers which I use to recompute the peer CDS coverage variables. As in
Panel A, I report only the coefficient estimates on the peer CDS coverage variables but
include the full set of firm and peer controls used in Table 3 as well as year and firm
fixed effects.
The results, shown in Panel B of Table 5, are consistent with the predatory motive.
The positive relationship between peer CDS coverage and cash is, for the most part,
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restricted to firms that are less financially constrained than their CDS referenced peers.
The effect of CDS coverage of relatively constrained peers on both cash and relative-
to-peer cash ratios is positive and significant at the one-percent level. In contrast, CDS
coverage of relatively unconstrained peers is insignificantly related to cash and relative-
to-peer cash. Moreover, the difference between the estimated coefficients, High Relative
AZ – Low Relative AZ, is positive and significant at the five-percent level.
Next, I investigate whether relative sales interact with the relationship between firm
cash holdings and peer CDS coverage. If my findings are in fact due to a predatory
motive, then I expect the results to be largely restricted to firms that have relatively high
relative to their CDS referenced peers. In contrast, the findings in Leary and Roberts
(2014) indicate that smaller, less profitable firms mimic the financial policies of their
more successful peers, but that the policies of industry leaders are not influenced by
their less successful peers. Given that own-firm CDS coverage is positively related to
cash holdings (as shown in Table A6 of this paper and in Subrahmanyam et al., 2016)
it is possible that rather than a predatory motive, my findings are explained by less
successful following their peer group leaders.
I test these conjectures in Panel C of Table 5 by decomposing peer CDS coverage
into the subset of peers that have higher sales than firm i and the subset that do not.
Consistent with the predatory motive, the positive effect of peer CDS coverage on firm
cash holdings is restricted to coverage of the subset of firms that have higher sales than
their CDS referenced peers.
The results in this sub-section support the hypothesis that the positive relationship
between firm cash reserves and peer firm CDS coverage is due to a predatory motive.
The positive relationship between cash-to-assets and relative-to-peer cash is generally
restricted to firms that are less financially constrained than their CDS referenced peers.
Not only are financially constrained firms prime targets for predation, but they have
also been shown to experience the most severe deterioration in credit quality and avail-




In this section, I investigate the extent to which strategic interactions between firms
within a peer group impact the relationship between firm cash holdings and peer firm
CDS coverage. As shown by Haushalter et al. (2007), predation risk is most relevant
when a firm’s investment opportunities are similar to its peers. Thus, under the preda-
tory motive, I expect the positive relationship between firm cash holdings and peer firm
CDS coverage to be most pronounced for firms where strategic interaction amongst
peers is strongest. I proxy for the degree to which firms interact within their peer group
using two approaches.
The first is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). For each firm i in my sample,
the HHI is equal to the sum of squared sales share across all firms located in firm i’s
peer group (including firm i) in year t. I select the size of the peer group to coincide
with the number of peers used in the peer CDS coverage variables. Thus, the standard
interpretation applies: firms with lower HHI index values reside in industries that are
more competitive relative to firms with a higher HHI index values. However, the actual
values will be inflated relative to HHI calculated at broader industry levels, e.g., 3-digit
SIC codes. With this in mind, I use the distribution of the computed HHI variables
to differentiate between concentrated and competitive peer groups. In particular, I
consider a firm to operate in a competitive peer group (Low HHI) if it’s HHI index lies
below the sample median. Moderately (Mid HHI) and highly concentrated (High HHI)
peer groups are those that lie between the 50th and 75th percentile and above the 75th
percentile respectively.14
Regardless of cash measure, Panel A of Table 6 confirms that CDS coverage of peers
has a differential impact on firm cash holdings depending on the level of competition.
In particular, the estimated coefficients on peer CDS coverage variables are positive
and significant at the one- and five-percent level for cash-to-assets and relative-to-peer
cash respectively for firms operating in the most competitive peer groups (Low HHI)
but insignificant for firms operating in less competitive peer groups. These findings
are consistent with the predatory motive since, as shown by Fresard (2010), firms that
14The results are robust to alternate cutoffs. In particular, the effects are strongest for firms operating
in the first two HHI quartiles, i.e., in the more competitive peer groups.
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hold more cash than their peers outperform in the product market, and that the effect
is most pronounced for firms that operate in more competitive industries.
[Table 6]
The second approach is meant to capture the degree of similarity between a firm’s
products and its closest peers. I incorporate this feature using two approaches. First, I
use the operating similarity measure from Mackay and Phillips (2005), Haushalter et al.
(2007) and Fresard (2010) which is defined as the absolute difference between a firm’s
ratio of net plant and equipment per employee and the median ratio of its peer group.
Lower values indicate that a firm operates near the technological core of it’s industry.
Thus, high similarity is defined by relatively smaller values. The second measure is
simply equal to the average TNIC similarity score across a firm’s peer group. Higher
values indicate that a firm operates in product market that is more similar to that of
its typical peer relative to lower values. I compute both measures using the number
of peers that coincides with the peer CDS coverage variable. In specific, I use the 20
most similar peers when regressing cash on CDS−i(20),t−1 and the 50 most similar peers
in regressions using CDS−i(50),t−1.
The results, displayed in Panel B of Table 6, are somewhat unexpected. The positive
relationship between cash and peer CDS coverage is generally strongest for firms that
are less similar to their peers. In particular, the relationship is most pronounced for
firms that operate furthest from the technological core of their industry (low operating
similarity) for both cash-to-assets and relative-to-peer cash. Similarly the effect on
relative-to-peer cash holdings is restricted to firms that are less similar to their typical
peer (low average TNIC similarity score). These results seem to suggest that firms
operating in a more unique corner of their product market space expend more resources
to ”defend their turf.”
3.4.3 Empty creditors
In this subsection I investigate whether the existence of empty creditors interacts with
the relationship between peer CDS coverage and firm cash reserves. Empty cred-
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itors have incentives to fight restructuring only if the CDS payoff is greater under
bankruptcy than under debt restructuring. This scenario arises naturally under the XR
(no-restructuring) clause where bankruptcy triggers CDS payment but debt-restructuring
does not. That is to say, lenders will have relatively stronger incentives to induce bor-
rower bankruptcy when restructuring is not covered by CDS in comparison to CDS that
are triggered by restructuring.
I investigate the impact of empty creditors by decomposing peer firm CDS cover-
age by restructuring clauses. In particular, I re-compute CDS−i(20),t−1 separately for
peers referenced by CDS contracts that exclude restructuring (XR CDS−i(20),t−1) and for
peers referenced by CDS that include restructuring clauses (AR CDS−i(20),t−1). The latter
group contains three types of contracts: cum-restructuring (CR), modified restructuring
(MM) and modified-modified restructuring (MMR). Table A2 in the appendix provides
detailed descriptions of the differences between restructuring clauses.
[Table 7]
I display the results from re-estimating Equation I.2 with peer CDS decomposed
by CDS contract type in Table 7. As with prior regressions, I include the full set of
firm and industry controls from Table 3 and cluster standard errors along the firm di-
mension. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) in Panel A suggest that the positive relation
between cash-to-asset ratios and peer CDS coverage is unrelated to the type of restruc-
turing clause. Examining the impact simultaneously, shown in Columns (5) and (6),
supports the conjecture that empty creditors are driving the relationship. In particular,
XR CDS−i(20),t−1 is significantly positive while AR CDS−i(20),t−1 is now insignificant.
In contrast, the results for relative-to-peer cash, displayed in Panel B, suggest that
the positive relation between cash-to-asset ratios and peer CDS coverage is unrelated to
the type of restructuring clause. In particular, Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) show that
the individual effects of either type of restructuring clause has a positive and significant
effect on relative-to-peer cash holdings. However, neither type of restructuring clause
dominates when examining the joint effects in Columns (5) and (6).
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4 Conclusion
Although the notional size of CDS markets is relatively small, and they cover only a
small proportion of all firms, the results documented in this paper indicate that cash
holding decisions of unreferenced firms are indeed affected by CDS coverage of their
most relevant peers. Defining peers using HP’s TNIC data, I find that firm cash holdings,
and relative-to-peer cash, are positively related to the introduction of CDS trading on
its peers. Importantly, the effects are robust to controlling for other common measures
of peer credit worthiness and financial constraints and to alternative specifications of
peer CDS coverage.
Next, I investigate whether the increase in cash holdings are due to predatory or
precautionary motives. Under a predatory motive, the positive relationship between
firm cash holdings and peer CDS coverage should be predominately due to coverage of
financially constrained peers, and particularly peers that are more constrained than the
firm in question. Indeed, I find evidence in support of a predatory motive. In particular,
the positive relationship between cash holdings and peer firm CDS coverage is generally
restricted to firms that are less financially constrained than their CDS referenced peers.
Importantly, the effect is strongest for firms operating in the most competitive peer
groups. This is consistent with a predatory motive as the strategic value of relative-to-
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6 Tables
Table 1: CDS Coverage by Year and Type
For each year in my sample period, this table presents the distribution of firms that are covered by CDS
as well as the distribution across restructuring type. CDS includes all firms that are covered by any type
of CDS contract, Non-CDS include all firms that are not covered by CDS. CR shows the number of firms
that are covered by contracts with a cum-restructuring clause, MM includes firms covered by CDS with a
modified-modified restructuring clause, MR presents the number of firms covered by CDS with a modified
restructuring clause and XR shows the number of firms covered by a CDS with an ex-restructuring clause.
Full definitions of each restructuring clause is given in Table A.6 in the appendix.
Year Non-CDS Firm CDS CR XR MR MM
2002 4482 239 225 193 239
2003 4139 324 304 267 324 224
2004 3836 437 383 344 432 297
2005 3649 497 403 401 492 335
2006 3619 489 427 431 483 344
2007 3600 497 433 445 489 345
2008 3450 503 434 457 496 344
2009 3335 473 428 447 468 331
2010 3135 446 409 444 440 317
2011 2991 409 153 407 386 111
2012 2980 406 179 406 379 122
2013 3010 402 178 402 381 85
2014 3060 389 162 389 373 119
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Table: 2 Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the main variables used throughout this paper. I present the mean, median (50th
percentile) standard deviation and the 25th and 75th percentiles. The sample includes all firms with
non-missing variables in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT/TNIC merged dataset and spans 2002 to 2015. Variable
definitions are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile
Outcome Variables
Cash 0.2371 0.2420 0.0417 0.1506 0.3643
zCash -0.0088 2.4681 -1.6295 -0.4981 1.1660
Peer CDS Coverage
CDS−i(5) 0.0875 0.1726 0.0000 0.0000 0.1443
CDS−i(20) 0.0894 0.1468 0.0000 0.0242 0.1218
CDS−i(50) 0.0899 0.1430 0.0000 0.0321 0.1194
Firm Characteristics
AZ-Score 4.4039 7.1809 1.5636 3.2782 5.8273
S&P Rating 11 3 9 10 13
BB B+ BB- BBB-
Market-to-Book 2.0962 1.7075 1.0966 1.5172 2.3990
Book Leverage 0.1814 0.2051 0.0009 0.1153 0.3000
Annualized Return 0.1230 0.6134 -0.2497 0.0328 0.3507
Dividend Indicator 0.2686 0.4433 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Cap. Exp. 0.0493 0.0557 0.0145 0.0306 0.0614
Fixed Assets 0.2416 0.2310 0.0642 0.1577 0.3481
R&D 0.0665 0.1218 0.0000 0.0049 0.0843
Size 5.4625 1.7176 4.2229 5.4672 6.6357
NWC 0.0607 0.1838 -0.0482 0.0474 0.1736
Sales 1.0726 0.7968 0.5081 0.9016 1.4444
Peer Characteristics
Cash Volatility 0.0789 0.0430 0.0435 0.0711 0.1126
Cash Holdings 0.2457 0.1907 0.0854 0.1843 0.3784
Market-to-Book 2.0503 1.0246 1.3472 1.7541 2.4428
Book Leverage 0.2001 0.1204 0.1060 0.1800 0.2718
Returns 0.1235 0.3271 -0.0541 0.1072 0.2669
Cap. Exp. 0.0501 0.0399 0.0252 0.0368 0.0608
Fixed Assets 0.2440 0.1959 0.0981 0.1658 0.3260
R&D 0.0785 0.1050 0.0005 0.0224 0.1300
Size 6.0626 1.1865 5.1157 5.9976 6.8772
NWC 0.0350 0.1172 -0.0503 0.0251 0.1198
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Table 3: The Impact of Peer Firm CDS Coverage on Cash Holdings (Baseline Estimation)
This table presents the results from regressing firm cash holdings, and z-scored cash holdings, on peer
firm CDS coverage, a set of firm level controls, peer group controls and year and firm fixed effects. The
sample consists of all firms who have non-negative cash holdings that are less than total assets and that
are in both CRSP and Compustat databases between 2002 and 2014. The dependent variables are the
ratio of firm cash holdings to total assets (Cashi,t) and cash-to-assets z-scored by peer group (zCashi,t).
Explanatory variable definitions are given in Table A.1. The −i subscript indicates peer group weighted
averages whereas the i subscript denotes firm level variables. CDS−i(5),t−1, CDS−i(20),t−1 and CDS−i(50),t−1
are the weighted proportion of firm i’s most similar 5, 20 and 50 peers that are referenced by CDS at
time t − 1. Standard errors are calculated to be robust to clustering at the firm level. Test statistics are
presented in parentheses with ***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)









Earningsi,t−1 0.0056 0.0056 0.0056 0.0380 0.0390 0.0391
(1.39) (1.40) (1.40) (0.69) (0.71) (0.71)
Earnings Vol.i,t−1 0.0138 0.0138 0.0138 -0.0591 -0.0603 -0.0608
(1.59) (1.59) (1.59) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54)
Book Leveragei,t−1 -0.1196*** -0.1196*** -0.1196*** -1.7264*** -1.7270*** -1.7262***
(11.47) (11.47) (11.47) (9.21) (9.22) (9.22)
Cap. Exp.i,t−1 -0.2746*** -0.2746*** -0.2746*** -4.3839*** -4.3844*** -4.3834***
(11.33) (11.33) (11.33) (8.78) (8.78) (8.78)
Market-to-Booki,t−1 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.1258*** 0.1258*** 0.1258***
(9.31) (9.31) (9.31) (6.10) (6.10) (6.10)
R&Di,t−1 -0.0409 -0.0407 -0.0407 -1.3463*** -1.3398*** -1.3396***
(1.42) (1.41) (1.41) (2.72) (2.71) (2.71)
Sizei,t−1 -0.0146*** -0.0145*** -0.0145*** -0.3536*** -0.3509*** -0.3508***
(4.18) (4.16) (4.16) (4.26) (4.23) (4.23)
NWCi,t−1 -0.0971*** -0.0973*** -0.0973*** -0.8308*** -0.8389*** -0.8407***
(7.95) (7.96) (7.97) (3.48) (3.51) (3.52)
Returni,t−1 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.1991*** 0.1991*** 0.1989***
(11.39) (11.39) (11.39) (7.53) (7.53) (7.52)
Dividend Indicatori,t−1 0.0055 0.0055 0.0055 0.1042 0.1045 0.1054
(1.38) (1.38) (1.39) (0.97) (0.98) (0.99)
Ratedi,t−1 -0.0049 -0.0050 -0.0050 0.0044 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.91) (0.93) (0.93) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
Peer Characteristics
Industry Cash Vol.i,t−1 0.2086*** 0.2074*** 0.2072*** -1.8646 -1.9075 -1.9133
(4.31) (4.28) (4.28) (1.38) (1.41) (1.41)
Cash Holdings−i,t−1 0.0267 0.0270 0.0270 -3.7661*** -3.7578*** -3.7577***
(1.49) (1.50) (1.50) (5.66) (5.64) (5.64)
Book Leverage−i,t−1 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.5873 0.5877 0.5872
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (1.43) (1.43) (1.43)
Cap. Exp.−i,t−1 0.1051** 0.1053** 0.1053** 2.9801** 2.9904** 2.9894**
(2.46) (2.46) (2.46) (1.97) (1.97) (1.97)
Market-to-Book−i,t−1 -0.0026* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0833** -0.0851** -0.0855**
(1.69) (1.73) (1.73) (2.14) (2.18) (2.19)
Peer R&D 0.1004*** 0.0997*** 0.0995*** -2.8977** -2.9269** -2.9333**
(2.83) (2.81) (2.80) (2.06) (2.08) (2.08)
Size−i,t−1 -0.0025 -0.0029 -0.0030* -0.1670** -0.1799** -0.1829**
(1.47) (1.64) (1.69) (2.08) (2.19) (2.22)
NWC−i,t−1 0.0083 0.0082 0.0083 -0.9666* -0.9705* -0.9694*
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (1.75) (1.76) (1.76)
Return−i,t−1 -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0064*** -0.3018*** -0.3017*** -0.3014***
(2.68) (2.68) (2.67) (4.33) (4.32) (4.32)
Observations 32,836 32,836 32,836 32,823 32,823 32,823
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.52 0.52 0.52
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Table 4: The Impact of Peer Firm CDS Coverage on Cash Holdings (Robustness)
This table presents the results from regressing firm cash holdings, and z-scored cash holdings, on peer
firm CDS coverage, a set of firm level controls and peer group controls. The sample consists of all firms
who have non-negative cash holdings that are less than total assets and that are in both CRSP and Com-
pustat databases between 2002 and 2014. The dependent variables are the ratio of firm cash holdings
to total assets (Cashi,t) and cash-to-assets z-scored by peer group (zCashi,t). Explanatory variable def-
initions are given in Table A.1. Each regression includes the full set of firm and peer group control
variables used in Table 3. The explanatory variables of interest in panels A, B and D are CDS−i(20),t−1
and CDS−i(50),t−1, and are equal to the weighted proportion of firm i’s 20 and 50 most similar peers that
are referenced by CDS at time t−1 respectively. In Panel B I re-define peer CDS coverage by constructing
a dummy variable for each of the 5 most similar peers that is equal to one if the peer is covered by a
CDS at time t−1 and zero otherwise. Standard errors are calculated to be robust to clustering at the firm
level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses with ***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent
levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)






Rating−i,t−1 -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0365*** -0.0364***
(2.28) (2.28) (3.74) (3.73)
Observations 29,694 29,694 29,693 29,693
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.58 0.58






AZ−i,t−1 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0114 0.0114
Observations 32,836 32,836 32,823 32,823
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.52 0.52
Panel C: Alternate Specification
Cashi,t zCashi,t
CDS−(1),t−1 0.0064*** 0.0072*** 0.2634*** 0.2753***









Observations 32,819 32,819 32,819 32,819
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.53 0.53






Observations 18,339 18,339 18,333 18,333
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.50 0.50
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Table 5: The Impact of Peer Firm CDS Coverage on Cash Holdings: Constrained versus
Unconstrained Peers
This table presents the results from regressing firm cash holdings (Cashi,t), and z-scored cash holdings
(zCashi,t) on a set of firm level controls, peer group controls and peer firm CDS coverage variables.
Regressions include the full set of firm and peer group control variables used in Table 3. Peer CDS
coverage variables are decomposed by peer credit constraints in Panel A and by relative credit constraints
in Panels B and C. In particular, I group the 20 most similar peers into a Constrained group and a High
Z-Score group. The Low Z-Score group contains peer firms that have an Altman Z-Score that is less than
or equal to 1.8, the Unconstrained group includes peer firms that have an Altman Z-Score that is greater
than 1.8. I then recalculate the peer CDS coverage variables separately for these two peer groups. For
instance, CDS−i(20),t−1(Z−i,t−1 ≤ 1.8) is the weighted average peer CDS coverage calculated using the set
of the 20 most similar peers that have an Altman’s Z-Score less than or equal to 1.8. Standard errors are
calculated to be robust to clustering at the firm level. Test statistics are presented in parentheses with
***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Peer Financial Constraints – Altman’s Z
Cashi,t zCashi,t
Constrained CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0392*** 1.5272***
(3.32) (2.98)
Unconstrained CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0206*** 0.5669*
(2.80) (1.87)
Constrained CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0363*** 1.3762***
(3.19) (2.83)
Unconstrained CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0193*** 0.5052*
(2.61) (1.67)
Cons. Peer CDS – Uncons. Peer CDS 0.0186 0.0171 0.9603* 0.8710*
(1.59) (1.51) (1.75) (1.66)
Observations 32,869 32,869 32,855 32,855
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.60 0.60
Panel B: Relative Financial Constraints – Altman’s Z
Cashi,t zCashi,t
High Relative AZ CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0340*** 1.1587***
(4.02) (3.38)
Low Relative AZ CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0138 0.3646
(1.55) (1.11)
High Relative AZ CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0334*** 1.0887***
(3.98) (3.24)
Low Relative AZ CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0104 0.2692
(1.17) (0.83)
High Relative AZ – Low Relative AZ 0.0203** 0.0230*** 0.7941** 0.8195**
(2.04) (2.31) (2.11) (2.23)
Observations 30,773 30,773 30,767 30,767
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.61 0.61
Panel C: Relative Sales
Cashi,t zCashi,t
High Relative Sales CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0340*** 0.7526***
(4.09) (2.87)
Low Relative Sales CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0115 0.2424
(1.24) (0.88)
High Relative Sales CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0328*** 0.7027***
(3.96) (2.73)
Low Relative Sales CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0117 0.1986
(1.27) (0.73)
High Relative Sales – Low Relative Sales 0.0225** 0.0211** 0.5102* 0.5041*
(2.13) (2.01) (1.65) (1.67)
Observations 32,832 32,832 32,818 32,818
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.59 0.59
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Table 6: Industry Characteristics and the Impact of Peer CDS Coverage on Cash Holdings
This table presents the results from regressing firm cash-to-asset ratios (Cashi,t), and z-scored cash
(zCashi,t) on a set of firm level controls, peer group controls and peer firm CDS coverage variables
interacted with industry characteristics. Each regression includes the full set of firm and peer group
control variables used in Table 3. In Panel A, I decompose the sample by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) constructed where the number of peers included coincides with the peer CDS coverage variable.
In Panel B, I decompose the sample based on industry similarity measures. The first, operating similarity,
follows Mackay and Phillips (2005) and Fresard (2010) and captures the degree to which a firm operates
at the technological core of its industry. The second is the average TNIC similarity score across a firms
peers. Standard errors are calculated to be robust to clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are presented
in parentheses with ***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels.
Panel A: Industry Concentration (HHI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cashi,t zCashi,t
Low HHI Mid HHI High HHI Low HHI Mid HHI High HHI
CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0355*** 0.0054 0.0008 0.4381** 0.2759 0.4992
(2.92) (0.33) (0.11) (2.00) (0.48) (1.37)
CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0456*** 0.0078 0.0008 0.5622** 0.2895 0.5088
(3.34) (0.47) (0.11) (2.21) (0.49) (1.40)
Panel B: Industry Similarity Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cashi,t zCashi,t
Low High Low High
Operating Similarity
CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0298*** 0.0096 0.9625*** 0.3371
(3.83) (1.32) (3.12) (0.83)
CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0294*** 0.0109 1.0149*** 0.3452
(4.12) (1.24) (3.17) (0.78)
Average TNIC Similarity Score
CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0161** 0.0253** 0.7229** 0.0032
(2.80) (2.28) (2.54) (0.02)
CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0173*** 0.0370** 0.7431** 0.0772
(3.00) (2.20) (2.64) (0.29)
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Table 7 : The Effects of Empty Creditors on the Relation Between Cash Holdings and Peer
CDS Coverage
This table presents the results from regressing firm cash holdings (Cashi,t), and z-scored cash holdings
(zCashi,t) on a set of firm level controls, peer group controls and peer firm CDS coverage variables
decomposed by restructuring clause. In particular, XR CDS−i(20),t−1 is the similarity score weighted
average number of firm i’s most similar 20 peers that are referenced by CDS that are not triggered
by debt restructuring in year t − 1. AR CDS−i(20),t−1 is calculated analogously, but for peers that are
referenced by CDS that are triggered by debt restructuring (MM, MR and CR restructuring clauses in
Table A2). Regressions include the full set of firm and peer control variables used in Table 3 with
standard errors estimated to be robust to clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses, with
***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Cashi,t
XR CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0382*** 0.0365**
(4.01) (2.01)
XR CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0429*** 0.0430**
(4.33) (2.28)
AR CDS−i(20),t−1 0.0355*** 0.0017
(3.86) (0.10)
AR CDS−i(50),t−1 0.0396*** -0.0000
(4.16) (-0.00)
Observations 32,671 32,671 32,671 32,671 32,671 32,671
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Panel B: Dependent Variable = zCashi,t
XR CDS−i(20),t−1 1.0420** 0.4995
(2.41) (0.73)
XR CDS−i(50),t−1 1.1536** 0.6036
(2.51) (0.80)
AR CDS−i(20),t−1 1.0255** 0.5644
(2.47) (0.90)
AR CDS−i(20),t−1 1.1276** 0.5702
(2.57) (0.84)
Observations 32,660 32,660 32,660 32,660 32,660 32,660




Table A1: Variable Definitions
CDS Coverage
CDS−i(m),t−1 The TNIC score weighted average number of peers that are covered by CDS in year t − 1. m denotes the
maximum number of peers included in the calculation. For example, CDS−i(20),t−1 is calculated using the
20 firms that are most similar to firm i as measured by HP’s TNIC similarity score.
CDSi,t−1 Binary variable equal to one if firm i is referenced by a CDS contract during year t − 1 and zero otherwise.
Outcome Variables
Cashi,t Firm i’s cash-to-asset ratio as of year t given by cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets.




Z-Score 1.2 × WCAP
AT
+ 1.4 × RE
AT
+ 3.3 × EBIT
AT




Earnings Earnings before interest and taxes, scaled by total assets.
Earnings Volatility The standard deviation of earnings over the prior 5 years.
Book Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets.
Cap. Ex Additions to a firm’s property, plant and equipment, scaled by total assets.
Dividend Indicator Takes a value of 1 if the firm issued cash dividends over the current year.
Fixed Assets The proportion of fixed assets (measure by net property, plant and equipment) relative total assets.
Market Leverage The sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities as a percentage of market value of assets.
Market-to-Book The ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.
NWC The difference between total current assets minus total current liabilities scaled by total assets.
R&D Research and development expenses scaled by total assets.
Rated Variable equal to one if the firm has a S&P issuer credit rating and zero otherwise.
Sales Gross sales less cash discounts, trade discounts and returned sales, scaled by total assets.
Size The natural logarithm of the total value of balance sheet assets.
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Table A2: Restructuring Clause Definitions
This table displays definitions of the four types of restructuring clauses, including the type of credit
events that qualify as a trigger and the types of obligations available for physical delivery. As of April
2009 – the implementation date of The Big Bang Protocol – new contracts are typically issued with no
restructuring clause.
Clause Definition
CR – Cum-Restructuring (Full Restructuring)
Any type of credit event qualifies as a trigger. Credit events include
bankruptcy, failure to pay and debt restructuring. Any debt obligation with
a maturity of up to 30 years can be used for physical delivery.
MM – Modified Modifed Restructuring
Any type of credit event qualifies as a trigger for delivery. Only obliga-
tions with maturities within 60 months of the CDS contract maturity are
available for physical delivery.
MR – Modified Restructuring
Any type of credit event qualifies as a trigger for delivery. Only obliga-
tions with maturities within 30 months of the CDS contract maturity are
available for physical delivery.
XR – Ex-Restructuring Restructuring is not considered a credit event – only bankruptcy or failure
to pay debt obligations qualify as credit events.
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Table A3: Industry Classifications of CDS Sample Firms
This table provides the distribution of CDS coverage across industries. The distribution is calculated from
the merged COMPUSTAT/CRSP/Markit/S&P Ratings dataset and spans 2002 to 2015.
Industry Number of CDS Sample Firms




Transportation & Public Utilities 141
Wholesale Trade 23
Retail Trade 54




Table A4: Distribution of Group Sizes
The table presents the distribution of peer group sizes for the full sample period. The only filter applied
is that firm cash holdings must be less than total assets, obviously neither variable can be missing.
Summation (average) group scores are calculated by adding (averaging) all peer similarity scores for
firm i in year t. Higher summations indicate a large number of peers, more similar peers, or both. High
average peer group score indicates that peers are highly similar, regardless of peer group size.
Peer Group Size Sum(Peer Group Scores) Average Peer Group Score
50 Most Similar Peers
Mean 22 2.74 0.1
Std Dev 20 3.44 0.06
P5 1 0.06 0.05
P25 3 0.26 0.07
P50 14 1.07 0.08
P75 50 4.17 0.11
P99 50 13.65 0.3
Largest 50 Peers in Terms of Sales
Mean 22 2.01 0.09
Std Dev 20 2.08 0.05
P5 1 0.06 0.05
P25 3 0.26 0.07
P50 14 1.06 0.08
P75 50 3.72 0.09
P99 50 7.49 0.23
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Table A5: The Impact of Peer Firm CDS Coverage on Cash Holdings: Additional
Robustness Tests
This Table presents the results from re-estimating Equation I.2 using the sample of firms that have non-
negative cash holdings that are less than total assets between 2002 and 2015. Panel A includes the subset
of firms that are covered by CDS at some point throughout the sampling period while in Panel B firms
that operate in the financial or utility sector (and firms eventually referenced by CDS) are excluded. The
dependent variables are the ratio of firm cash holdings to total assets (Cashi,t) and relative-to-peer cash
(zCashi,t). The −i subscript indicates peer group weighted averages whereas the i subscript denotes firm
level variables. CDS−i(5),t−1, CDS−i(20),t−1 and CDS−i(50),t−1 are the similarity score weighted proportion
of firm i’s most similar 5, 20 and 50 peers that are referenced by CDS at time t − 1. CDSi,t−1 is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if firm i is referenced by CDS in year t−1 and zero otherwise. Each regression
includes the full set of firm and peer control variables from Table 3 as well as year and firm fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses with
***/**/* denoting significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels. All control variables (other than book
leverage) are scaled by total assets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash zCash







CDSi,t−1 0.0075** 0.0076** 0.0075** 0.1482 0.1464 0.1470
(2.21) (2.24) (2.23) (1.37) (1.36) (1.36)
Observations 32,787 32,787 32,787 32,787 32,787 32,787
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.56 0.56 0.56







Observations 27,291 27,291 27,291 27,282 27,282 27,282
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.53 0.53 0.53
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Chapter II
The Geography of Sub-advisors and its
Impact on International Equity Mutual
Funds
Markus Broman, Michael Densmore and Pauline Shum Nolan1
1 Introduction
Since the mid 2000s, the U.S. mutual fund industry has seen a significant increase in de-
mand from investors seeking international exposure. According to the 2017 Investment
Company Institute (ICI) Factbook, net outflows from U.S. equity mutual funds totaled
$834 billion between 2006 and 2015, while international equity funds experienced net
inflows of $643 billion over the same period. More importantly, the rise in international
mandates has led to an increase in the hiring of portfolio managers overseas. Indeed,
many fund managers boast about having an international presence in their marketing
materials.2
A U.S. mutual fund family that wants to tap into local expertise aboard has sev-
eral options. First, the fund can retain in-house (i.e., belonging to the same parent
organization) subadvisors overseas, which we will refer to as an international in-house
sub-advised fund. For example, according to the SEC’s N-SAR filings, Fidelity U.S. sub-
1We are grateful for the comments of Kelley Bergsma, Melanie Cao, Raymond Kan, Fabio Moneta,
Aleksandra Rzeźnik, Ben Sand and seminar participants at York University. We also benefited from
comments received during presentations at the 2019 Financial Management Association, the 2019 CFA
Society Toronto and Hillsdale Canadian Investment Research Award Reception and the 2020 Midwestern
Finance Association. Lastly, we would like to thank Valeriya Kolobashkina for her excellent assistance in
collecting data for an earlier version.
2For example, Wilmington Multi-Manager International Fund claims that their sub-advisory team
provides investors with ”global brand name association” and ”access to local investment teams.”
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advises its international equity funds to Fidelity offices around the world. Second, the
fund can outsource to unaffiliated sub-advisors overseas, which we will refer to as an
international outsourced fund. For example, BBH International Equity currently sub-
advises its international equity fund to unaffiliated investment advisors in the U.K..3
In this paper, we study the extent to which hiring an international sub-advisor(s)
– in-house or outsourced – impacts fund performance, conditioned on a fund’s sub-
advising decision. Importantly, we focus not only on the sub-advising relationship, but
also on the geography of the sub-advisors. Using the geography of the sub-advisors, we
decompose a fund into its local (country or region) and non-local holdings, from the
perspective of its sub-advisors. Further, this decomposition helps us isolate and identify
evidence of local expertise (if any), and allows us to better understand the channels
through which the overall fund-level abnormal performance can arise. To the best of
our knowledge, this perspective is new to the literature.
Our sample consists of international and global equity funds registered for sale in
the U.S.. Therefore, all fund advisors, who either manage the fund themselves or hire
sub-advisors, are U.S. based. International funds provide worldwide exposure to stock
markets outside the U.S., while global funds provide exposure to both U.S. and inter-
national markets. The bulk of our empirical tests focus on international funds. This is
because they represent the majority of the sample (73 percent), and importantly, they
allow for a cleaner test: since all of their holdings are foreign, there is potentially an
incentive to seek local expertise abroad.
Local investors may have a local information advantage as a consequence of spe-
cialization that is facilitated by physical proximity (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009)), as well as by language and cultural similarities (Hau (2001), Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001)). Important channels of local information diffusion include local so-
cial networks and local media outlets (Bernile, Kumar and Sulaeman (2015)). How-
ever, hiring outsourced, as opposed to in-house, sub-advisors abroad presents a trade-
off, as agency conflicts from outsourcing, such as excessive risk taking and less pref-
erential treatment compared to the sub-advisors’ own brand of funds, may negatively
3It is also possible, but not tested in the current paper, that a fund hires a U.S. sub-advisor that
originated in a foreign country.
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impact fund performance (Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013), Churprinin, Massa
and, Schumacher (2015)).
That said, the negative impact of agency costs should apply to the entire fund man-
aged by the outsourced sub-advisor(s). Therefore, irrespective of agency costs, portfolio
managers with a local information advantage would be expected to perform better in
their local, compared to their non-local, holdings. By decomposing overall fund per-
formance into local- and non-local holdings-based performance, we provide a better
understanding of whether internationally sub-advised funds in-house or outsourced
are able to exploit their local expertise, and to shed light on the root cause of any ab-
normal performance. This perspective stands in contrast to Chen et al. (2013) and
Churprinin et al. (2015), both of which focus exclusively on fund-level performance.
The former compares outsourced funds to in-house funds, while the latter compares
a sub-advisor’s own brand of funds to outsourced funds that they manage in parallel
(side-by-side management).4
Following Debaere and Evans (2017), we use the SEC’s N-SAR filings to obtain a
complete list of a fund’s sub-advisors and their headquarter locations over time. This
allows us to cleanly identify all locations where a fund has access to local expertise,
and to partition a fund’s holdings into local versus non-local, from the sub-advisors’
perspective. (See Figure 1 for an illustration of the various relationships.) Approx-
imately two-thirds of the internationally sub-advised funds in our sample have more
than one sub-advisor and about 45 percent have more than two. Therefore, the N-SAR
data is well suited to studying the geography of the sub-advisors compared to the Fact-
set database used by Chuprinin et al. (2015), which only identifies one sub-advisor,
and to the Thomson Mutual Fund database used by Chen et al. (2013), which only
identifies up to two.
[Figure 1]
At the fund level, we find that the attempt to tap into local expertise via an interna-
4Chen, Hong, Jiang and Kubik (2013) examine a broad sample of U.S. equity mutual funds and show
that outsourced funds underperform in-house funds by around 50 bps per year and are more likely to
be closed following poor performance. Chuprinin, Massa and Schumacher (2015) examine a sample of
asset management firms that manage both in-house and outsourced funds. They find that in-house funds
outperform outsourced funds by approximately 85 bps per year.
48
tional sub-advisory relationship in-house or outsourced does not improve fund per-
formance. Further, funds that hire international outsourced sub-advisors significantly
underperform relative to both international in-house sub-advised funds and non-sub-
advised funds. The magnitude of this underperformance is economically meaningful.
For example, using the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC4) alpha, the underperformance is
122 basis points per year compared to non-sub-advised funds. Moreover, we show
that internationally outsourced funds underperform U.S. outsourced funds, which sug-
gests that the former do not (or are unable to) exploit their local expertise in a way
that compensates for the agency costs of outsourcing. Even international in-house sub-
advised funds, which do not suffer from agency conflicts between the advisor and the
sub-advisor, do not outperform.
In order to examine how sub-advisors perform in their local versus non-local hold-
ings, we split a fund’s holdings into three mutually exclusive sub-portfolios: i) local
country, ii) local region and iii) non-local. The local country sub-portfolio contains se-
curities that are headquartered in the same country as the fund’s sub-advisor(s), and
this is the sub-set of securities that local sub-advisors should have relative expertise.5
The local region sub-portfolio includes all securities headquartered in the same region
(U.S., Europe, or Asia-Pacific), but outside the sub-advisor’s local country. A fund’s
non-local sub-portfolio contains the holdings in regions where the fund has no physical
presence. In this construct, we expect agency costs to affect overall fund performance
in the case of outsourced funds, but not variations in sub-portfolio performance.
We find that internationally sub-advised funds, whether in-house or outsourced,
significantly underperform in their local country and local region sub-portfolios relative
to that of non-sub-advised funds. Interestingly, we continue to find strong evidence
of underperformance when we focus on within-fund variations by controlling for fund
fixed effects. For example, internationally outsourced funds underperform in their local
country sub-portfolio by 140 bps per year based on DGTW-adjusted returns and by 200
bps per year based on FFC4 alphas, relative to their non-local sub-portfolio. These
magnitudes are large enough to explain the overall fund-level results, since these funds
allocate a substantial fraction of their assets to local country and local region holdings
– on average 26 and 39 percent, respectively.
5For funds with sub-advisors in multiple countries (e.g., in the U.K. and in Hong Kong), the local
country sub-portfolio includes holdings in all those countries.
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To shed light on the underperformance in international sub-advisors’ local holdings,
we investigate two aspects of fund management: portfolio activeness and risk taking,
across and within funds. An important line of inquiry in the mutual fund literature
is whether actions by fund managers reveal skill. Existing literature has shown that a
number of actively managed funds are closet indexers as they have similar holdings to
their passive benchmark, and that these funds tend to underperform (e.g., Cremers and
Petajisto (2009), Cremers and Pareek (2016)). A related stream of literature examines
a manager’s incentive to engage in risk shifting due to agency issues in delegating fund
management (e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), Goetzmann et al (2007), Lee,
Trzcinka and Venkatesan (2019), and Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2019)). In particular,
Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) document a negative relation between risk shifting
and performance, and suggest that risk shifting is either an indication of unskilled
managers or agency conflicts.
At the overall fund level, we document a new source for the underperformance of
outsourced funds: we find that internationally outsourced funds, and to a lesser ex-
tent U.S. outsourced funds, have significantly lower active share and greater risk shift-
ing. This appears consistent with the higher agency costs associated with outsourcing.
However, these fund-level results hide significant within-fund variations. Specifically,
we find that internationally outsourced funds have lower active share and higher risk
shifting in their local, compared to their non-local, holdings. In fact, lower active share
is also found among international in-house sub-advised funds.
Taking advantage of our data where 40% of funds have multiple sub-advisors (57%
when there is at least one international outsourced sub-advisor), we investigate whether
fund underperformance is related to entrenchment (in single sub-advised funds) or co-
ordination problems (in multiple sub-advised funds). We find evidence of the former:
funds outsourced to a single international sub-advisor underperform but at the same
time, they are less likely to be terminated following poor performance compared to
multiple sub-advised funds.
The decision by a fund family to outsource fund management to a third party is
endogenous. One possibility for the continued use of international sub-advisors, par-
ticularly outsourced ones, is that the U.S. based fund could not have obtained better
outcomes by managing the fund itself (Debaere and Evans (2017) and Massa and Schu-
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macher (2019)). Endogenizing the sub-advising decision is beyond the scope of this
paper, except for a reversal causality test to see whether poor past performance leads
to international outsourcing (it does not).
To summarize, we make the following contributions to the existing literature. First,
we focus on the geography of the sub-advisors of international/global equity mutual
funds and how it impacts fund performance. In order to do so properly, we collect
the full list of sub-advisors (if any) and their locations for each fund, as well as the
changes in the sub-advising relationships over time. Second, by taking the geography
of the sub-advisors into account, we show that funds that outsource to international
sub-advisors underperform funds that outsource to U.S. sub-advisors. Third, using the
location data, we decompose a fund into its sub-advisor(s)’ local and non-local hold-
ings. We provide insights into the relative performance of and manager behaviours in
these sub-portfolios, both within a fund and against non-sub-advised funds. Fourth, we
document a new channel of underperformance for outsourced funds in terms of their
activeness and risk-shifting. In fact, some of these behaviours are also found amongst
international in-house sub-advisors. Taken together, these within-fund differences in
performance and behaviours are difficult to reconcile with agency costs alone, as long
as the sub-advisors are responsible for the whole portfolio. Finally, our results on sin-
gle versus multiple sub-advised funds suggest that the incentive mechanism inherent
in multiple sub-advised funds can alleviate some of the agency costs of outsourcing by
reducing entrenchment, which is new to the literature.
2 Data and variable definitions
Our sample consists of equity mutual funds with an international or global investment
mandate that are sold in the U.S., as identified by Morningstar Direct. We include funds
that belong to one of the following Morningstar categories: foreign large-value, foreign
large-blend, foreign large-growth and world large stock. Funds in the foreign/world
small cap categories are eliminated, since we do not have benchmark holdings for these
funds (they represent 11 percent of the raw sample). In the asset management industry,
international/foreign refers to funds that invest across developed markets outside of the
U.S., whereas global/world refers to funds that invest worldwide including the U.S..
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Thus, our sample does not include any single-country or regional funds. We further
screen for and delete sector funds, balanced funds, long-short funds, fund-of-funds and
funds that primarily use ETFs/futures contracts. Our sample period is from January
2000 to December 2014.
We collect data on fund returns and characteristics from Morningstar Direct and
the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database (henceforth CRSP MFDB). We
link the two databases by CUSIP and TICKER. To verify the accuracy of the matches, we
compare fund names and inception dates (and liquidation dates, if applicable) between
the two databases. Following Berk and Van Binsbergen (2014) and Pastor, Stambaugh
and Taylor (2015), we reconcile the data on fund returns and assets under manage-
ment (AUM) between Morningstar Direct and CRSP MFDB.6 Data on expense ratios are
obtained from CRSP MFDB.
Following Kacperczyk Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2014), we address the poten-
tial bias resulting from a fund’s incubation period by removing observations prior to
its inception date, and we only include a fund in our final sample once it passes the
$15 million in AUM. Further, we exclude any fund that holds less than 70 percent of
its assets in equities (Amihud and Goyenko (2013)). The average fund in our sample
holds more than 95 percent in equities at any given point in time.
2.1 Defining sub-advisory relationships
We use the form N-SAR filed with the SEC to obtain each fund’s complete list of sub-
advisors and their locations through time. This form is a semi-annual report filed by
registered investment companies, and it includes comprehensive details on fund man-
agement and sub-advisory relationships. For each fund in our sample, we extract the
reporting period, registrant name (Q1), the full list of sub-advisor names (Q8A) and
their locations (Q8D). If no sub-advisory contract exists, then the advisor is solely re-
sponsible for managing the fund.7 For sub-advised funds, the advisor typically acts as a
manager of the managers and is responsible for determining how the fund’s assets are
spread among the sub-advisors.
6Additional details are provided in the Internet Appendix, Sections IA-1 and IA-2.
7In all but two cases, the advisor is the asset management arm of the registrant in our sample.
52
By definition, a sub-advisor’s responsibilities include research and asset manage-
ment. As such, we use the sub-advisor’s headquarters location to measure international
presence. We classify each fund as either outsourced or in-house using Bloomberg,
supplemented with web queries. We check historical affiliations between the advisor
and the sub-advisors, carefully tracing a firm’s parent (or subsidiaries) all the way up
(or down) the corporate ladder. Similar to Chen et al. (2013), we classify a fund as
outsourced if at least one sub-advisor is unrelated to the fund complex.
2.2 Performance measures
We measure fund performance relative to factor models and style benchmarks. First,
for factor models, we include the CAPM, the 3-factor Fama and French (FF3), and the
4-factor Fama-French-Carhart (FFC4). We use a rolling 36-month window to estimate
the factor loadings. To construct appropriate factors for our international/global equity
funds, we use country-level factors provided by AQR and weigh each country by each
fund’s actual country weight based on its reported holdings at t− 1.8 This methodology
is consistent with Fama and French (2012, 2017) and Hollstein (2020), who show
that local factors are superior to global factors that weigh each country by its market
capitalization at t − 1. Our results remain robust to using global factors.
Second, we evaluate fund performance relative to style benchmarks, since the aver-
age retail investor has been shown to rely on Morningstar style benchmarks to indirectly
adjust for risk (Evans and Sun (2018), Chakraborty et al. (2020)). Fund managers
themselves are often evaluated against style benchmarks (Evans et al. (2020)), which
gives them an incentive to maximize this measure. We define the benchmark-adjusted
return as the fund’s gross return minus the style benchmark return. This effectively
assumes that the beta on the benchmark is equal to one. We also consider benchmark-
adjusted alphas, where the beta with respect to the benchmark is estimated using the
prior 36 months of data.
8Said differently, local factors are assigned to each stock in a fund’s portfolio. The stock-level factors
are then aggregated to the fund-level by taking a weighted average across the stocks in a fund’s portfolio
based on the weight invested at t − 1. AQR’s risk factors are only available for developed markets.
For emerging markets (tax havens) we use the corresponding regional (global) factors. The median
proportion invested in emerging markets and tax havens is relatively low, at around 4 percent.
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2.3 Fund benchmarks and underlying portfolio holdings
To select the style benchmark for each fund, we use the following procedure. First,
we classify each fund into one of four broad categories: i) All Country World Index
(MSCI ACWI) (developed and emerging markets), ii) MSCI WORLD (developed mar-
kets), iii) MSCI ACWI ex. U.S., or iv) MSCI WORLD ex. U.S.. We select the primary
benchmark with the lowest median active share (i.e., with the closest portfolio overlap)
as suggested by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Primary benchmarks are time-invariant
for most funds. The only exception is if a fund has changed its strategy from global to
international, or vice-versa. To identify these cases, we look for changes in the Morn-
ingstar Category variable and manually confirm these changes by checking the fund’s
historical prospectus. We then select the benchmark with the lowest active share.
Second, we determine a fund’s style. We use Morningstar style box classifications,
which are updated monthly based on the prior three years of fund holdings and account
for style tilts (value, blend, or growth). We use the four broad benchmarks above
together with the Morningstar style tilts to select the style benchmark for each fund. In
total we have twelve style benchmarks corresponding to twelve MSCI indices.9 Their
returns are used in the fund-level performance analysis.
Many of our empirical tests require data on a fund’s benchmark holdings. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have MSCI index constituent data, and there are no corresponding
index funds or ETFs with sufficiently long histories. Thus, we use Vanguard index
funds10 tracking the four broad benchmarks above for the holdings. We collect this
data from Morningstar Direct because it provides reliable and complete holdings data
on a quarterly basis. Specifically, for international equity funds (i.e., ex. U.S.), we use
the Vanguard Total International Stock Index Fund (developed and emerging markets)
and the Vanguard Developed Markets Index Fund (exclude emerging markets). For
global equity funds, we use the Vanguard Total World Stock Index Fund. This fund is,
however, only available after July 2008. Prior to this date, we construct the index us-
ing three constituent funds that cover developed (Vanguard Developed Markets Index
9The twelve (4×3) indices we use for style benchmark returns are: MSCI ACWI Value, MSCI ACWI
Growth, MSCI ACWI Blend, MSCI WORLD Value, MSCI WORLD Growth, MSCI WORLD Blend, MSCI
ACWI ex. U.S. Value, MSCI ACWI ex. U.S. Growth, MSCI ACWI ex. U.S. Blend, MSCI WORLD ex. U.S.
Value, MSCI WORLD ex. U.S. Growth and MSCI WORLD ex. U.S. Blend.
10We use Vanguard funds since they have the longest time-series of historical holdings.
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Fund), emerging (Vanguard Emerging Markets Stock Index Fund) and the U.S. equity
markets (Vanguards Total Stock Market Index Fund). To combine the three funds into
one global benchmark, we start by computing the weights in July 2008 based on Van-
guard Total World Stock Index Fund. We then back-fill the weights by assuming that
any changes over time are solely driven by return differences. This gives us a com-
plete time-series of holdings for the ACWI benchmark from January 2000 to December
2014. The benchmark for WORLD is the same, except that we exclude all stocks that
are headquartered in emerging markets.
We obtain the data on underlying stock returns and characteristics from CRSP (US
firms), Compustat/North America (Canadian firms) and Compustat/Global (non-US
firms).11 We convert international stock prices to U.S. dollars using the exchange rates
from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s H.10 release.12 Our final sample consists of 489
distinct funds holding 13,558 unique securities. The benchmark funds hold 12,526
unique securities. The total number of unique securities held by our sample funds
and/or their benchmark funds is 16,340.
2.4 Measures of active fund management
Our first measure is active share (Cremers and Petajisto (2009)), which is based on
deviations of a fund’s actual portfolio weights from those of its benchmark. Since the
Vanguard funds that serve as our benchmarks have no style tilt, we include style fixed
effects in the analysis to help account for the influence of style. The results remain
robust when we compute active share relative to a subset of the benchmark holdings
with similar style characteristics. Our second measure of activeness is tracking error,
which is the standard deviation of the difference between the fund’s gross return and
its benchmark return, estimated over a rolling 24-month window.
We use risk shifting based on tracking error as another predictor of fund perfor-
mance. Following Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) and Lee, Trzcinka and Venkatesan
(2019), we define risk shifting as the difference between the tracking error on a hy-
11As shown by Chaieb, Langlois and Scaillet (2020), the data quality in Compustat Global is superior
to Datastream. We follow the data cleaning steps provided in their Appendix B.
12For exchange-rates not covered by H.10, we use WM/Reuters closing mid-quote rates from Datas-
tream.
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pothetical portfolio consisting of the securities currently held and the actual tracking
error based on realized returns. The hypothetical holdings-based tracking error uses the
most recently disclosed portfolio weights (e.g., as of December 2010) with returns mea-
sured over the preceding 24 months (e.g. from January 2009 to December 2010). As
shown by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011), this measure of risk shifting is the strongest
predictor of future performance.
2.5 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we report for each year the number of funds, the proportion of funds that are
managed by international sub-advisors and the proportion of funds that are in-house or
outsourced. The total number of global/international funds has steadily increased over
our sample period. The fraction of funds that are sub-advised increases until around
2009, after which it remains relatively stable at around 52 percent. Similarly, the pro-
portion of funds that outsource sub-advisory duties peaks in 2009 at just under 37 per-
cent, followed by a modest decline to about 32 percent by the end of 2014. Although
our sample of funds is significantly different from those used in Chen et al. (2013) and
Chuprinin et al. (2015) in terms of the investment mandate (global/international) and
investor clientele (U.S. investors), the overall proportion of outsourced funds remains
comparable.
[Table 1]
Table 2 reports univariate differences amongst different sub-advisory arrangements.
Columns (1) and (2) show that funds that hire international sub-advisors tend to
be older, smaller, more expensive and have a lower proportion of AUM in institu-
tional share classes, compared to non-sub-advised funds. Moreover, internationally
sub-advised funds are significantly less active based on both active share and tracking
error. In terms of fund performance, there are no statistically significant differences in
the unconditional means.
Comparing column (3) to column (4), shows that internationally outsourced funds
underperform significantly on all performance metrics relative to funds with in-house
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international sub-advisors. They also have significantly lower active share but signifi-
cantly lower risk shifting. These results offer provisional support of the higher agency
costs associated with outsourcing.
If international-based sub-advisors possess a local information advantage, and if
the performance benefit of this advantage exceeds the agency costs associated with
outsourcing, then internationally outsourced funds should outperform funds that out-
source to U.S. sub-advisors. However, the results in column (8) provide some tentative
evidence that internationally outsourced funds actually underperform U.S. outsourced
funds, although the difference is only marginally significant. Chen et al. (2013) finds
that outsourced funds tend to be smaller and come from smaller fund families. Our
findings indicate that internationally outsourced funds are in fact significantly larger
(by a factor of three), older, less expensive and they tend to come from larger fund
families, relative to funds outsourced to U.S. sub-advisors.
[Table 2]
3 Empirical results
Here we investigate the consequences of international sub-advising for fund perfor-
mance and activeness first at the fund-level, and then separately for the fund’s local
and non-local holdings.
3.1 Fund-level performance
To study the impact of sub-advisor locations and affiliations on fund performance, we
regress fund i’s risk-adjusted return in month t on lagged sub-advisory dummies, con-
trol variables and fixed effects:
PERFi,t = β0INT ’L SAi,t−1 + γ0US SAi,t−1 + c0Controlsi,t−1 + αt + αs,t−1 + εi,t (II.1)
57
PERFi,t = β1INT ’L IN-Hi,t−1 + β2INT ’L OUTS.i,t−1 + γ1US IN-Hi,t−1 + γ2US OUTS.i,t−1
+ c1Controlsi,t−1 + αt + αs,t−1 + εi,t (II.2)
where INT ’L OUTSi,t−1 is equal to one if fund i has at least one outsourced sub-
advisor headquartered abroad at t − 1 and zero otherwise, INT ’L IN-Hi,t−1 is equal to
one if the fund has at least one in-house sub-advisor headquartered abroad and zero
otherwise. US OUTSi,t−1 and US IN-Hi,t−1 are constructed to be mutually exclusive from
the international sub-advisor dummies. All specifications include time fixed effects (αt)
to account for time trends in fund performance, and Morningstar style fixed effects
(αs,t−1) to account for style-specific differences in performance.
Our conjecture is that funds managed by international sub-advisors have a local
information advantage β > 0, β1 > 0 and β2 > 0). If the costs of outsourcing exceed the
potential benefits of having access to local information, then internationally outsourced
funds are expected to underperform international in-house sub-advised funds β1 −
β2 > 0). Moreover, if the benefits of a local information advantage exceed outsourcing
costs, then internationally outsourced funds are expected to outperform relative to U.S.
outsourced funds β2 − γ2 > 0).
We include a standard set of lagged control variables: the net expense ratio from
CRSP, the cumulative gross return over the preceding 12-months, and net fund flows
over the preceding 12-months and the natural logarithm of fund size. In addition, we
include the percentage of assets in institutional share-classes to control for the possi-
bility that more sophisticated investors are better at monitoring the fund manager. We
also control for the liquidity of fund holdings relative to its benchmark, as measured by
the natural log of the dollar-weighted monthly Amihud’s illiquidity for the fund’s hold-
ings minus the corresponding weighted average for the fund’s benchmark holdings.
Additional details on variable construction can be found in Table A-1 in the Appendix.
Standard errors are clustered by style × time to account for any residual dependence
among funds in the same style at a given point in time. To minimize the impact of




We focus our discussion on the results from the sample of funds with an international
(i.e., ex. U.S.) mandate. This is arguably the more interesting subset of funds and
accounts for the majority of the sample (73 percent). They are more popular than
globally mandated funds because fund companies already offer a wide array of U.S.
equity funds. Importantly, they present a cleaner test of the local information advantage
hypothesis. Since the U.S. equities make up roughly half of the global stock market by
capitalization, global funds that are managed by a U.S.-based firm may have a home
advantage in the U.S. market. Nonetheless, our main findings are robust to using the
full sample of international and global funds.
The regression results for Equation II.1 in Table 3 – columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and
(9) – provide no evidence that internationally sub-advised funds outperform non-sub-
advised funds. This contradicts the idea that local sub-advisors exploit local information
in a manner that boosts fund performance.
[Table 3]
The results from estimating Equation (2) are provided in columns (2), (4), (6),
(8) and (10). Here, we find that internationally outsourced funds underperform funds
that are managed by international in-house sub-advisors. This difference is statistically
significant and ranges from 77 and 131 bps per year (6.4 and 10.9 bps per month).
Moreover, this difference is entirely driven by the poor performance of internationally
outsourced funds: they underperform non-sub-advised funds by between 74 bps (CAPM
alpha) and 124 bps per year (FF3 alpha), while international in-house sub-advised
funds do not have significantly different performance relative to non-sub-advised funds.
Using the geography of the sub-advisors, we show that within the context of the
international equity mandate, funds with international outsourced sub-advisors do not
outperform funds with U.S. outsourced sub-advisors, despite the possibility of a local
information advantage. The performance differential is negative in all cases (between
0.23 and 0.60 percent annualized) and significant at the 10 percent significance level




3.2.1 Decomposing fund performance
The existing literature on outsourcing in fund management suggests that the poor per-
formance of outsourced funds is to a large extent explained by agency costs (Chen et al.
(2013) and Chuprinin (2015)). To the extent that the sub-advisor (or the sub-advisors
together, if there is more than one) manage the entire portfolio, agency costs should
affect the entire portfolio.14 Irrespective of agency costs, managers that have a local
information advantage are expected to perform better in their local holdings relative to
their non-local holdings.
To explore this hypothesis, we decompose the fund-level portfolio into three mutu-
ally exclusive sub-portfolios: i) local own country, ii) local own region (excluding own
country), and iii) non-local holdings. A fund’s local own country sub-portfolio con-
tains all securities that are headquartered in the same country as its sub-advisors. For
funds with sub-advisors in multiple countries, the local country sub-portfolio includes
holdings in all those countries. For instance, if a fund has one sub-advisor in the U.K.
and another in Hong Kong, then its local country portfolio includes the U.K. and Hong
Kong. Sub-advisors may also have a regional information advantage. A sub-advisor
in the U.K. (Hong Kong) might be more informed about European (Asian) securities
than a sub-advisor in the U.S.. We take this into account by constructing a local region
sub-portfolio that includes all securities headquartered in the same region (North Amer-
ica, Europe, Asia-Pacific), but outside the countries where the sub-advisors are located.
Lastly, a fund’s non-local sub-portfolio contains all securities located in regions where it
has no physical sub-advisory presence. Funds without international sub-advisors have
only non-local holdings by definition, since the advisors/sub-advisors are all U.S. based.
13In unreported results, we find that the performance differences are in fact negative and significant
at the 5 percent level for all five measures if we use instead the full sample of international and global
funds. Although not the focus of our study, this difference is largely explained by the outperformance of
U.S. outsourced funds with a global mandate.
14Although there may be instances where the international sub-advisors only manage their local hold-
ings, and the fund advisor or its U.S. sub-advisors manage the non-local holdings. Unfortunately, the
N-SAR filings do not provide this level of information.
60
We use quarterly fund holdings from Morningstar Direct to construct buy-and-hold
portfolio returns. For the three types of sub-portfolios, we compute international risk
factors using the same procedure as before. That is, we use country-level Fama-French-
Carhart factors provided by AQR and weigh each country in the sub-portfolio of a given
fund i by its actual country weight based on its reported holdings at t− 1. Our country-
weighted methodology extends the standard models in the prior literature, where the
performance of U.S. equity funds is adjusted for risk exposure to U.S. risk factors. As
an example, for a U.K. sub-advisor, the local region includes other European stocks. We
therefore weigh each of the 14 developed markets in Europe (ex. U.K.) by the fund’s
actual weight in each market at t − 1.
Although the sub-portfolio risk-adjusted returns provide a clean decomposition of
the fund-level abnormal returns, a potential drawback is that we are restricting the
factor loadings for each sub-portfolio to be the same as their fund-level counterparts.
It is possible that managers take more (or less) systematic risk in their local hold-
ings compared to their non-local holdings. To address this concern, we turn to the
characteristic-based benchmarks by Daniel, Grindblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997).
We extend their benchmarking approach to international markets, with a few modifica-
tions. Specifically, our benchmarks are defined by region to maintain consistency with
the existing literature on international asset pricing (e.g., Asness, Moskowitz and Ped-
ersen (2013), Fama and French (2017)).15 The DGTW-adjusted sub-portfolio returns
are then computed as the dollar-weighted average of the difference between the actual
holdings returns and the characteristic-benchmark returns.
3.2.2 Results
We estimate Equations II.1 and II.2 at the fund (i)-sub-portfolio (k)-month (t) level.
For each fund-month, there are up to three observations, one for each sub-portfolio. To
15We make a few additional modifications. First, we use the Fama-French 48 industries for computing
industry-adjusted B/M ratios. Second, for international markets we compute breakpoints for large stocks
based on the 55th percentile by region (roughly equivalent to using NYSE stocks), similar to Fama and
French (2017). Third, for the benchmark portfolios, we only include primary issues and stocks traded on
the main exchanges in each country (see e.g., Chaieb, Langlois, and Scaillet (2020); Bessembinder et al.
(2020)). Fourth, to ensure that we have a similar number of stocks in the benchmark portfolios across
regions, we construct 5×5×5 = 125 benchmark portfolios on size, B/M and momentum for North Amer-
ica and Developed Europe; for Asia-Pacific ex Japan and Japan we use instead 4×4×4 = 64 benchmark
portfolios.
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disentangle the performance of local from non-local holdings, we focus on two types
of comparisons. First, we compare the local sub-portfolio performance of internation-
ally sub-advised funds with the non-local performance of non-sub-advised funds (the
omitted group). Second, we compare the local sub-portfolio with the non-local sub-
portfolio among internationally sub-advised funds by controlling for fund fixed effects.
In this case, each fund has its own omitted group which corresponds to the average
performance across all its sub-portfolios. To account for the correlation in residuals
across the sub-portfolios of a given fund, we cluster standard errors by fund.
The results in Table 4, columns (1) and (4), show that internationally sub-advised
funds underperform in their local country sub-portfolios, suggesting that they are un-
able to exploit their most immediate local information. Next, in columns (2), (3),
(5) and (6), we decompose these results further based on sub-advisor affiliation (out-
sourced vs. in-house). Whether we consider the DGTW-adjusted returns or the FFC4
alphas, we find very strong evidence of underperformance in the local country holdings
of both international outsourced and in-house funds. For example, the local country
sub-portfolios underperform by 158 bps per year using the DGTW measure for inter-
national outsourced sub-advisors, and by 150 bps per year for international in-house
sub-advisors, relative to non-sub-advised funds (the omitted group, where the advisor
is based in the U.S.). The results remain strong, particularly for internationally out-
sourced funds, if we control for fund fixed effects in order to focus on within fund
variations, as shown in columns (3) and (6). In column (3), internationally outsourced
funds underperform by 138 bps per year in their local country sub-portfolios relative to
their non-local counterparts. The results in column (6) based on the FFC4 alphas are
even stronger, at 204 bps per year.16
[Table 4]
Our evidence clearly indicates that internationally sub-advised funds – in-house or
outsourced – do not outperform in their local holdings. Further, the magnitudes are
large enough to explain the overall fund-level underperformance of internationally out-
sourced funds since these funds allocate a substantial fraction of their assets to local
16Similar results are obtained for the full sample of funds (global and international), see Table IA-1 in
the Internet Appendix.
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own country or own region holdings – 26 and 39 percent on average, respectively.
Funds managed by international in-house sub-advisors also show no evidence of out-
performance in local holdings. These results run counter to the hypothesis that local
investors should outperform in their local holdings relative to their non-local holdings
due to an information advantage, irrespective of agency costs. In the next section, we
show that the underperformance can, at least in part, be explained by differences in
sub-portfolio activeness and risk shifting.
3.3 Active fund management
An active line of inquiry in the mutual fund literature is whether actions by managers
reveal the existence of skilled asset management. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) docu-
ment that active share and tracking error are positively related to future risk-adjusted
fund performance. Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) show that the funds that engage
in positive risk shifting perform abnormally poorly in the future.
We explore differences in active fund management ”activeness” and risk shifting
between funds that should have a local information advantage and those that do not.
Our conjecture is that funds with such an advantage are more active and are less likely
to engage in significant risk shifting, particularly in their local holdings, a necessary
condition for obtaining higher risk-adjusted performance.
3.3.1 Fund-level activeness and risk shifting
We start by confirming the existence of a positive (negative) and significant relationship
between active share (risk shifting) and future fund performance in our sample. We do
not want to take these relationships for granted, because recent evidence by Jones and
Mo (2019) suggests that the out-of-sample performance of mutual fund predictors has
declined substantially in the U.S., which they link to the increase in arbitrage capital
and the size of the mutual fund industry.
The regression specification is the same as Equation II.1, except that we drop the
sub-advisory dummies and we include either style or fund fixed effects. Results, re-
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ported in Table IA-2 in the Internet Appendix, show that active share and tracking error
both positively predict future performance at the one percent level in the cross-section
(when controlling for style and time fixed). Moreover, within fund variations in fu-
ture performance are also significantly negatively predicted by risk shifting at the one
percent level. Next, we investigate whether the degree of activeness or risk shifting
varies across sub-advising status. We use Equation (2) and replace fund performance
with a measure of activeness or risk shifting. To account for the persistence in some
of these measures over time (e.g., active share), we cluster standard errors by fund.
The results indicate that relative to non-sub-advised funds, active share is significantly
lower for both internationally outsourced and U.S. outsourced funds by 4.6 percent
and 2.7 percent, respectively. Similarly, risk shifting is significantly higher for inter-
nationally outsourced funds by about 0.11 percent, corresponding to almost twice the
unconditional mean. Tracking error is insignificantly related to sub-advising status.
Overall, these results appear consistent with the hypothesis of higher agency costs
associated with outsourcing documented in previous studies. However, these fund-
level results hide significant within-fund variations that cannot be fully explained by
standard agency cost arguments, as we explain below.
[Table 5]
3.3.2 Sub-portfolio activeness and risk shifting
In this section, we compute active share separately for each sub-portfolio (local country,
local region and non-local), with weights summing to 100 percent at the fund (i)-sub-
portfolio (k)-month (t) level. Sub-portfolio tracking error is defined as the standard
deviation of the return differences between the buy-and-hold sub-portfolio return and
the buy-and-hold benchmark return.
To measure risk shifting at the sub-portfolio level, we use the difference between the
hypothetical sub-portfolio tracking error with the end-of-quarter portfolio weights and
the actual sub-portfolio tracking error based on buy-and-hold returns. The hypothetical
tracking error uses the most recently disclosed portfolio weights with returns measured
over the preceding 24-month window as suggested by Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011).
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We estimate Equations II.1 and II.2 with active share, tracking error, or risk shifting
as the dependent variable. We include time fixed effects in all specifications, and either
style or fund fixed effects. To account for the correlation in residuals within a fund, we
cluster standard errors by fund.
We hypothesize that internationally sub-advised funds with a local information ad-
vantage should be more active and less prone to risk shifting in their local holdings.
Our results, for the most part, do not support this conjecture. Columns (1), (4), (7)
and (10) in Table 6 show that local country active share of internationally sub-advised
funds are both significantly lower than non-local active share of non-sub-advised funds,
while tracking error and risk shifting are significantly higher.17
[Table 6]
Next, we explore the differences among sub-advised funds based on their affilia-
tion: in-house vs. outsourced. Both international in-house and outsourced funds are
significantly less active in their local country and region sub-portfolios relative to non-
sub-advised funds (the omitted group of ”No SA”). For example, for internationally
outsourced funds, active share is lower by 14.3 and 9.5 percent points (unconditional
mean = 75.9 percent), and risk shifting is higher by 0.30 percent and 0.40 percent
points (unconditional mean = 0.17 percent), respectively. If we focus on within-fund
variations by including fund fixed effects, we continue to find that internationally out-
sourced funds have significantly lower active share (by 12.6) and significantly higher
risk shifting (by 0.32 percent) in their local country sub-portfolio compared to their
non-local sub-portfolio. Similar results are obtained for the local region sub-portfolio.18
For international in-house sub-advised funds, the main difference is that risk shift-
ing is not significantly different for their local versus non-local holdings in terms of
within-fund variations. This may help explain why only internationally outsourced
funds underperform at the fund level, but international in-house sub-advised funds do
not.
17Cremers and Petajisto (2009) suggest that funds with lower than average active share and higher
than average tracking errors focus on factor bets.
18This set of results is not sensitive to the inclusion of funds with a global mandate. See Table IA-3 in
the Internet Appendix.
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Overall, the lower activeness and greater risk shifting of internationally outsourced
funds offer some explanation for their relatively poor performance. Importantly, to the
extent that sub-advisors manage the entire portfolio, our findings are not explained by
agency costs alone because we would expect lower activeness and risk-shifting across
the entire portfolio.
3.4 Multiple sub-advised funds: Peer incentives
Roughly 40 percent of our sample of sub-advised funds have multiple sub-advisors.
This proportion rises to 57 percent on average for internationally outsourced funds.
Peer monitoring and joint monetary incentives in team-based managerial structures
can, in theory, be an effective tool for mitigating agency costs; see for example, Ma et
al. (1988), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Acemoglu et al. (2008). Multi-manager
fund structures can also be an effective tool for reducing the likelihood of extreme and
risky decisions through diversification of opinions (Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011)), for
offsetting an individual manager’s overconfidence (Fedyk, Patel and Sarkissian (2020))
and for improving overall fund performance (Patel and Sarkissian (2017)). We contend
that the underperformance of internationally outsourced funds is explained by single
sub-advised (single SA) funds having an entrenched sub-advisor, resulting in higher
agency costs. In contrast, we expect multiple sub-advised (multi SA) funds to have
lower agency costs due to better effort coordination through peer pressure and moni-
toring, and a higher likelihood of termination in the event of poor performance.
To test this hypothesis, we start by re-estimating the fund-level performance regres-
sions (Equation (2)) for two specifications. In the first, we drop multi SA funds from the
sample. In the second, we drop single SA funds. The results, found in Table 7, indicate
that the underperformance of internationally outsourced funds is worse among single
SA funds compared to multi SA funds. We also confirm that outsourced funds with
a single international sub-advisor underperform in their local holdings, are generally




The lack of underperformance among multi SA funds could be explained by single
SA funds having an entrenched sub-advisor leading to higher agency costs. An impor-
tant implication of entrenchment is that sub-advisors in single SA funds are less likely
to be fired for poor performance compared to their counterparts in multi SA funds. We
investigate this hypothesis by estimating logistic regressions of sub-advisor termination
on prior performance and fixed effects:
Pr(Tj,i,t = 1) = F (a0 + b1Perf≥0j,i,[t−1,t−36]SingleSAi,t + b2Perf<0j,i,[t−1,t−36]SingleSAi,t
(II.3)
+ b3Perf≥0j,i,[t−1,t−36]MultiSAi,t + b4Perfj, i, [t − 1, t − 36]
<0
MultiSAi,t
+ αt + αs,t−1)
where Tj,i,t equals one if sub-advisor j employed by fund i is terminated at time t,
and F (.) is the logistic function. We infer a termination event as the last observation
when a given sub-advisor appears on the semi-annual N-SAR filing.19 Our sample con-
sists of 601 unique termination events, out of which 50 are for international outsourced
sub-advisors, 417 are for U.S. outsourced sub-advisors and the remaining cases are for
the termination of in-house sub-advisors.
The explanatory variable of interest is past performance, Perf , which corresponds
to the average monthly performance over the prior 36 months. This measure is sub-
advisor specific in the sense that we only include time-periods during which a sub-
advisor has been employed by fund i. Evans et al. (2020) document that fund man-
agers are evaluated based on their performance relative to pure (index) benchmarks,
peer (funds in a similar style) benchmarks, or both. We therefore assess past per-
formance using benchmark-adjusted returns or the equal-weighted peer benchmark-
adjusted returns. We define the set of peers based on Morningstar categories.20 We
19To qualify as a termination event, we impose the following three requirements. First, the last obser-
vation of a sub-advisor must be at least 12 months before the fund’s termination (liquidation/merger)
date (if applicable), or the end date of the sample period (December 2014). This is to minimize the pos-
sibility that we are picking up events related to fund closures. Second, the sub-advisor must have been
employed by the fund for at least 12 months before termination. Third, we include interim terminations
(i.e., termination followed by a re-hiring) if the sub-advisor is dropped from the N-SAR filings, but it
reappears at least 18 months later.
20We require a minimum of 30 funds per category, which is the typical size of peer group for U.S.
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include category fixed effects to account for category-specific differences in termina-
tion probabilities, and cluster standard errors by fund.
To ease the interpretation of results, we report average marginal effects and their
associated t-stats instead of the raw coefficient estimates in Table 8. The results con-
firm our conjecture: poor performance is more likely to lead to termination in multi SA
funds than it is in single SA funds. This is especially true for international outsourced
sub-advisors (column (2)), where the average marginal effect of a one std. dev. de-
crease in performance – when performance is negative – is associated with a 7.2 to
7.8 percentage point increase in the termination probability for multi SA funds. In
contrast, poor performance is insignificantly related to the termination probability for
internationally outsourced sub-advisors in single SA funds. A similar pattern is evident
for U.S. outsourced funds, but not among in-house funds where termination seems to
be unaffected by past performance.21
[Table 8]
In summary, these results are consistent with the conjecture that single SA funds
with an outsourced sub-advisor suffer from significant entrenchment effects and offers
an additional explanation for the fund level underperformance of internationally out-
sourced funds. Importantly, our results indicate that the incentive mechanism inherent
in multiple sub-advised funds can help alleviate the agency costs of outsourcing, which
is entirely new to the literature.
3.5 Alternative explanations
In this section, we add to the literature by considering several possible reasons for the
underperformance of international outsourced funds beside agency cost.
equity funds (Evans et al. (2020)). For categories with fewer than 30 funds, we use benchmark-adjusted
returns.
21In Table IA-6 of the Internet Appendix, we provide additional results on the unconditional differences
in termination probability between different sub-advising types. The results suggest that internationally
outsourced sub-advisors in single-SA funds are more likely to be terminated compared to multi-SA funds.
Similar, albeit weaker, results are also obtained for U.S. outsourced sub-advisors.
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3.5.1 Reverse causality
The decision by a fund family to hire a sub-advisor (or not) is clearly endogenous.
The analysis in this paper, however, is conditioned on a firm’s sub-advising decision,
and the goal is to evaluate the performance consequences of sub-advising from an in-
vestor’s perspective. That said, it is possible that our fund-level results are driven by
underperforming funds trying to tap into outside expertise. To test this hypothesis,
we estimate the impact of prior performance on the propensity to outsource. The de-
pendent variables, Int’l Outs. SA, is equal to equal to one if the fund has at least one
outsourced sub-advisor headquartered abroad and zero otherwise. We keep only the
first semi-annual observation during which a fund is reported to have an outsourced
subadvisor. Any subsequent observations are removed from the sample. The results
in Table IA-7 in the Internet Appendix indicate that performance is not significantly
related to the propensity to outsource internationally.
3.5.2 Distribution channel
Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) and Del Guercio and Reuter (2015) suggest
that funds sold through brokers have less incentive to generate alpha than those sold
directly to investors. It is therefore possible that the underperformance of internation-
ally outsourced funds is concentrated in broker-sold funds. This is, however, not the
case. Using the definition of broker-sold funds from Christoffersen, Evans and Musto
(2013), we find that internationally outsourced funds are significantly less likely to be
broker-sold compared to funds managed by international in-house sub-advisors (see Ta-
ble IA-8 in the Internet Appendix). If anything, the underperformance is worse among
direct-sold funds. Similar results are also obtained using the Sun (2014) definition of
broker-sold funds.
Using the definition of broker-sold funds from Christoffersen, Evans and Musto
(2013), we find that internationally outsourced funds are significantly less likely to
be broker-sold compared to funds managed by international in-house sub-advisors (see
Table I.A.8). If anything, the underperformance is worse among direct-sold funds.
Similar results are also obtained using the Sun (2014) definition of broker-sold funds.
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Additional details on defining broker sold funds are provided in the Internet Appendix,
section 1.3.
3.5.3 Quantitative funds
By definition, quantitativeas opposed to fundamentalinvestment strategies are less re-
liant on local information. Therefore, we should expect the negative effects of outsourc-
ing to outweigh the potentially positive effects of local information for quant funds. We
conjecture that funds that have higher regression R2 from the FFC4 model, funds with
more holdings, and funds that voluntarily report holdings more frequently than is re-
quired are more likely to follow quantitative strategies. Our findings, provided in Table
IA-9 in the Internet Appendix, show that the underperformance of internationally out-
sourced funds is actually stronger among non-quant funds, which runs counter to the
argument that quantitative funds are driving the results.
4 Summary and Conclusions
We extend the literature on mutual fund sub-advising to the international setting by
focusing on i) international/global mandates and ii) the geography of the sub-advisors.
We analyze whether and how local information obtained through sub-advising abroad
impact fund performance. Taking the geography of sub-advisors into account allows
us to decompose a fund into its local versus non-local holdings from the perspective
of its advisors/sub-advisors. Importantly, this decomposition helps us test for evi-
dence of local expertise by comparing the performance of funds with different sub-
advising arrangements in their local versus non-local sub-portfolios We also study the
extent to which active management and risk shifting behaviours differ across these
sub-portfolios. Lastly, our design allows us to provide new evidence on the incentive
mechanism and consequences inherent in multiple versus single sub-advised funds.
We document that sub-advising abroad does not improve fund performance, whether
the international sub-advisors are in-house or outsourced. Funds that hire outsourced
international sub-advisors, in particular, underperform on a risk-adjusted basis by up to
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126 bps annually. Further, we find that internationally outsourced funds underperform
U.S. outsourced funds. Diving deeper to identify the source of the underperformance,
we find that it is concentrated in the outsourced international sub-advisors’ local stock
picks. Surprisingly, we also find that international in-house sub-advisors underperform
in their local sub-portfolios, leading to the conclusion that even if a local information
advantage exists, it does not translate into risk-adjusted returns for investors.
We also explore several possible reasons. First, we show that international sub-
advisors – in-house or outsourced – are significantly less active in managing holdings
in countries/regions where they are located, compared to the rest of the fund. In
addition, we provide evidence that international outsourced sub-advisors engage in
higher risk shifting in those same local holdings. Prior studies have shown that these
behaviours are not conducive to producing superior fund performance. While we do not
rule out agency costs as a contributing factor to the relative underperformance, these
within-fund variations suggest that there is more to the story. Second, we document
that the incentive mechanism in multiple sub-advised funds can alleviate some of the
agency costs of outsourcing by reducing entrenchment. Finally, we rule out the reverse
causality explanation; that is, poorly performing funds try to boost performance by
tapping into outside, international expertise.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Sub-Advisory Relationship and Portfolio Holding Definitions




U.S. (in-house or outsourced)
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International  (in-house or outsourced)




Table 1: Sub-Advisory Status of International/Global Mutual Funds
This table summarizes the sub-advisory status for the full sample of funds over time. For each year we
provide: the total number of distinct funds (aggregated by share class), the average fraction of funds i)
that are sub-advised (i.e., having a U.S. or International sub-advisor whether in-house or outsourced),
ii) with international sub-advisor(s), whether in-house or outsourced (Int’l SA), iii) with U.S. based sub-
advisors, whether in-house our outsourced (U.S. SA), and iv) with an outsourced sub-advisor, whether
U.S. or international (Outs. SA). Annual averages are calculated from fund-month observations since
sub-advisory status can change throughout the year.
Proportion of Funds per SA Category
Year Number of Funds Sub-advised Int’l SA U.S. SA Outs. SA
2000 200 27.39 11.44 15.95 17.5
2001 210 32.13 11.39 20.74 20.57
2002 236 32.77 11.37 21.4 20.07
2003 251 40.51 14.67 25.84 24.31
2004 273 44.05 15.3 28.75 25.51
2005 292 45.89 16.66 29.23 27.7
2006 316 47.81 17.51 30.3 30.13
2007 364 47.7 16.36 31.34 30.42
2008 388 48.83 16.16 32.67 30.87
2009 409 51.1 19.97 31.13 32.01
2010 416 51.23 21.04 30.19 30.8
2011 432 51.53 21.02 30.51 30.18
2012 407 50.69 19.59 31.1 27.75
2013 394 49.8 19.06 30.74 26.91
2014 384 50.98 20.27 30.71 25.56
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Sub-Advisory Status
This table reports univariate tests for differences between sub-advising categories. Performance measures
and net flows are reported in percentages per month, while expense ratios are annual. AUM is reported
in $millions. Sub-sample means are reported in Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). For example,
the column labeled Int’l SA presents statistics using the sub-sample of funds that have at least one
international sub-advisor, whether in-house or outsourced. Cochran and Cox t-statistics associated with
testing for differences in sub-sample means are in columns (6), (7) and (8). Statistics are calculated
using the full sample of observations (2000-2014). A full list of variable descriptions is given in the Table
A-1 in the appendix.
No SA Int’l SA Int’l Outs. Int’l In-H US Outs. (2) - (1) (4) - (3) (5) - (3)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
%Performance (p.m.)
CAPM Alpha 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 1.75 3.00 1.33
FF3 Alpha 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.97 3.77 1.43
FF4 Alpha -0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10 1.87 3.57 1.80
BMK-Adj. Return 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.11 1.66 3.92 2.13
BMK Alpha 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.11 1.3 3.63 1.55
%Activeness and risk taking
Active Share 76.85 71.45 69.96 72.52 74.74 28.02 7.60 17.10
Risk Shifting 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.12 -0.89 2.08 4.18
Tracking Error 1.45 1.27 1.27 1.28 1.36 21.15 0.36 7.08
Fund characteristics
ln(Illiq. Dev.) -146.00 -139.65 -136.10 -142.21 -134.54 -2.01 -1.13 0.33
Age 11.98 13.30 14.69 12.30 10.27 -10.96 -10.38 -21.86
Family AUM 11545 33318 14735 46861 3746 -32.64 26.43 -12.21
Fund AUM 2738 2478 1646 3085 708 2.82 11.87 -13.38
%Expense Ratio 1.19 1.24 1.22 1.25 1.37 -7.96 2.50 17.72
%Net Flow 0.58 0.48 0.36 0.57 0.63 1.53 1.80 2.66
%Inst. Share Class 55.6 48.39 62.57 38.01 51.35 12.36 -25.06 -12.86
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Table 3: Baseline Performance Regression
This table reports estimates from panel regressions of risk-adjusted fund performance on sub-advisory
variables (Equations (III.1) and (III.2)) for the sample of funds with international (ex-US) mandates. The
sample period is from January 2000 to December 2014. Odd numbered columns use broad sub-advisory
dummies measuring local presence: Int’l SA is equal to one if a fund has an international sub-advisor at
time t − 1 and zero otherwise; US SA is equal to one if a fund has a US sub-advisor and zero otherwise.
In even numbered columns we further differentiate sub-advisors by affiliation: Int’l Outs. SA is equal to
one if a fund has an internationally outsourced sub-advisor at time t − 1 and zero otherwise, Intl In-H
SA is equal to one if a fund has at least one in-house international sub-advisor. US In-H SA is equal
to one if a fund has at least one in-house sub-advisor located in the US and no international in-house
sub-advisors, US Outs. SA is equal to one if a fund has at least one outsourced US sub-advisor and no
internationally outsourced sub-advisors. A full description of additional explanatory variables is given in
Table A-1 in the Appendix. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that are
robust to clustering by style × time. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels.
CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha FF4 Alpha BMK-adj Return BMK Alpha
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Int’l SA -0.0070 -0.0216 -0.0177 -0.0067 -0.0090
(0.41) (1.22) (1.00) (0.35) (0.46)
US SA -0.0367*** -0.0387*** -0.0541*** -0.0241* -0.0310**
(3.01) (3.16) (4.29) (1.88) (2.28)
US In-H SA -0.0256 -0.0049 -0.0246 -0.0244 -0.0201
(1.20) (0.22) (1.09) (1.03) (0.82)
US Outs. SA -0.0457*** -0.0572*** -0.0588*** -0.0299** -0.0426***
(3.11) (3.88) (3.90) (1.98) (2.74)
Int’l In-H SA 0.0024 0.0059 0.0066 0.0185 0.0042
(0.11) (0.27) (0.30) (0.78) (0.17)
Int’l Outs. SA -0.0618*** -0.1035*** -0.1007*** -0.0739*** -0.0657***
(2.59) (4.17) (3.68) (3.10) (2.65)
Past Performance 0.0065* 0.0064* 0.0063** 0.0062** 0.0076*** 0.0075*** 0.0071*** 0.0070*** 0.0097*** 0.0096***
(1.82) (1.80) (2.33) (2.29) (3.31) (3.27) (2.90) (2.85) (3.78) (3.75)
Inst. Share Class (%AUM) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002
(1.16) (0.93) (2.74) (2.39) (2.38) (2.02) (0.40) (0.08) (1.45) (1.23)
Ln(Illiq.) 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(2.45) (2.41) (2.28) (2.24) (2.66) (2.58) (3.51) (3.52) (3.41) (3.39)
Netflow 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.89) (0.92) (2.91) (2.93) (1.85) (1.91) (0.38) (0.31) (1.13) (1.17)
Expense Ratio 0.0177 0.0174 0.0729*** 0.0712*** 0.0342 0.0313 -0.0054 -0.0051 0.0335 0.0334
(0.78) (0.76) (3.19) (3.12) (1.56) (1.43) (0.22) (0.21) (1.43) (1.43)
Ln(AUM) 0.0018 0.0009 0.0026 0.0016 0.0047 0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0045 0.0029 0.0020
(0.32) (0.17) (0.44) (0.27) (0.82) (0.64) (0.58) (0.76) (0.50) (0.34)
Ln(Family AUM) 0.0023 0.0008 0.0064* 0.0038 0.0019 -0.0007 0.0067* 0.0052 0.0080** 0.0065*
(0.68) (0.24) (1.77) (1.03) (0.53) (0.18) (1.75) (1.34) (2.16) (1.72)
Ln(Age) -0.0124 -0.0105 -0.0136 -0.0100 -0.0224* -0.0182 -0.0129 -0.0091 -0.0152 -0.0130
(1.08) (0.89) (1.17) (0.84) (1.96) (1.54) (1.04) (0.72) (1.24) (1.06)
Int’l In-H SA - Int’l Outs. SA 0.0642** 0.1094*** 0.1073*** 0.0924*** 0.0699**
(2.19) (3.66) (3.20) (3.25) (2.31)
Fund FE No No No No No No No No No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
Observations 37,369 37,369 37,369 37,369 37,369 37,369 37,408 37,408 37,408 37,408
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Table 4: Decomposing fund performance
This table reports the results for regressions of sub-portfolio risk-adjusted performance on sub-advisory
(SA) dummies and control variables for the sample of funds with international (ex-US) mandates. For
each fund i and month t, there are up to three sub-portfolios. The three mutually exclusive sub-portfolios
are: i) local own country, ii) local own region (excl. own country) and iii) non-local. A fund’s local own
country sub-portfolio contains all stocks that are headquartered in the same country as the fund’s sub-
advisor(s). The local own region sub-portfolio includes all stocks headquartered in the same region, but
outside the country where the funds sub-advisor(s) is (are) located. A fund’s non-local sub-portfolio
contains all stocks located in regions where the fund’s sub-advisor(s) has (have) no physical presence.
The omitted group consists of funds without sub-advisors. The sample period is from January 2000 to
December 2014. A full description of the control variables is given in Table A-1 in the Appendix. The
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that are robust to clustering by fund.
*/**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
DGTW-adj. Returns FFC4 Alpha
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local Country × Int’l SA -0.1319*** -0.1302***
(4.79) (4.88)
Local Region × Int’l SA 0.0081 -0.0316
(0.37) (1.29)
Non-Local × US SA -0.0339 -0.0497***
(1.39) (2.62)
Non-Local × Int’l SA -0.0853*** -0.0305
(2.73) (0.97)
Local Country × Int’l In-H SA -0.1246*** -0.0873* -0.0875*** -0.0239
(4.20) (1.78) (2.60) (0.50)
Local Country × Int’l Outs. SA -0.1318*** -0.1149*** -0.1916*** -0.1711***
(3.57) (2.62) (5.26) (3.64)
Local Region × Int’l In-H SA -0.0176 0.0198 0.004 0.0676
(0.67) (0.42) (0.13) (1.38)
Local Region × Int’l Outs. SA 0.0524** 0.0695** -0.0837*** -0.0632*
(2.22) (1.98) (2.98) (1.76)
Non-Local × US In-H SA 0.0010 -0.0255
(0.04) (1.21)
Non-Local × US Outs. SA -0.0356 -0.0515**
(1.59) (2.57)
Non-Local × Int’l In-H SA -0.0679* -0.0067
(1.85) (0.15)
Non-Local × Int’l Outs. SA -0.0742** -0.0425
(1.98) (1.07)
Omitted group: Non-local portf. × No SA × No SA Within-fund × No SA × No SA Within-fund
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No Yes No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.16 0.17
Observations 51,986 46,816 46,814 52,094 46,927 46,925
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Table 5: Fund Activeness and Sub-Advisory Status
This table reports the results for regressions of fund activeness on sub-advisory variables for the sample
of international and global equity funds. Tracking Error is the standard deviation of the fund return in
excess of the benchmark return from time t to t + 35. Active Share is the sum of the absolute differences
between the fund’s portfolio weight and its benchmark weight divided by two at time t. The independent
variables include the sub-advisory dummies and control variables at t−1. The sample includes funds with
international (ex-US) mandates. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that
are clustered by fund. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Active Share Tracking Error Risk Shifting
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Int’l In-H SA -2.0876* -0.0527 0.0378
(-1.71) (-1.28) (1.64)
Int’l Outs. SA -4.5343*** -0.0658 0.1081***
(-2.89) (-1.13) (3.07)
US In-H SA -0.5542 0.0193 0.0596*
(-0.40) (0.40) (1.80)
US Outs. SA -2.7828*** 0.0071 0.0330
(-2.80) (0.17) (1.50)
Past Performance 0.1005*** 0.0031*** -0.0001
(5.29) (3.31) (-0.17)
Inst. Share Class (%AUM) -0.0229* -0.0004 -0.0002
(-1.88) (-0.95) (-0.56)
Ln(Illiq.) 0.0011 0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.99) (1.87) (-1.80)
Netflow 0.0073*** 0.0002** -0.0002**
(3.08) (2.23) (-2.07)
Expense Ratio 4.1468*** 0.1208*** -0.0066
(3.10) (2.62) (-0.25)
ln(AUM) 0.0425 0.0178 -0.0026
(0.15) (1.55) (-0.36)
ln(Family AUM) -0.7780*** -0.0155** 0.0026
(-4.81) (-2.31) (0.68)
ln(Age) -0.8328 -0.0827*** 0.0051
(-1.14) (-3.22) (0.31)
Fund FE No No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.34 0.39 0.07
Observations 50,585 40,367 39,804
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Table 6: Decomposing Fund Activeness
This table reports the results for regressions of sub-portfolio activeness (active share or tracking error)
or risk shifting on sub-advisory dummies and control variables for the sample of funds with international
(ex-US) mandates. For each fund i and month t, there are up to three observations, one for each sub-
portfolio. The three mutually exclusive sub-portfolios are: i) the local own country, ii) the local own
region (excl. the own country) and iii) the non-local. A funds local own country sub-portfolio contains
all stocks that are headquartered in the same country as its sub-advisors. The local region sub-portfolio
includes all stocks headquartered in the same region, but outside the countries where the sub-advisors
are located. A funds non-local sub-portfolio contains all stocks located in countries where it has no
physical presence through sub-advisors. The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2014. A
full description of additional explanatory variables is given in Table A-1 in the appendix. The t-statistics
(in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that are robust to clustering by fund. */**/***
denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Active Share Tracking Error Risk Shifting
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Local Country × Int’l SA -13.6249*** 0.2339*** 0.1400***
(8.71) (3.74) (2.94)
Local Region × Int’l SA -10.1905*** 0.0653 0.2309***
(6.61) (1.10) (3.74)
Non-Local × US SA -5.4603*** -0.0318 0.0044
(4.65) (0.75) (0.19)
Non-Local × Int’l SA 1.1229 0.3855*** 0.0550
(0.70) (5.39) (1.46)
Local Country × Int’l In-H SA -9.2727*** -8.7555*** 0.2803*** 0.0000 0.0315 -0.1042
(5.13) (7.41) (3.59) (0.00) (0.79) (1.35)
Local Country × Int’l Outs. SA -14.3355*** -12.0604*** 0.1626** -0.0472 0.2957*** 0.3155***
(7.11) (10.17) (2.07) (0.89) (3.00) (2.87)
Local Region × Int’l In-H SA -6.7583*** -6.2411*** 0.1282* -0.1547** 0.1138** -0.0241
(3.87) (6.84) (0.87) (2.17) (2.01) (0.27)
Local Region × Int’l Outs. SA -9.4940*** -7.2190*** -0.0296 -0.2457*** 0.3975*** 0.4111***
(4.67) (6.30) (0.34) (4.57) (3.11) (3.03)
Non-Local × US In-H SA -1.9614 -0.0458 0.0457
(1.20) (0.81) (1.18)
Non-Local × US Outs. SA -3.5516*** -0.0211 -0.0401*
(2.79) (0.46) (1.66)
Non-Local × Int’l In-H SA 6.2272*** 0.4123*** 0.0400
(3.20) (4.41) (0.83)
Non-Local × Int’l Outs. SA 1.0807 0.3672*** 0.0567
(0.53) (3.77) (1.12)
Omitted group: Non-local portf. × No SA × No SA Within-fund × No SA × No SA Within-fund × No SA × No SA Within-fund
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.28 0.3 0.8 0.36 0.36 0.69 0.07 0.08 0.19
Observations 49,424 46,608 46,607 35,974 35,957 35,955 35,492 35,475 35,473
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Table 7: Single vs. Multi Sub-Advised Funds
This table reports the results for regressions of risk-adjusted fund performance on sub-advisory variables
for two sub-samples. First, we compare funds with a single sub-advisor to non-sub-advised funds by
dropping funds with multiple sub-advisors from the sampleresults are in columns denoted by Single.
Second, we drop funds with a single sub-advisor to compare multi sub-advised funds to non-sub-advised
fundsresults are in columns denoted by Multi. The sample includes funds with international (ex US)
investment mandates and the sample period is from January 2000 to December 2014. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that allow for clustering by style and time. */**/***
denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha FF4 Alpha BMK-adj. Return BMK Alpha
Single Multi Single Multi Single Multi Single Multi Single Multi
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Int’l In-H SA -0.0312 0.0294 -0.0035 0.0017 0.0107 -0.0158 -0.0534 0.0560* -0.0251 0.0182
(-0.99) (1.08) (-0.11) (0.06) (0.31) (-0.57) (-1.52) (1.85) (-0.73) (0.61)
Int’l Outs. SA -0.0977*** -0.0305 -0.1495*** -0.0643** -0.1486*** -0.0546** -0.1260*** -0.0389 -0.1114*** -0.0297
(-2.63) (-1.19) (-3.96) (-2.44) (-3.62) (-1.99) (-3.14) (-1.53) (-2.73) (-1.13)
US In-H SA -0.0182 -0.0684* 0.0065 -0.0557 -0.0273 -0.0669* -0.0211 -0.0751** -0.0030 -0.0942**
(-0.69) (-1.81) (0.24) (-1.45) (-0.98) (-1.71) (-0.72) (-1.97) (-0.10) (-2.39)
US Outs. SA -0.0559*** -0.0186 -0.0519*** -0.0611*** -0.0733*** -0.0362 -0.0531*** 0.0110 -0.0493*** -0.0127
(-3.09) (-0.80) (-2.84) (-2.74) (-3.96) (-1.55) (-2.99) (0.46) (-2.69) (-0.53)
Past Performance 0.0061 0.0068 0.0064** 0.0054* 0.0079*** 0.0086*** 0.0067** 0.0074*** 0.0095*** 0.0084***
(1.60) (1.50) (2.26) (1.78) (3.30) (3.47) (2.48) (2.64) (3.48) (3.12)
Inst. Share Class (%AUM) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0005** -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0004* -0.0003
(-0.81) (-0.71) (-2.57) (-2.48) (-2.26) (-1.37) (-0.34) (-0.03) (-1.74) (-1.09)
Ln(Illiq.) 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(2.60) (2.04) (2.20) (2.13) (2.59) (2.46) (3.22) (3.84) (3.25) (3.35)
Netflow 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.99) (0.47) (2.89) (1.49) (1.41) (-0.32) (-0.16) (-0.81) (1.11) (0.53)
Expense Ratio 0.0142 0.0081 0.0771*** 0.0749*** 0.0304 0.0292 -0.0094 -0.0164 0.0348 0.0282
(0.54) (0.30) (2.91) (2.71) (1.21) (1.09) (-0.34) (-0.54) (1.30) (0.96)
ln(AUM) 0.0018 0.0014 0.0027 0.0059 0.0047 0.0039 -0.0056 -0.0041 0.0025 0.0054
(0.29) (0.23) (0.41) (0.93) (0.76) (0.63) (-0.88) (-0.64) (0.40) (0.87)
ln(Family AUM) -0.0003 -0.0033 0.0026 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0028 0.0028 0.0061 0.0038
(-0.07) (-0.81) (0.62) (0.22) (-0.25) (-0.06) (0.67) (0.65) (1.47) (0.92)
ln(Age) -0.0106 -0.0186 -0.0063 -0.0318** -0.0223* -0.0406*** -0.0135 -0.0131 -0.0143 -0.0252*
(-0.84) (-1.28) (-0.49) (-2.14) (-1.75) (-2.74) (-1.02) (-0.84) (-1.08) (-1.67)
Firm FE No No No No No No No No No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.24
Observations 30,043 26,228 30,043 26,228 30,043 26,228 30,076 26,258 30,076 26,258
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Table 8: Sub-Advisor Termination and Performance
This table reports the results for logistic regressions of sub-advisor termination on the average fund per-
formance over the prior 36 months and style and year fixed effects. Performance is measured either by
the benchmark-adjusted return (relative to style benchmarks), or by the equal-weighted peer-adjusted
return (of other funds in the same Morningstar Category). We estimate separate coefficients for neg-
ative and positive performance. Past performance is then interacted with a dummy for single or multi
sub-advised funds. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors that allow for
clustering by fund. */**/*** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Sub-sample results
Variables Full Sample Intl. Outs. U.S. Outs. Intl. In-House U.S. In-House
Panel A: Benchmark-adjusted return
Perf≥0 × Single 0.0130*** 0.0008 0.0123 -0.0309 0.0184**
(3.83) (0.03) (1.48) (0.66) (2.24)
Perf<0 × Single -0.0176*** -0.0151 -0.0305** -0.0086 -0.0062
(3.20) (0.74) (2.24) (0.57) (0.82)
Perf≥0 × Multi -0.0003 0.0242 0.0028 -0.0055 -0.0035
(0.05) (1.50) (0.36) (0.42) (0.35)
Perf<0 × Multi -0.0401*** -0.0721*** -0.0805*** 0.0109 -0.0226***
(4.73) (2.71) (6.08) (0.86) (2.63)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.24 0.111 0.167 0.099
Observations 7,065 423 2,688 1,303 1,498
Panel B: Peer benchmark-adjusted return
Perf≥0 × Single 0.0091*** 0.0015 0.0117** -0.0186 0.0075**
(3.68) (0.09) (1.96) (0.48) (2.09)
Perf<0 × Single -0.0199*** -0.0254 -0.0344*** -0.0193 -0.0012
(4.62) (1.34) (3.16) (1.38) (0.18)
Perf≥0 × Multi 0.0052 0.0254* 0.0113* -0.0021 -0.0069
(1.37) (1.72) (1.91) (0.22) (0.55)
Perf<0 × Multi -0.0427*** -0.0775*** -0.0846*** 0.0037 -0.0183**
(5.11) (2.79) (7.13) (0.37) (2.23)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.241 0.129 0.131 0.095









CAPM Alpha 1-Factor alpha relative to the market portfolio.
FF3 Alpha 3-Factor alpha relative to the Fama and French 3-factor model.
FF4 Alpha 4-Factor alpha relative to the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model.
BMK-Adj. Returns
Gross fund returns in excess of the fund’s benchmark return. We classify each fund into one of four
primary benchmarks: i) All Country World Index (ACWI) (developed and emerging markets), ii)
WORLD (developed markets), iii) ACWI ex. U.S., or iv) WORLD ex. U.S.. Furthermore, we use the
Morningstar Category at t − 1 to assign a value/blend/growth tilt to each fund. We then use the
corresponding MSCI index return (e.g., MSCI ACWI ex US Value).
BMK Alpha 1-Factor alpha relative to the benchmark return.
All factor-models are estimated with 36 months of data for funds with at least 24 months of valid
returns. For funds with less than 24 months of return data, we use instead the median factor
loadings of other funds with the same benchmark and style classification as of t − 1.
Sub-Advisory Variables
Int’l SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has an internationally headquartered sub-advisor and zero
otherwise.
Int’l In-H SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has an affiliated sub-advisor located in an international
country (ex-U.S.) and zero otherwise.
Int’l Outs. SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has an unaffiliated sub-advisor located in an international
country (ex-U.S.) and zero otherwise.
U.S. SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has a sub-advisor headquartered in the United States and
zero otherwise.
U.S. In-H SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has an affiliated sub-advisor headquartered in the United
States and zero otherwise.
U.S. Outs. SA
Binary variable equal to one if a fund has an unaffiliated sub-advisor headquartered in the United
States and zero otherwise.
Activeness and Risk Taking







The standard deviation of the difference between a fund’s returns and its benchmark returns (cal-
culated using 24 month rolling windows with a minimum of 12 months).
Risk Shifting
The difference between a hypothetical holdings-based tracking error of the fund and the actual
tracking error based on realized returns. The hypothetical holdings-based tracking error uses the
most recently disclosed portfolio weights (e.g., as of December, 2010) with returns measured over
the preceding 24-month window (in this case from January, 2009 to December, 2010).
Fund Characteristics
Expense Ratio The percentage of fund assets used to pay for operating expenses and management fees.
AUM Fund assets under management.




%Inst. Share Class The proportion of a fund’s assets held by institutional investors.
Ln(Ill. Dev)
The natural log of the fund’s deviation from it’s benchmarks illiquidity measure - the illiquidity
measure is as defined in Amihud (2002).
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Chapter III
The growth of passive indexing and




Over the past decade the US mutual fund industry has seen a dramatic shift from active
management towards explicitly indexed funds, including both exchange traded funds
(ETFs) and open-ended index funds. Historically, index fund assets have been concen-
trated in funds that provide investors with diversified exposure to the market portfolio.
For example, the SPDR trust (ticker: SPY) and the NASDAQ 100 trust (ticker: QQQ)
provide investors with exposure to the total return of the US stock market by passively
replicating the performance of the S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100 indexes respectively.
For the remainder of this paper, these types of funds are referred to as market index
funds. More recently, there has been a proliferation of index funds that strategically se-
lect stocks based on metrics other than market capitalization (e.g., smart-beta funds).
Common examples of these metrics include risk factors such as momentum and volatil-
ity or firm fundamentals such as earnings growth or profitability. For instance, Invesco’s
DWA Momentum ETF (Ticker:PDP) tracks the Dorsey Wright Technical Leaders Index
which selects stocks based on security and industry performance. Hereafter, I refer to
these types of index funds as factor index funds. As show in Figure 1, the recent growth
in both market and factor US equity index funds has been accompanied by a significant
1I am grateful for the comments of Markus Broman, Melanie Cao, Fabio Moneta, Aleksandra Rzeźnik,
Ben Sand, Pauline Shum Nolan and seminar participants at the Schulich School of Business, York Uni-
versity.
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decline in flows to actively managed US equity funds.2
[Figure 1]
The increased popularity in index investing can be attributed to, at least partially,
the low cost and comparable performance relative to actively managed funds. Indeed,
the debate on active versus passive management tends to focus on the relative value,
or performance net of fees.3 In this paper, I investigate the degree to which increased
competition from index funds has affected actively managed mutual fund fees, survival,
and future performance. Factor index funds provide investors with active risk exposure
whereas market index funds deliver diversified exposure to the broad market. Thus,
investors seeking active risk strategies are likely to substitute actively managed mutual
funds with factor index funds rather than market index funds. By the same token,
active funds are more likely to respond to competitive threats from factor index funds
than to competitive threats from market index funds. Thus, my conjecture is that factor
index funds are more of a competitive threat to actively managed funds than market
index funds.
The question of whether competitive forces from open-ended index funds and ETFs
has affected actively managed mutual funds is important for several reasons. The ex-
isting evidence on the competitiveness of the money management industry is mixed.
For example, research showing relatively stable average, or aggregate, expense ra-
tios during periods of rapid industry growth (Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005; Wahal
and Wang, 2011; Khorana and Servaes, 2012; Sun, 2020) has raised questions about
whether sufficient price competition exists. Along the same vein, net expense ratios
have been shown to be unrelated to market share growth (Sirri and Tufano, 1993) or
fund inflows (Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005) and are higher for funds that operate
in more competitive regions (Ellis and Underwood, 2018). On the other hand, com-
petition between actively managed funds has been shown to attenuate management
2According to the 2020 ICI Factbook, US equity index funds and ETFs received $1.8 trillion in new
cash and reinvested dividends, whereas actively managed US equity funds experienced a net outflow of
$1.7 trillion from 2010 to 2019.
3Research in agreement with the implications of Sharpe (1991)’s arithmetic of active management,
active investing is a negative sum game at the aggregate level (French, 2008) and on average, include:
Carhart (1997), Edelen (1999), Gruber (1996), Fama and French (2010), Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995)
and Wermers (2000).
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fees (Wahal and Wang, 2011; Ellis and Underwood, 2018; Hoberg, Kumar and Prab-
hala, 2018), and relative family level fees have been found to predict family market
share (Khorana and Servaes, 2012). With the exceptions of Cremers, Ferreira, Matos
and Starks (2016) and Sun (2020), very little has been said about the consequences of
index fund competition on active management.
Determining an appropriate measure of competition is not an easy task. I follow
Wahal and Wang (2011) and measure the intensity of index fund competition using
the overlap between entrant and incumbent portfolio holdings. This measure is calcu-
lated by multiplying the ratio of the market value of each overlapping security in each
incumbent’s and entrant’s portfolio by the weight of the security in the incumbent’s
portfolio. Wahal and Wang (2011) use this measure to examine competition between
actively managed funds whereas my focus is on investigating the consequences of in-
dex fund competition on actively managed mutual funds, and whether the competitive
effects differ based on index fund strategy. I therefore calculate overlap measures for
three types of entrants: factor index overlap, market index overlap and active overlap.
I include the latter group to control for direct competition from active entrants.
There are several reasons why this measure is appropriate in my empirical setting.
First, a new fund must enter for an incumbent to experience a change in competition.
Aside from being intuitive, this ensures that the variation over time is influenced by
the number of new entrants. There is also considerable variation in the degree to
which incumbents are affected by new entry. Importantly, this variation is a function of
the similarity between the portfolios (products) of the incumbent and entrant which is
reflected by the number of overlapping stocks in their portfolios. This is important since
investors holding an actively managed incumbent fund that has a high factor or market
index overlap can obtain exposure to a similar set of stocks, and pay lower fees, by
switching to the index entrant. Moreover, concentrating on overlapping stocks speaks
to competition in security selection, which can have implications for performance and
costs. A second source of incumbent level variation is the weight of each overlapping
security in each incumbent’s portfolio. This ensures that entrants who hold the most
important stocks in an incumbent’s portfolio are treated as a greater competitive threat
than entrants who hold stocks that are less important to the incumbent’s portfolio.
Using the entrant-incumbent overlap measure as a proxy for competition, I first
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investigate the consequences of index fund entry on active incumbent fee decisions.
Standard theory on competition suggests that active incumbent fees should decline fol-
lowing the entry of relatively inexpensive index funds that offer exposure to a similar
portfolio. In contrast, investor search costs, and increased product diversity can lead
to substantial fee dispersion (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2018; Hortac, su and Syverson,
2004). On the one hand, factor index funds offer active risk exposure at a relative
discount to active mutual funds. On the other hand, the advent of active risk exposure
packaged into an index fund increases the diversity of products available to investors
and therefore could result in increased search costs. The effect of factor index fund
entry on active mutual fund fees is therefore unclear. The objective of market index
funds is distinctly different – to provide diversified exposure to the market portfolio.
Actively managed funds presumably differentiate themselves from market index funds
by delivering active risk exposure. Nonetheless, questions regarding the relative per-
formance suggest that actively managed fees most likely decline with increased market
index fund entry.
I test these hypotheses by regressing post entry changes in net fees (and their various
components) on the index overlap measures. My findings indicate that index fund
competition has had significant effects on actively managed net fees, but that the effect
depends on the type of index fund. In particular, there is no significant relationship
between market index overlap and changes in net fees. In contrast, active funds reduce
net fees by approximately 1.1 basis points following a one standard deviation increase
in factor index overlap. The effect is largest for funds that charge above the median of
their actively managed peers at approximately 1.52 basis points. While the magnitude
may seem marginal, it represents roughly 6.3% of the total reduction in the average
net fee charged by active funds over my sampling period. Thus, competitive pressure
from relatively low-cost index funds that offer active risk exposure (factor index funds)
has directly contributed to a reduction in the net cost of actively managed US equity
mutual funds.
Next, I investigate the source of net fee changes by examining the impact on the
three largest components: management fees, operating fees, and distribution fees.
Management fees provide the cleanest price of a fund’s investment performance and
increased competition should reduce the ability of funds to extract profit through man-
90
agement fees. Ex-ante, index fund competition is expected to be positively related to
distribution fees as they are generally used to generate investor attention. The expected
effect on operating fees is ambiguous as it is unclear how index competition effects the
supply and demand for the types of services they include.
My findings indicate that both factor and market index fund competition are posi-
tively related to future changes in active management fees, negatively related to changes
in operating fees and insignificantly related to changes in distribution fees. With mar-
ket index fund competition, the increase in management funds is offset by the decrease
in operating fees, resulting in no significant change in net fees. In contrast, the increase
in management fees associated with factor index fund competition is more than offset
by a reduction in operating fees which is not surprising given the negative effect on net
fees.
It may seem counter-intuitive that management fees are positively related to index
overlap, however, my results indicate that this effect is driven by funds that: 1) outper-
form their peers and 2) charge relatively low management fees to begin with. A similar
observation can be made for operating fees – reductions are restricted to funds with rel-
atively high operating costs and who have outperformed their peers. The implication
is that entry of low-cost alternatives has helped to drive fee components towards their
peer group median. These findings are important as prior criticisms against sufficient
competition in the mutual fund industry point to the considerable dispersion in fees
charged by similar funds (Cooper, Halling and Yang, 2020).
Importantly, the observed relationships between changes in active fund fees and in-
dex fund competition are, for the most part, consistent with funds optimizing future net
flow. Funds that reduce net fees or operating fees over the prior two years experience
significantly positive net flows over the subsequent year relative to funds that either in-
crease these fees or leave them unchanged. For example, reducing net (operating) fees
is associated with an increase in annual net flows of about 3.42% (3.28%) relative to
increasing or maintaining current net (operating) fee levels. Increases in management
fees do not predict positive future net flow, however, they also do not predict negative
net flow. Thus, the changes in active incumbent fees associated with increased index
fund entry appear to be rewarded by the typical investor through increased net flow.
91
Although my findings show a direct relationship between active fund net fees and
factor index fund competition, casual inspection of Figure 1 might lead one to hypoth-
esize that factor index competition has also had an indirect effect on actively managed
net fees through increased exit rates. I test this conjecture by analyzing the relationship
between active incumbent survival rates and the index entry overlap measures. I find
that liquidation rates of actively managed funds are positively related to both factor
and market index overlap measures. In line with my conjecture, the negative effect on
liquidation rates is most prevalent for active funds that charge net fees above the me-
dian of their actively managed peers. These findings are, to the best of my knowledge,
new to the literature.
In the final section I examine the performance implications. If markets are complete
and frictionless, then composite assets (i.e., mutual funds and ETFs) are redundant
and do not impact the prices of their constituent securities. Nonetheless, theoretical
and empirical evidence suggests otherwise. 4 Moreover, Hoberg, Kumar and Prabhala
(2018) and Wahal and Wang (2011) find that competition amongst active funds has a
moderating effect on performance. Factor index funds seek active risk exposure which
is, at least in some cases, similar to the active risk exposure offered by active mutual
funds. Presumably, increases in the number of investors trading on a given risk factor
reduces the associated profitability. I therefore expect that the increase in factor-based
trading associated with factor index fund entry is detrimental to the performance of
actively managed incumbents.
Ex-ante, the effect of market index fund entry on the performance of actively man-
aged funds is not overly clear. On the one hand, buying and selling by passive market
index funds is based solely on market-capitalization rather than fundamental values
which may provide active managers with opportunities to capitalize on mis-priced se-
curities. On the other hand, institutional investors have been shown to hold relatively
large proportions of stocks held in common indices (Dannhauser, 2017) and to reduce
information asymmetries and pricing inefficiencies in the stocks they hold (Bartov, Rad-
4Basak, and Pavlova (2013) provide theoretical evidence that institutional investors have incentive to
tilt their portfolios toward benchmark constituents which amplifies prices, volatility and return correla-
tion of constituent stocks and overall market volatility which are supported empirically by Dannhauser
(2017) and Boone and White (2015). Additions (deletions) from large indices have been found to in-
crease (decrease): prices, correlations and trading volume with other constituent stocks (Chen, Noronha
and Singal , 2004; Greenwood and Sosner, 2007). ETF activity has been shown to have similar effects
(Da and Shive, 2018; Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi, 2018).
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hakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Boone and White, 2015). In
this case, it should be more difficult for active managers to identify mis-priced securi-
ties.
I find some evidence that index fund entry is detrimental to the future performance
of actively managed mutual funds. For instance, a one-standard deviation increase in
factor index overlap is associated with a reduction in performance over the next 24
months between 17 and 38 basis point. In contrast, while I find a negative relationship
between market index overlap and active incumbent future performance, the effect is
not robust. Given that I have shown that higher index fund competition is positively
related to future attrition, future performance cannot be estimated for the worst per-
forming funds since returns are unavailable. My estimates are therefore conservative.
The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate whether index fund
strategy interacts with competition in determining actively managed fees, survival rates
and performance. In this respect, my research complements the vast literature that ex-
plores competition within the actively managed space.5 In contrast, research examining
the effects of index fund competition on actively managed mutual funds is sparse.
Two notable exceptions include Cremers, Ferreira, Matos and Starks (2016) and Sun
(2020). The former performs a cross-country study on the relationship between index
fund availability and active fund strategies and find that funds operating in countries
with more explicit indexing have lower total shareholder costs and higher levels of
active share. The latter finds that funds distributed through broker (direct) channels
increase (decrease) total shareholder costs following entry of Vanguard index mutual
funds launched between 1976 and 1998. My paper differs from these papers in a few
distinct ways. First, my objective is to determine whether competition originating from
factor index funds is distinct from competition arising from market index funds in the
US equity market, which is not addressed by previous studies. Sun (2020) analyzes
the first wave of open-ended index funds offered by the ”Walmart” of the index fund
industry over a period in which: 1) the average actively managed net fee was stable
and 2) ETFs were relatively non-existent. In contrast, I examine a period over which
there was a proliferation of ETFs and more elaborate factor-based indexing, as well as
5Noteworthy studies on competition between actively managed funds include: Coates and Hubbard
(2007), Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), Wahal and Wang (2011), Ellis and Underwood (2018), Hoberg,
Kumar and Prabhala (2018), Khorana and Servaes (2012) and Hortac, su and Syverson (2004).
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an observable reduction in the average net fee charged by actively managed mutual
funds. Thus, Sun’s objective was to explain the lack of observable reduction in average
actively managed net fees over sample period, while mine is to explain the recently
observed reduction.
Other notable differences include the methodological approach and specific tests
performed. For instance, I not only provide evidence that index fund competition has
had a negative effect on total net fees, but show which components are responsible
for the reduction. Moreover, I provide evidence on how index fund entry has im-
pacted active fund exit rates and offer an indirect channel through which active net
fees have been affected, neither of which were addressed in Cremers, Ferreira, Matos
and Starks (2016) or Sun (2020). Lastly, I close by examining the performance impli-
cations whereas the prior two papers concentrate on investigating activeness.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and sample
construction. Section 3, presents the results and Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2 Data and variable construction
2.1 Data
The mutual fund data is from Morningstar Direct’s Mutual Fund Database over the
period 1998 to 2018. To avoid survivorship bias, I include live and defunct funds.
The sample of actively managed funds is restricted to domestic equity-only funds sold
in the US since this asset class has suffered more pronounced declines in assets under
management relative to fixed income or international/global equity funds. Accordingly,
I include only funds that fall into one of the following Morningstar classifications: small
blend, small growth, small value, mid-cap blend, mid-cap growth, mid-cap value, large
blend, large growth, and large value. This filter eliminates: bond funds, money market
funds, international funds, funds of funds, sector funds, real estate funds and life-cycle
funds. I use Morningstar identifiers to confirm that the sample of active funds is free
from: index funds, leveraged funds, fund-of-funds, feeder funds and life cycle funds.
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Mutual funds often offer multiple share classes of the same fund. Individual share
classes of a given fund are managed by the same manager and provide claims to the
same portfolio of assets. The primary difference between share classes is their fee
structure. For example, institutional share classes generally charge lower fees than
retail share classes. Therefore, I aggregate all share classes of the same fund. I compute
fund assets under management (AUM) by summing the AUM across a fund’s share
classes and aggregate share class level characteristics using AUM weighted averages. I
collect quarterly holdings data from Morningstar which includes all equity positions and
their associated CUSIP, as well as other non-equity positions; including bond and option
holdings. I link Morningstar holdings data to the CRSP stock database by security
CUSIP.
Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015) find that instances of extreme reversal pat-
terns exist in net asset data provided by Morningstar and that it is likely due to decimal-
place mistakes. I follow their methodology to identify these observations and treat re-
versals as missing values.6 As is standard in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Evans,
2010; Kacperczyk et al., 2014 among others), I address the potential bias that results
from fund incubation periods being included in the mutual fund databases by eliminat-
ing observations prior to a fund’s inception date.7 In addition, a fund is included in the
sample only after it’s aggregate AUM across all share classes passes a threshold of $10
million. Funds that fall below $10 million are not subsequently deleted. The resulting
data set contains 2914 actively managed US equity funds.
Evidence in Sun (2020) suggests that fund responses to changes in competition
might differ based on distribution channel. I classify funds as either direct- or broker-
sold following Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2013). This methodology relies on
data from fund semi-annual reports (form N-SAR) filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2013) describes the N-
SAR data in detail, so here I focus primarily on how I define broker-sold funds. The
N-SAR form reports mutual fund data on combined share classes (i.e., at the aggregate
fund level). Thus, the classification is at the fund level rather than the share class level.
6The precise methodology is described on page 10 of the online data appendix for Pastor, Stambaugh
and Taylor (2015).
7The inception date given in the Morningstar Direct database provides the first date that the fund was
listed.
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Fund i is defined as broker-sold if, over the prior fiscal year, it received loads through
unaffiliated brokers/dealers (N-SAR Q32 > 0) or through captive broker/dealers (N-
SAR Q33 > 0). I merge the N-SAR data to the aggregated Morningstar by fund name,
and confirm imperfect name matches by checking the difference between net assets
reported by each database.
2.1.1 Market and factor index funds
This sub-section describes how I construct the samples of market and factor index
funds. Open-ended index funds and ETFs differ primarily by structure and, depend-
ing on the type account in which they are held, tax implications. Nevertheless, they
offer exposure to similar, and often times the same, indexes, charge comparable fees,
and have been shown to be substitutes (Agapova, 2011). I therefore do not explicitly
differentiate between open-ended index funds and ETFs.
The sample of open-ended index funds and ETFs comes from Morningstar Direct
and is selected in a manner that is consistent with the sample of active mutual funds
with respect to asset class and end-investor. In specific, my objective is to select the
sub-set of US equity index funds, both open-ended and exchanged traded, that are
most likely to be considered as alternatives to the sample of actively managed mutual
funds. I collect all live and defunct ETFs and open-ended funds flagged as index funds
by Morningstar between 1998 and 2018. ETFs sold in the US over this period were
required to disclose portfolio holdings on a daily basis which led to the vast majority
being structured as index funds. In any case, I use Morningstar’s actively managed flag
to remove all actively managed ETFs. I also remove all ETFs that are not sold on a
US exchange to keep the end investor consistent across samples. Similarly, I exclude
all open-ended index funds that are not registered for sale in the US. Lastly, I remove
leveraged funds, life-cycle funds, and funds that do not invest primarily in US equity.
Next, I classify funds as either a market index fund or a factor index fund. Market in-
dex funds track broad market indexes using market capitalization weighting schemes.8
In contrast, factor index funds generally seek to enhance returns by tracking bench-
8Common examples of broad market indexes include: Russell 1000 and 3000, S&P 500, Wilshire
5000 total market, CRSP US Large Cap and CRSP US total market.
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marks that provide active risk exposure, for example, momentum and volatility factors
or firm fundamentals. I use Morningstar’s strategic beta flag as a starting point – all
index funds Morningstar flags as strategic beta are defined as factor index funds. As
noted in Broman (2019), this filter fails to account for a number of factor-based index
funds. I manually examine fund names, stated benchmarks and objectives to classify
the remaining index funds as either market index or factor index.9 Lastly, I remove any
funds where the first reported holdings date is more than 18 months after the fund’s
reported inception date but note that my main results are robust to more stringent re-
strictions. Applying these filters results in 151 market index funds and 552 factor index
funds.
2.2 Definition of variables
2.2.1 Measuring competition
Various methodologies for studying the effects of fund competition have been proposed
in prior literature. Self-disclosed benchmarks provide a simple method for inferring
a fund’s investment universe but are not strictly regulated. Moreover, they are not
suitable for identifying fund style since they do not necessarily coincide with holdings-
based style metrics.10 Morningstar institutional categories are intended to help institu-
tional investors identify peer groups (Box, Davis and Fuller, 2018) but are static and
therefore problematic since fund styles vary over time.
In this paper, I use a variation of the holdings overlap measure proposed by Wahal
and Wang (2011). This measure is based on the ratio of the market value of overlap-
ping securities in entrant’s and incumbent’s portfolios, with each ratio being multiplied
by the weight of the overlapping security in the incumbent’s portfolio. This provides a
measure of the degree of competition between entrants and incumbents based on the
substitutability of their products (portfolios), and effectively assumes that investors be-
have as if they observe fund holdings. The latter may seem problematic, however, prior
evidence indicates that many investors are interested in fund holdings. For example,
9I am grateful to Markus Broman for providing me an initial list of manual classifications. I extend
this list since our samples are not identical.
10For example, see Sensoy (2009) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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Solomon, Soltes and Sosyura (2014) find that flows are related to returns on individ-
ual holdings, particularly holdings with recent media coverage.11 Furthermore, prior
evidence indicates that managers engage in window dressing and that this behaviour
can ultimately influence investor flows (Agarwal, Gay and Ling, 2014). Lastly, the most
relevant portion of a fund’s portfolio (i.e., the most heavily weighted stocks) is readily
available to investors at no cost through public sources (e.g., Morningstar’s website).12
The calculation and notation are as follows. MVOi,t denotes the average mar-
ket value of overlapping securities between active incumbent i and new entrants e =
1,2, ...,N during quarter t. I calculate the measure separately for each type of en-
trant: factor index fund entrants (Factor Index MV Oi,t), market index fund entrants
(Market Index MV Oi,t) and actively managed mutual fund entrants (Active MV Oi,t),
but discuss only the general construction for concision. I include Active MV Oi,t in my
analysis to control for the competitive effects from actively managed entrants.
Let s = 1, ...,M denote the subset of securities that exist in both the incumbent’s and
entrant’s portfolio. Let j = 1, ...,K denote the full set of securities in active incumbent

















where Pi,s,t (Pe,s,t) is equal to the price of overlapping security s at the beginning of
quarter t. The subscripts e and i are used to denote the entrant and incumbent re-
spectively. Si,s,t and Se,s,t denote the number of shares of stock s in incumbent i’s and
entrant e’s portfolio at the beginning of quarter t respectively. The weight, wi,e,s,t, is
the ratio of the dollar value of overlapping security s, scaled by the weight of security
s in the incumbent’s portfolio. The first term in wi,e,s,t accounts for the relative market
value of the overlapping security. The second term accounts for the relative impor-
tance of the overlapping security in the incumbent’s portfolio. MVOi,t is calculated by
11Solomon, Soltes and Sosyura (2014) also note that Morningstar indicates that 42% of retail investors
would prefer holdings to be disclosed more frequently.
12Page 44 in Wahal and Wang (2011) provides a similar discussion.
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summing the weights (wi,e,s,t) for all overlapping securities between incumbent i and
entrant e and then averaging across all entrants. I remove entrants with zero holdings
overlap from the calculation. This eliminates the impact of entrants that have zero
overlap with an incumbent. Unlike, Wahal and Wang (2011) I define entry dates as
6 months after the entrant’s reported inception date and include the subsequent two
quarters in the calculation. This is important since a large portion of the index funds
in my sample are ETFs, which, as shown by Broman and Shum (2018) take time to
establish liquidity. Investors, and active incumbent’s, are less likely to consider funds
that are still establishing liquidity as a viable substitute and competitive threat respec-
tively. Less importantly, I use the average overlap measure over the prior year when
estimating annual regressions.13
Rather than treating all entrants within a certain group (e.g., investment category
or region of sale) as equally important, the overlap approach measures the intensity
of competition based on the similarity between entrant and incumbent portfolios. This
is important since incumbents that have high portfolio overlap with entrants are more
likely to face increased competitive pressure relative to incumbents that have more
unique portfolios. By using market values, this approach also addresses an important
element of competition – large entrants, and particularly the size of their overlapping
holdings, are more of a competitive threat than small entrants.
2.2.2 Fund performance
When studying the impact of index fund entry of active incumbent future performance,
I measure fund performance relative to factor models or style benchmark indices. For
factor models, I use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and the 4-factor model
(4F) from Carhart (1997). I estimate factor loadings with rolling 36 month windows
and use the US equity factors provided on Fama and French’s website.
Evans, Gomez, Ma and Tang (2020) document that fund managers are evaluated
based on their performance relative to pure index benchmarks, peer group bench-
marks, or both. I therefore include benchmark adjusted returns and the equal weighted
13My main results are numerically similar when using alternative constructions. For example, defining
various entry windows and, to a lesser extent, restricting the calculation to incumbent-entrant pairs that
are located in the same Morningstar style box.
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peer benchmark adjusted returns in assessing fund performance. Peer benchmark ad-
justed returns are equal to the difference between fund i’s gross return and the equally
weighted gross return of its peer group based on Morningstar categories. Benchmark
adjusted returns use traded style benchmarks provided by Morningstar. Morningstar
classifies US equity funds into nine different categories based on style and assigns a
benchmark portfolio to each category14 that is defined based on actual fund holdings
meaning it does not suffer from any self selection bias. Pastor, Stambaugh and Tay-
lor (2015) and Zhu (2018) suggest the use of Morningstar benchmark portfolios over
factor models (e.g. Fama-French factors) since the former are accessible to the typical
investor while the latter are not. These benchmarks are also free from the “cherry-
picking bias” associated with prospectus benchmarks (Sensoy, 2009) and, as argued
by Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2013) and Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2015),
index-based benchmarks are more likely to capture style and risk than the Fama-French
factors.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the time series variation in: the number of existing funds, new entries,
total net assets and the equally weighted net expense ratio. Statistics are grouped by
three fund types: actively managed mutual funds (Active), factor index funds (Factor)
and market index funds (Market). Entry dates are identified using the inception date
of each fund’s oldest share class. Statistics on the number of existing funds, total AUM
and net expense ratios are calculated using all funds with non-missing net asset data.
Note that some funds shown in this table are removed from my main analysis due to
missing data. I present this broader sample to provide a more complete picture of the
US equity fund industry.
Consistent with the aggregate flow statistics in Figure 1, the past two decades have
seen a substantial increase in the number of index funds, reflected by both the number
14The categories are based on size and the book-to-market ratio of the stocks held. The specific bench-
mark indices and associated styles are: Russell 1000 Total Return for large blend, Russell 1000 Growth
Total Return for large growth, Russell 1000 Value Total Return Index for large value, S&P 400 Mid Cap
Total Return for mid blend, Russell Mid Cap Growth Total Return for mid growth, Russell Mid Cap Value
Total Return for mid value, Russell 2000 Total Return for small blend, Russell 2000 Growth Total Return
for small growth and Russell 2000 Value Total Return for small value.
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of new entries and the number of existing funds. For example, the number of existing
factor (market) index funds increases from 16 (46) in 1998 to 485 (152) in 2018.
Similarly, the number of existing, and newly launched, active funds increases until
around 2009, at which point it starts to decline.
[Table 1]
The size of each market segment, AUM (Billions USD), is also illuminating. As of
the end of 1998, the total amount of net assets invested in market index funds was
approximately 11 times the total net assets invested in factor index funds. By the end
of 2018 this number was closer to 2. The equally weighted expense ratios (EW Net
Expense) highlight the cost differential between active and passive management as
well as the additional cost associated with factor indexing relative to market indexing.
In addition, the decline in average active fund expense ratios from 1998 to 2018 is
quite large at 24 basis points. In sum, the observed patterns in Table 1 roughly coincide
with the concept that average actively managed net fees have declined with the growth
of passive index investing.
Before proceeding to my empirical tests, I provide some basic summary statistics on
the variables used in this paper. Table 2 presents the distributions over the full sample
period. The median factor index MVO and market index MVO are 0.062 and 0.125
respectively, both of which are well below their means (0.306 and 0.724 respectively).
As noted in Wahal and Wang (2011), this variation is important as funds with high
overlap are expected to face stronger competitive pressure than incumbents with little
overlap.
[Table 2]
The average annual net fee is approximately equal to 1.14% of fund net assets. Man-
agement fees make up the largest portion of net expenses at 0.69%, while operating
fees and distribution fees are generally smaller at 0.20% and 0.25% per year respec-
tively. Performance measures (benchmark adjusted returns and alphas) are stated as
annual percentage returns gross of fees. The average benchmark adjusted return is
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approximately 0.74% per year while the mean 3- and 4-factor alphas are slightly lower
at 0.637% and 0.412% per year respectively. Given the average net expense ratio is
1.14%, the average after fee performance is indeed negative. The equally weighted
peer benchmark return (Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.) is closer to zero at 0.024% per year. The
average fund in my sample has about 1.6 billion in assets under management, 30% of
which is in an institutional class, and is approximately 154 months old.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Strategic fee adjustment
In this section I investigate the consequences of index fund entry overlap on actively
managed fee decisions. Factor index funds offer investors active risk exposure at a
considerable discount relative to actively managed mutual funds. It is therefore rea-
sonable to expect that factor index competition has put negative pressure on actively
managed net fees. In contrast, the packaging of active risk exposure into a passive
product is a relatively new concept which suggests an increase in product diversity and
investor search costs. Thus, the expected relationship between factor index overlap and
changes in active fund net fees is ambiguous. Market index funds are another low-cost
alternative to active management but are distinct from actively managed funds in that
they provide diversified exposure to market beta rather than active risk exposure. De-
spite these differences, questions regarding relative performance suggest that actively
managed net fees are likely to be negatively related to market index fund overlap.
Fee changes require approval from the fund’s board of trustees and typically occur
on an annual basis. I therefore examine fees change over the two years following the
entry of a new index fund competitor but reproduce the primary results for three- and
four-year changes in Table A2 of the appendix. I proceed by regressing changes in
active fund net fees over the next two years (t to t+2) on the average overlap measures
over the prior year, control variables and fixed effects:
∆Feei,t∶t+2 = α + β1FactorIndex MV Oi,t + β2MarketIndex MV Oi,t
+ β3Active MV Oi,t + γ ×Ci,t + vt + zs + εi,t (III.3)
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The dependent variable, ∆Feei,t∶t+2, is the change in fund i’s fee from year t to year t+2.
The control variables, Ci,t, include: turnover, the standard deviation of gross returns
over the prior 24 months (std.(Gross Ret.)), fund size as measured by the natural log
of net assets (ln(AUM)), the equally weighted peer benchmark adjusted return com-
pounded over the prior year (Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.), and the natural log of a fund’s
age in months (ln(Age)). The explanatory variables of interest, factor index overlap
(Factor Index MV Oi,t) and market index overlap (Market Index MV Oi,t), are equal
to the average overlap measures over the prior fiscal year (t − 1 to t).
All specifications are estimated with year fixed effects (vt) to control for unobserved
heterogeneity in the cross-section of funds over time. Additionally, I control for fund
(Panel A) and style fixed effects (Panel B) to account for fund and style specific differ-
ences in fee changes (zs). I address the concern that errors might be correlated within
funds or across time by estimating standard errors that allow for clustering along the
fund and year dimensions (shown in parentheses). I employ two main specifications in
my baseline regressions. First, I concentrate solely on index competition by analyzing
the effects of the two index overlap measures. Next, I ensure that I am not picking up
the direct effects of active competition by controlling for the active overlap measure.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results from estimating Equation III.3 with fund
and year fixed effects. To ease interpretation of the overlap measures, I report av-
erage marginal effects and their associated t-statistics instead of the raw coefficient
estimates. The results suggest that the negative effect on fees arising from cheap,
factor-based, alternatives outweighs any increase in investor search costs. In partic-
ular, factor index overlap has a significantly negative effect on two-year changes in net
fees (∆Net Feei,t∶t+2). A one-standard deviation change in factor index overlap is asso-
ciated with a reduction in net fees of around 1.1 basis points. Although this represents
only a fraction of the observed reduction in actively managed net fees over my sample
period, evidence presented in later sections shows that this is only part of the story. In
contrast, market index overlap is not significantly related to future changes in net fees.
[Table 3]
Net fees can be decomposed into management fees, distribution fees, and other
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operating fees. Management fees are the proportion of fund net assets used to com-
pensate the portfolio manager(s) and, unlike net fees, provide a purer price of a fund’s
investment performance. Fund’s facing increased competition should have a reduced
ability to extract profit through management fees which suggests competition should
negatively affect changes in management fees. That said, total manager revenue is
equal to assets under management multiplied by the management fee. Thus, the large
withdrawals from actively managed US equity funds, shown in Figure 1, indicate a
considerable reduction in the compensation paid to active managers. Since managers
require some base level of compensation, the relationship between management fees
and index competition could instead be positive.
The other two fee components are distribution fees and operating expenses. Dis-
tribution fees are comprised of marketing and distributing costs and are often used as
a commission to brokers for selling the fund. Operating fees include accounting, ad-
ministrator, auditor, board of directors, custodial, legal, organizational, professional,
registration, shareholder reporting, and transfer agency fees. Ex-ante, index fund com-
petition is expected to be positively related to distribution fees as they are generally
used to generate investor attention. The expected effect on operating fees is ambigu-
ous as it is unclear how index competition effects the supply and demand for the types
of services they include.
The results show that both factor and market index overlap are positively related to
changes in active incumbent management fees (∆Mgmt.Feei,t∶t+2), negatively related
to future changes in operating fees (∆OperatingFeesi,t∶t+2) and generally unrelated
to changes in distribution fees (∆Dist.Feei,t∶t+2). The magnitudes of the changes in
management and operating fees are also quite large. For instance, a one-standard
deviation increase in factor index MVO is associated with a 3.36 basis point increase
in management fees which represents almost 5% of the sample average (68.7 basis
points). Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in factor index MVO is associated
with a 4.57 basis point reduction in operating fees which is around 20% of the sample
average. While the change in operating fees may seem excessive relative to the mean,
results in the subsequent sub-section show that this effect is restricted to funds that
incur relatively high operating expenses to begin with. In short, the reduction in net
fees associated with factor index competition is due to reductions in operating fees.
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In some cases, fund managers contractually agree to waive/reimburse expenses
above and beyond a pre-specified threshold. Alternatively, fee waivers can be used
as a discretionary tool by fund companies to temporarily improve their net perfor-
mance (Christoffersen, 2001). While they are not meant to permanent, active funds
may use waivers in response to increased index fund competition to improve net per-
formance, thereby increasing expected fund flows. I estimate the probability that a
fund uses a waiver in the next year with a logistic regression. The dependent variable,
Prob.(Waiveri,t+1), is an indicator that is equal to one if a fund uses an expense waivers
in year t + 1 and zero otherwise. As with distribution fees, neither factor nor market
index MVO are significantly related to active incumbent fee waivers.
In Panel B of Table 3, I replace fund fixed effects with style fixed effects. Although
the t-statistics are generally smaller, the main results are still significant at the one
percent level. In unreported results, I find that the main results are also robust to al-
ternative clustering specifications. Moreover, separating the sample into broker- and
direct-sold funds does not significantly alter my findings. I find that restricting the
sample to the pre-2005 period yields results similar to Sun (2020) – factor index fund
entry is associate with an increase in net expense ratios for broker-sold funds and no
significant change for direct-sold funds. Differences in results could be due to varia-
tions in methodologies, sampling period and the type of index funds considered. For
example, Sun (2020) concentrates solely on Vanguard index mutual funds whereas I
include a broad sample of index mutual funds and ETFs investing in US equities that
are sold in the US. Additionally, there is very little overlap in the entry dates of index
funds between our samples.
3.1.1 Fee change explanations
In this sub-section I investigate explanations for the relationships between fee changes
and index competition. Intuitively, the observed relationships should be a function of
various fund characteristics. For example, investors have gravitated towards relatively
cheap funds over the past two decades15 which suggests that funds charging fees above
the average (median) charged by their actively managed peers have the strong incen-
15By the end of 2019, actively managed funds in the lowest expense ratio quartile held 73 percent of
actively managed fund assets (Investment Company Institute Factbook 2020, Chapter 6).
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tives to reduce fees, particularly in response to entry of new low-cost index funds that
offer exposure to similar stocks. Thus, I expect the positive (negative) relationship be-
tween index fund overlap and actively managed management (net and operating) fees
from Panel A to be confined to funds that charge relatively low (high) fees to begin
with. I test this conjecture by interacting index overlap measures with fee indicators,
denoted by High Feei,t, that are equal to one if fund i charges a fee above the median
fee charged by all other active funds in the same Morningstar style box, in year t, and
zero otherwise. To be clear, the High Feei,t indicators in Panels C and D of Table 3
coincide with the dependent variable under consideration.
The results from interacting high fee indicators with factor index overlap are shown
in Panel C of Table 3. I include all control variables from Panel A, but report only the
coefficients on the overlap measures and their interaction effects to conserve space.
The results generally support my conjecture. The observed fee increases (decreases)
associated with the factor index overlap measure are restricted to funds that charge be-
low (above) the median fee charged by their active peers. For example, the coefficient
estimate on Factor Index MV Oi,t × HighFee in the net fee regression is -0.0152 and is
significant at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on Factor Index MV Oi,t is now
positive but insignificant. The implication is that the relatively expensive active funds
respond to increased factor index competition by reducing net fees while the least ex-
pensive funds do not make any significant changes. A 1.5 basis point may not seem
overly meaningful; however, it represents approximately 6.3% of the total reduction in
average net fees observed over my sampling period.
The results for the interactions between factor index overlap measures and the vari-
ous fee components are largely similar to the net fee results. The increase (decrease) in
management (operating) fees is restricted to funds that charge below (above) the me-
dian charged by their peers. Moreover, the interaction between Factor Index MV Oi,t
and the high distribution fee indicator is significantly negative while Factor Index
MV Oi,t is now significantly positive. This helps explain the somewhat puzzling finding
of no significant relationship between distribution fees and index fund competition. An
interesting implication of these results is that factor index competition appears to be
driving net fees, and their various components, towards the peer group median.
Next, I investigate the role of past performance. My hypothesis is that the positive
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relationship between management fees and factor index fund competition should be
related to prior performance. That is, the funds that increase management fees in
response to index fund entry are expected to have outperformed their peers in the
recent past. Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) document that funds with worse before-
fee performance strategically charge higher fees. Their findings suggest that poorly
performing charge higher fees due to relatively performance insensitive investors while
better-performing funds have performance sensitive investors and therefore engage in
price competition. This suggests that the effect of increased availability of low-cost
factor index funds on net fees should be most pronounced for active funds that have
sophisticated, performance sensitive investors and is therefore expected to exacerbate
this puzzle. The effects on operating and distribution fees are less clear.
Evans, Gomez, Ma and Tang (2020) show that fund managers are evaluated based
on their performance relative to peer funds in a similar style, pure index benchmarks, or
both. I therefore measure performance using benchmark-adjusted returns or the equal-
weighted peer benchmark-adjusted returns compounded over the prior 12 months.
I present results using equal-weighted peer benchmark-adjusted returns (Peer Bmk.
Adj. Ret.i,t) but note that the results are numerically similar, though statistically weaker,
when using benchmark-adjusted returns.
The results are consistent with the conjecture that factor index competition does
not alleviate the fee-performance puzzle identified in Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009)
– the negative relation between changes in net fee and factor index competition is most
pronounced for better-performing funds. The influence of peer benchmark-adjusted
performance on the relation between factor index overlap and changes in management
fees is also in line with my predictions – the top performing funds increase their man-
agement fees the most. Lastly, reductions in operating fees are also most pronounced
for funds that have performed well relative to their peers.
The interaction effects of market index overlap and high fee dummies, reported
in Panel D of Table 3, are generally similar to those reported in Panel C for factor
index overlap interactions. That is, market index overlap seems to drive fees towards
their peer group median. In contrast, the interaction between index overlap and past
performance does not significantly effect changes in fees.
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The results in this section show that both market index fund competition and factor
index fund competition are positively related to future changes in management funds,
but negatively related to future changes in operating fees. With market index fund
competition, the effects are offsetting which results in no significant change in net
fees. In contrast, the increase in management fees associated with factor index fund
competition is more than offset by a reduction in operating fees, resulting in a negative
effect on net fees. Moreover, retaining talented managers is exceedingly important in
the actively managed equity space. Active managers who have performed well in the
face of increased competition from cheap alternatives are rewarded through increased
management fees. When taking stock of the survivorship bias associated with looking
at future changes in fees this finding is quite intuitive. Lastly, my findings indicate that
competitive pressure from index funds has helped to drive active fees towards their
peer group median. To the best of my knowledge, this finding is new to the literature.
3.1.2 Investor response to fee changes
In this sub-section I investigate how investors respond to the changes in fund fees
associated with index entrant overlap in Section 3.1. The objective is to determine
whether the observed relationships between fund fee changes and market/factor index
overlap measures are consistent with flow optimizing behavior. To answer this question,
I construct dummy variables based on changes in fees over the prior two years. The
direction of the fee change is set to correspond to the relationship between the fee
in question and the index overlap measures from Panel A in Table 3. For example,
Increase Mgmt. Feei,t is equal to one if fund i increased it’s management fee over
the prior two years and zero otherwise. I measure monthly dollar flow following the
approach in Sirri and Tufano (1998) and obtain forward dollar flows by adding monthly
flows over the next one, two and four quarters. Percentage flow is calculated by dividing
forward dollar flows by the fund’s current period net assets. I then regress forward
percentage flow on the fee change indicators, a set of control variables and fixed effects:
Flowi,t∶t+T = α + β1Reduce Net Feei,t + γCi,t + vt + zs + εi,t (III.4)
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Flowi,t∶t+T = α + β1Increase Mgmt. Feei,t + β3Reduce Operating Feei,t
+ β3Increase Dist. Feei,t + γCi,t + vt + zs + εi,t (III.5)
Flowi,t∶t+T denotes cumulative flow (in percent) from quarter t to T , with T equal to t
plus one, two or four quarters. The control variables, Ci,t, include variables shown to
influence flows by prior literature: size, age, net fees, turnover, return volatility, per-
formance and tracking error. I account for past performance using CAPM alpha com-
pounded over the prior year as prior research has shown that CAPM outperforms other
models in explaining investor capital allocation decision (Berk and Binsberger, 2015;
Barber, Huang and Odean, 2016).16 The remaining control variables are as defined in
Section 3.1. I account for style and fund specific differences in net flow by including
style or fund fixed funds, zs, and allow for time specific differences by including time
fixed effects, vt. To address the concern that errors might be correlated within styles
or time periods, I cluster standard errors by fund style and year-quarter. To minimize
the impact of outliers, I winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
I winsorize net flow at the 1st and 98th percentile since the positive side is extremely
volatile. The results I present are robust to winsorizing net flow measures using other
methods proposed in the literature, (e.g., winsorizing observations where the net fund
flow percentage is larger than 300% in a year as in Sun, 2020).
The results in Panel A of Table 4 show that the relationships between fund fee
changes and factor index fund entry are generally consistent with flow optimizing be-
havior. Reducing net fees, and particularly operating fees, is associated with positive net
flow over the next year. For example, the estimated coefficient on Decrease Net Feei,t
is 1.0003 when predicting fund net flow over the next quarter (Net F lowi,t∶t+1) and
3.4241 when predicting fund net flow over the next year (Net F lowi,t∶t+4). These val-
ues translate to increases in net flow of about 1 and 3.4 percent over the next quarter
and year respectively. The estimated coefficients on Increase Mgmt. Feei,t are positive,
but insignificant.
16I find numerically similar results when accounting the asymmetrical relationship between flows and
past performance (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998) when using Morningstar fund ratings which
follows Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) who provide evidence that Morningstar fund ratings have a causal
impact on fund flows.
109
[Table 4]
In Panel B of Table 4, I show that the results in Panel A are robust to replacing fund
fixed effects with style fixed effects. The regression specifications are otherwise the
same, but I omit control variable coefficient estimates for concision. In unreported re-
sults, I find that the results are also robust to clustering standard errors along alternate
dimensions. Thus, the results in this sub-section suggest that the changes in fees made
by active funds following entry of similar factor or market index funds are rational in
the sense that they are consistent with optimizing net flow. That is, investors respond
positively through increased net flow.
3.2 Active Incumbent attrition
In this section I study the impact of index fund entry on active fund attrition rates.
Morningstar Direct identifies the exact date and reason for exit which allows me to
study liquidations and mergers separately. Funds frequently merge or liquidate single
share classes in which case the portfolio still exists. For this reason, I consider exits at
the fund level rather than the share class level.
I start by sorting all active funds into quintiles based on the average factor index,
market index and active overlap measures over the prior year. Sorts are performed on
an annual basis and I examine attrition rates over the next one, two and five years. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 5. There is no apparent relationship between
active fund merger rates and any of the three overlap measures. On the other hand,
liquidation rates monotonically increase with all three overlap measures. For example,
the two-year (five-year) liquidation rate for funds in factor index MVO quintile 5 is
6.53% (14.95%), compared to 3.77% (9.31%) for funds in factor index MVO quintile
1.
The sorting exercise suggests that active fund liquidations are correlated with the
entry of index funds that have relatively high post-entry holdings overlap. However, it
is well known that various fund characteristics influence a fund’s probability of exiting
which could explain the differences in attrition rates shown in Panel A. For example,
performance, size and inflows have been shown to be negatively related to mergers
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while net fees and age have been shown to be positively predict mergers (Jayaraman,
Khorana and Nelling, 2002; Zhao, 2005). I additionally control for return volatility and
tracking error since risk and activeness might influence exit. I proceed by estimating a
Cox proportional hazard model:
Exiti,t = h0,i,te(β1FactorIndex MV Oi,t+β2MarketIndex MV Oi,t+β1Active MV Oi,t+β2Controlsi,t) (III.6)
The baseline hazard function, h0,i,t, is year and style specific. Funds that survive until
the end of the sample period are included as censored observations. To ease the in-
terpretation of results, I report average marginal effects and their associated z-scores
instead of the raw coefficient estimates. I estimate the covariance using the ”sand-
wich estimator” developed in Lin and Wei (1989).17 The control variables, size, return
volatility, tracking error, age and net fees are as defined in Section 3.1. I control for
fund performance using benchmark-adjusted returns compounded over the prior two
years and fund flow using percentage net flows over the prior 6 months. To minimize
the impact of outliers, I winsorize all control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
[Table 5]
Panel B of Table 5 presents the hazard ratios and z-scores (in parentheses) from
estimating equation III.6. Consistent with the univariate results, the factor index over-
lap measure has a positive and significant effect on liquidation rates and no significant
effect on merger rates. A one-standard deviation increase in factor index overlap in-
creases the implied probability of liquidation by between 16 and 21 percent. In con-
trast, market index fund overlap has a positive effect on both merger and liquidation
rates, although the effect on merger rates is marginally significant. The magnitude
of the effect on liquidations is again quite large – a one-standard deviation increase in
market index MVO is associated with about a 28 percent increase in the baseline hazard
ratio.
Next, I investigate whether index fund overlap measures interact with active incum-
bent relative net fees, and past performance, in predicting future exit rates. I contend
that part of the reduction in actively managed average net fees over my sample period
17Results are very similar when specifying a parametric survival model with a Weibull distribution.
The Weibull distribution also fits the data better than other commonly used distributions.
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can be explained by increased exit rates of the most expensive funds following an in-
crease in competition from low-cost index fund alternatives. In addition, I expect that
funds that have performed well are more likely to be insulated from the index fund en-
try and are therefore less likely to be liquidated. I test these hypotheses by interacting
benchmark adjusted returns compounded over the prior 24 months and the high net
fee dummy variable defined in Section 3.1.1 with the market and factor index overlap
measures.
The results generally support my conjectures – the positive effect of factor and mar-
ket index fund competition on active incumbent liquidation rates is most severe for
the funds that charge relatively high net expense ratios. The coefficient estimates on
the interactions between the high net fee indicator and both factor and market index
overlap measures are positive and significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, there
is only marginal evidence that liquidation rates are less pronounced for funds that have
performed well over the prior 24 months. These findings, combined with the findings
in Section 3.1, suggest that increased index fund competition has put negative pres-
sure on active fund net fees both directly, through actual fee reductions, and indirectly
through increased liquidation rates of the funds charging the highest net fees. Further-
more, the average net fee charged by active funds that exit, either through a liquidation
or merger, my sample subsequent to 2010 is 1.19%. In contrast, the average actively
managed entrant over the same time period charges a net fee of 0.97%.
3.3 Future performance
This section investigates the performance implications. My expectation is that entry of
factor index funds negatively affects the performance of actively managed incumbents
with high overlap as both chase active risk. In contrast, market index funds deliver
passive exposure to the market portfolio. On the one hand, increased overlap with
passive investors might enhance manager’s ability to capitalize on mis-priced securities.
On the other hand, it may reduce informational asymmetries, thereby making it more
difficult to identify mis-priced securities. To provide an answer to these questions, I first
estimate cumulative performance over the 8-quarters (t ∶ t+ 8) after a new fund enters.
I define performance using the Fama, French and Carhart 4-factor alpha, peer adjusted
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benchmark returns or benchmark adjusted returns. Next, I regress estimated post-entry
performance on the three overlap measures, a standard set of control variables, year-
quarter fixed effects and style or fund fixed effects. I estimate standard errors that allow
for clustering along year and fund dimensions to account for residual dependence in a
given year and within funds.
The results are shown in Table 6 with column headings specifying the dependent
variable. In Panel A I include fund and year-quarter fixed effects while in Panel B
I replace fund fixed effects with style fixed effects. As with the prior regressions, I
report average marginal effects of overlap measures and their associated t-statistics
instead of the raw coefficient estimates. Whether considering alpha, peer benchmark
adjusted returns or benchmark adjusted returns, I find significant evidence that active
incumbents with high factor index overlap underperform over the next two years. For
example, the underperformance associated with a one-standard deviation increase in
factor index overlap ranges between 17 basis points (4-factor alpha and controlling for
style fixed effects) and 38 basis points (using the 4-factor alpha and controlling for fund
fixed effects).18 In contrast, the effects of market index overlap on future performance
is restricted to peer benchmark adjusted returns.
[Table 6]
Active incumbents that have high overlap with factor index entrants chase perfor-
mance by investing in a largely similar set of stocks. Thus, a possible explanation for
the negative effect on future performance is that the future profitability of these assets
diminishes as more investors invest in them. In this case, underperformance might be
reflected by increased trading costs as more funds invest in the same set of securities. I
test this latter conjecture by regressing active incumbent return gaps (Kacperczyk et al.
(2008)) compounded over the 2 years after entry on the entrant overlap measures. As
noted in Kacperczyk et al. (2008), the return gap measures the costs, or benefits, of
managers unobserved actions. A large portion of the costs consist trading costs, e.g.,
the price impact of trade execution and trading commissions. In unreported results I
find some support of my conjecture – factor index overlap is negatively related to future
return gaps, however, the statistical significance is marginal at best.
18In unreported results, I find some evidence of underperformance over the next year. Results are also
similar when measuring performance with 3-factor alpha.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the consequences of increased index fund competition on actively
managed mutual fund fees, survival, and performance. While there is ample anecdotal
evidence supporting the conjecture that index competition has significantly affected
the actively managed industry, this paper provides a rigorous empirical investigation.
Importantly, I find that the competitive effects of index competition varies depending
on the type of exposure offered, namely exposure to active risk or broad market beta.
Measuring the intensity of index competition using entry/incumbent holdings overlap,
I show that future changes in net fees are negatively related to factor index overlap but
insignificantly related to market index overlap.
Decomposing net fees into their various components suggests that the reduction in
net fees associated with factor index overlap is due to a reduction in operating expenses.
However, investors only realize approximately one-quarter of this reduction as the rest
is diminished by an accompanied increase in management fees. The effects of market
index overlap on changes in operating fees is negative, but is completely offset by a
positive changes in management fees.
The direct effect on net fees, or lack there of in the case of market index funds, is
only part of the story. Competitive pressure from index funds has also had an indirect
effect on actively managed net fees through increased liquidation rates. In particular,
active incumbents charging relatively high net fees are more likely to be liquidated
following entry of both factor and market index funds compared to active incumbents
charging relatively low net fees.
Lastly, critics have argued that the substantial fee dispersion for nearly identical
mutual funds that has existed for some time does not reflect pricing in a competitive
market. The evidence in this paper indicates that increased availability of index funds,
and particularly factor index funds, has not only contributed to the reduction in average
net fees but has also led to a reduction in fee dispersion by helping to drive fees towards
their peer group medians.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Cumulative Annual Flows by Fund Type
This figure presents cumulative dollar net flows, in millions of USD, from 1998 to 2018 for the
three fund types used in this paper: actively managed mutual funds, market index funds and
factor index funds. A complete description of how factor index funds differ from market index
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7 Tables
Table 1: Sample Fund Entry Statistics
For each calendar year in my sample period, this table presents: 1) the number of new mutual funds
created (entrants), 2) the number of existing funds (entrants plus incumbents), 3) the total AUM and iv)
the equally weighted net expense ratio (EW Net Expense). Statistics are grouped by the three fund types:
actively managed mutual funds, market index funds and factor index funds. Entry dates are defined as
the inception date of a fund’s oldest share class. A complete description of how factor index funds differ
from market index funds is provided in section 2.1.1.
Number of Existing Funds Number of New Entries AUM (Billions USD) EW Net Expense (%)
Index Index Index Index
Year Active Factor Market Active Factor Market Active Factor Market Active Factor Market
1998 957 16 46 104 2 9 1505.9 16.9 190.7 1.28 0.55 0.42
1999 1059 17 59 102 2 13 1968.0 28.6 292.4 1.26 0.57 0.42
2000 1161 38 82 102 21 23 1937.6 29.7 312.4 1.30 0.40 0.43
2001 1308 49 95 147 10 11 1776.3 34.4 311.2 1.33 0.63 0.47
2002 1378 57 100 70 8 6 1398.4 34.2 264.1 1.31 0.64 0.47
2003 1464 68 106 86 11 5 1934.9 56.4 370.5 1.30 0.55 0.44
2004 1549 83 114 86 15 8 2268.1 89.5 435.6 1.27 0.57 0.43
2005 1673 102 117 125 19 4 2489.5 110.7 473.0 1.25 0.56 0.41
2006 1800 146 120 130 44 3 2829.4 149.3 549.3 1.21 0.55 0.41
2007 1906 190 124 107 45 5 2993.1 171.8 615.8 1.21 0.61 0.42
2008 1982 199 126 78 9 4 1737.5 124.1 435.3 1.27 0.58 0.40
2009 2018 207 137 51 12 11 2289.7 163.2 582.0 1.19 0.55 0.42
2010 2003 218 143 79 26 13 2537.9 215.4 697.4 1.17 0.53 0.37
2011 1972 257 148 74 46 8 2392.7 232.4 729.1 1.15 0.51 0.35
2012 1951 279 142 86 27 1 2597.5 286.4 868.3 1.12 0.51 0.34
2013 1948 274 132 105 25 3 3508.3 450.7 1178.4 1.09 0.50 0.32
2014 1938 297 130 77 28 4 3708.6 549.0 1389.7 1.08 0.50 0.32
2015 1953 352 139 62 58 12 3516.4 584.2 1444.8 1.07 0.48 0.31
2016 1950 396 142 63 48 6 3621.2 736.7 1690.1 1.05 0.44 0.32
2017 1922 464 146 61 87 10 4153.4 901.6 2100.9 1.02 0.42 0.30
2018 1894 485 152 44 34 12 3685.4 909.6 2054.7 1.04 0.42 0.30
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics on the annual sample of actively managed funds. The sampling
period is from January 1998 to December 2018. Fees are reported as annual percentages of fund net
assets. Benchmark adjusted returns (Bmk. Adj. Ret.), 3F alpha, 4F alpha and equal weighted peer
benchmark adjusted returns (EW Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.) are annualized returns expressed in %. Net flow
is equal to annual percentage flows. AUM (Billions) is fund total net assets in billions of USD. % AUM
Inst. Class is the proportion of fund assets that are in an institutional class. Age in months refers to
a fund’s oldest share class. Turnover is the lesser of the dollar value of purchases or sales divided by
previous period assets under management. The standard deviation of gross returns (std.(Gross Ret.))
and tracking error are calculated using 24 months of return data.
Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. 50th Pctl. 75th Pctl.
Overlap measures
Factor Index MVO 0.306 0.519 0.012 0.062 0.323
Market Index MVO 0.724 1.258 0.022 0.125 0.732
Outcome variables
Net Fee (%) 1.144 0.393 0.900 1.104 1.352
Mgmt. Fee (%) 0.687 0.341 0.556 0.728 0.888
Operating Fee (%) 0.199 0.399 0.001 0.165 0.327
Dist. Fee (%) 0.248 0.236 0 0.250 0.379
Bmk. Adj. Ret. (% p.a.) 0.743 18.004 -7.954 0.205 8.809
3F Alpha (% p.a.) 0.637 16.961 -7.724 0.219 8.134
4F Alpha (% p.a.) 0.412 15.271 -7.472 0.140 7.655
Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret. (% p.a.) 0.024 16.552 -7.805 0.076 7.961
Net Flow (% p.a.) -0.446 13.353 -4.982 -1.855 2.193
Control variables
AUM (Billions) 1.596 5.941 0.070 0.270 1.045
%AUM Inst. Class 0.296 0.381 0 0.039 0.634
Age (Months) 154 135 63 122 198
Turnover (%) 77 184 31 57 96
std.(Gross Ret.) 4.515 1.703 3.225 4.127 5.631
Tracking Error 1.514 0.963 0.892 1.274 1.820
Broker Sold 0.427 0.495 0 0 1
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Table 3: Strategic Fee Adjustment
This table presents regressions of post-entry changes in active fund fees on the set of overlap measures
and control variables. Dependent variables are given in column headers. Logistic regressions are used to
predict the probability that fund i uses a fee waiver in the next period (Pr.(Waiver)), all other columns
show pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates. The dependent variables: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+2, ∆Mgmt.
Feei,t∶t+2, ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+2 and ∆Distribution Feei,t∶t+2 are changes in active incumbent fees from
fiscal year t to t+2. Ln(AUM) is the natural log of fund net assets as of the end fiscal year t−1. Peer Bmk.
Adj. Ret. is equal to the difference between fund i’s gross return and the equally weighted gross return of
it’s peer group based on Morningstar categories, and is compounded over the prior fiscal year (t − 1 ∶ t).
The standard deviation of gross returns (std(Gross Ret.)) and tracking error are calculated over the prior
24 months. All regressions include year fixed effects. Regressions in Panel A, C and D include fund fixed
effects and regressions in Panel B include style fixed effects. Reported t-statistics, shown in parentheses,
use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that cluster by style and year. ***/**/* denote statistical
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Panel A: Strategic Fee Adjustments
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Mgmt. Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+2 Pr.(Waiver)
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.0114*** -0.0113*** 0.0303*** 0.0335*** -0.0444*** -0.0474*** 0.0027 0.0027 -0.0116
(5.42) (5.35) (3.68) (4.18) (5.03) (5.51) (1.16) (1.14) (0.20)
Market Index MVOi,t 0.0028* 0.0031 0.0219** 0.0275*** -0.0227** -0.0280*** 0.0036* 0.0036 0.0379
(1.68) (1.58) (2.50) (3.13) (2.48) (3.00) (1.75) (1.59) (0.71)
Active MVOi,t -0.0006 -0.0144*** 0.0137** 0.0001 0.1196**
(0.32) (2.69) (2.16) (0.03) (2.07)
Turnoveri,t 0.0032 0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0088 0.0089 -0.0047* -0.0047* 0.0538
(1.16) (1.15) (0.14) (0.15) (1.08) (1.10) (1.94) (1.94) (0.78)
std(Gross Ret.)i,t 0.0033* 0.0033* -0.0035 -0.0038 0.0116*** 0.0119*** -0.0049*** -0.0049*** 0.0461
(1.86) (1.86) (1.14) (1.23) (2.86) (2.92) (3.50) (3.50) (0.91)
Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t-0.1362*** -0.1362*** 0.1311*** 0.1304*** -0.2348*** -0.2341*** -0.0325* -0.0325* 0.3498
(8.22) (8.23) (3.51) (3.50) (5.12) (5.12) (1.68) (1.68) (0.76)
ln(Age)i,t -0.0144*** -0.0144*** -0.0689*** -0.0697*** 0.0403*** 0.0410*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** -0.2039*
(3.13) (3.14) (7.44) (7.53) (3.65) (3.73) (3.09) (3.08) (1.89)
Tracking Error -0.0018 -0.0019 0.0056 0.0045 -0.0122** -0.0112** 0.0049** 0.0049** -0.0276
(0.76) (0.78) (1.33) (1.08) (2.12) (1.98) (2.12) (2.13) (0.43)
ln(AUM)i,t 0.0083*** 0.0083*** -0.0216*** -0.0221*** 0.0270*** 0.0274*** 0.0029** 0.0029** -0.1616***
(8.45) (8.33) (6.44) (6.58) (7.30) (7.41) (2.40) (2.38) (5.48)
Observations 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,755
R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.04
Panel B: Robustness
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Mgmt.i,t∶t+2 ∆Operatingi,t∶t+2 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+2
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.0058*** 0.0224*** -0.0309*** 0.0027
(3.05) (3.03) (3.90) (1.27)
Market Index MVOi,t 0.0060*** 0.0220*** -0.0183** 0.0022
(3.38) (2.67) (2.15) (1.14)
Observations 23,092 22,414 20,751 21,219
R-squared 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02
Panel C: Factor Index Interaction Effects
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Mgmt. Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+2
Factor Index MVOi,t 0.0028 0.0608*** -0.0089 0.0070***
(1.27) (6.50) (1.19) (2.85)
Factor Index MVOi,t × High Feei,t -0.0152*** -0.0594*** -0.0490*** -0.0145***
(5.67) (6.96) (4.62) (4.79)
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.0077*** 0.0378*** -0.0481*** 0.0015
(4.24) (4.82) (5.56) (0.64)
Factor Index MVOi,t × Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t -0.0498** 0.1691*** -0.1781** -0.0002
(2.40) (2.70) (2.23) (0.01)
Panel D: Market Index Interaction Effects
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Mgmt. Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+2 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+2
Market Index MVOi,t 0.0136*** 0.0433*** 0.0187** 0.0070**
(6.49) (3.93) (2.32) (2.52)
Market Index MVOi,t × High Feei,t -0.0155*** -0.0484*** -0.0564*** -0.0029
(6.00) (4.61) (5.18) (0.93)
Market Index MVOi,t 0.0043** 0.0226*** -0.0245*** 0.0035
(2.55) (2.75) (2.68) (1.61)
Market Index MVOi,t × Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t -0.0379 0.1056** -0.1021 -0.0171
(1.42) (2.04) (1.56) (1.26)
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Table 4: Investor Response to Fee Changes
This table presents results from estimating pooled OLS regressions of active fund net flows on a set
of dummy variables corresponding to fee changes over the prior two years. The unit of observation
is fund-quarter. The dependent variables, shown in column headings, are net fund flow over the next
quarter (i, t ∶ t + 1), 6 months (i, t ∶ t + 2) or year (i, t ∶ t + 4) scaled by the AUM at the beginning of the
measurement period. The explanatory variables include the natural log of fund net assets (ln(AUM)),
gross return volatility estimated over the prior 24 months (std(Gross Ret.)), fund turnover, and the
natural log fund age in months (ln(Age)) and prior performance. Prior performance is measured by
CAPM alpha compounded over the prior year. Fee change variables are measured over the prior two
years. For example, Decrease Net Feei,t−8∶t is equal to the change in net fees over the prior two years
(eight quarters). Regressions in Panel A include fund and year-quarter fixed effects. Panel B includes
style and year-quarter fixed effects and the full set of control variables from Panel A. Reported t-statistics,
shown in parentheses, use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are clustered by fund style ×
year-quarter. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Panel A: Investor response to active fund fee changes
Dependent Variable: Net Flowi,t∶t+1 Net Flowi,t∶t+2 Net Flowi,t∶t+4 Net Flowi,t∶t+1 Net Flowi,t∶t+2 Net Flowi,t∶t+4
Decrease Net Fee 0.6392* 1.3453** 1.9010**
(2.79) (4.60) (4.99)
Increase Mgmt. Fee 0.2136 0.4947 0.6188
(0.92) (1.27) (1.19)
Increase Dist. Fee -0.1449 -0.3586 0.2295
(1.12) (1.43) (0.55)
Decrease Operating Fee 0.7418* 1.3781** 2.0322*
(2.95) (3.68) (3.04)
Turnover -0.0095*** -0.0164*** -0.0198* -0.0079** -0.0161** -0.0240*
(8.83) (6.82) (2.86) (4.21) (3.30) (3.10)
std(Gross Ret.) -0.1838 -0.4391 -1.2556 -0.1445 -0.4502 -1.5927
(0.81) (1.37) (1.10) (0.61) (1.22) (1.34)
CAPM Alpha 0.2755*** 0.5108*** 0.7480*** 0.2778*** 0.5179*** 0.7571***
(10.82) (6.95) (6.78) (7.46) (6.21) (6.29)
Tracking Error 0.6913** 1.5728** 2.9520** 0.6619* 1.5681** 3.0171**
(3.88) (4.09) (3.99) (3.07) (4.00) (3.76)
ln(Age) -2.1102** -4.7418** -14.3292*** -1.3370 -3.2498* -11.9595***
(3.42) (3.34) (7.98) (2.14) (2.42) (7.10)
ln(AUM) -2.4685*** -6.4770*** -19.5219*** -2.5978*** -6.7525*** -20.1269***
(10.95) (11.55) (15.12) (10.94) (11.18) (14.14)
Net Flow 0.2096*** 0.4015*** 0.7520*** 0.2109*** 0.4029*** 0.7617***
(10.82) (11.21) (14.47) (10.14) (11.37) (10.48)
Observations 101,364 101,496 101,792 91,540 91,656 91,873
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.35
Panel B: Robustness
Dependent Variable: Net Flowi,t∶t+1 Net Flowi,t∶t+2 Net Flowi,t∶t+4 Net Flowi,t∶t+1 Net Flowi,t∶t+2 Net Flowi,t∶t+4
Decrease Net Feei,t−8∶t 0.7216** 1.5610** 2.7918***
(4.37) (5.58) (5.90)
Increase Mgmt. Feei,t−8∶t 0.3087 0.7382 1.5528**
(1.58) (2.19) (4.00)
Increase Dist. Feei,t−8∶t -0.2049 -0.3988 0.3759
(1.98) (1.74) (0.61)
Decrease Operating Feei,t−8∶t 0.8970** 1.7315** 2.9555**
(4.52) (4.90) (5.18)
Observations 99,879 100,010 100,297 90,333 90,446 90,657
R-squared 0.29 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.30 0.22
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Table 5: Active Incumbent Attrition
Panel A of this table provides one, two and five year attrition rates of active mutual funds sorted by the
factor index, market index and active overlap measures. Portfolios are updated annually with rankings
based on the average overlap measure over the prior year. One, two and five year attrition rates are
equal to the proportion of funds that are liquidated or merged over the one, two and five years after the
sort. Panel B presents the results from estimating a Cox proportional hazard model:
Hazardi,t = h0,i,te(β1FactorIndexMV Oi,t+β2MarketIndexMV Oi,t+β3ActiveMV Oi,t+γCi,t)
The unit of observation is fund-quarter. Active funds that exist for the entire sample are included
as censored observations. Control variables include: benchmark adjusted returns compounded
over the prior two years (Bmk. Adj. Ret.), turnover, percentage net flow over the prior 6 months
(Net Flow), the natural log of fund net assets size (ln(AUM), gross return volatility calculated
over the prior 24 months (std.(Gross Ret.), the natural log of fund age in months (ln(Age),
tracking error and the net expense ratio (Net Fee). The covariance matrix is estimated using
the ”sandwich estimator” developed in Lin and Wei (1989). Hazard ratios are reported with
z-scores in parentheses. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
127
Panel A: Attrition rates based on univariate sorts by competition ranking
Merged Liquidated
Factor Index MVO Quintile 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year
1 2.02 3.33 7.78 1.94 3.77 9.31
2 1.70 3.22 8.43 2.07 4.38 10.64
3 1.42 3.16 8.57 2.61 4.75 11.32
4 1.49 3.52 8.67 2.31 4.70 11.60
5 1.65 3.20 7.25 3.28 6.53 14.95
Market Index MVO Quintile 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year
1 1.75 2.79 7.02 2.26 4.06 9.60
2 1.51 3.31 8.58 1.71 3.67 9.71
3 1.52 3.49 8.66 2.43 4.81 11.27
4 1.57 3.39 9.02 2.40 5.02 12.26
5 1.94 3.45 7.47 3.41 6.58 14.99
Active MVO Quintile 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year 1 Year 2 Year 5 Year
1 1.33 2.43 6.68 1.86 3.66 8.96
2 1.48 3.40 8.98 1.94 3.87 9.88
3 1.76 3.49 8.38 2.27 4.62 11.43
4 1.65 3.48 8.80 2.74 5.34 12.76
5 2.05 3.63 7.91 3.41 6.65 14.80
Panel B: Cox proportional hazard model estimation
Baseline Regressions Interaction Effects
Dependent Variable: Merged Liquidated Merged Liquidated
Factor Index MVOi,t 0.9801 1.0297 1.1692*** 1.1916*** 1.0865 1.0375 1.0685 1.2258***
(0.24) (0.40) (3.44) (3.96) (1.11) (0.48) (1.22) (4.57)
Market Index MVOi,t 1.0405 1.0774 1.2383*** 1.2457*** 1.0817 1.1588 1.2770*** 1.1077
(0.50) (1.04) (4.80) (5.04) (1.13) (1.64) (5.49) (1.60)
Active MVOi,t 0.7764*** 0.9382* 0.7734*** 0.7738*** 0.9452 0.9433
(3.89) (1.69) (3.92) (3.92) (1.48) (1.56)
Bmark Adj. Ret.i,t 0.9803*** 0.9810*** 0.9882*** 0.9887*** 0.9829*** 0.9814*** 0.9939 0.9903**
(3.16) (3.06) (2.69) (2.59) (2.63) (2.98) (1.30) (2.19)
Turnoveri,t 1.0006*** 1.0006*** 1.0006*** 1.0006*** 1.0006*** 1.0007*** 1.0004*** 1.0005***
(3.29) (3.30) (4.71) (4.77) (2.95) (3.46) (2.79) (4.30)
Net Flowi,t−2∶t 0.9793*** 0.9801*** 0.9771*** 0.9775*** 0.9800*** 0.9800*** 0.9776*** 0.9776***
(7.01) (6.75) (10.59) (10.29) (6.68) (6.70) (10.29) (10.33)
ln(AUM)i,t 0.9245*** 0.8775*** 0.9264*** 0.9069*** 0.8912*** 0.8916*** 0.8861*** 0.8902***
(2.70) (4.07) (3.56) (3.95) (3.66) (3.64) (5.02) (4.80)
std(Gross Ret.)i,t 1.2242** 1.2230** 1.0769 1.0724 1.2267** 1.2273** 1.0527 1.0558
(2.49) (2.45) (1.46) (1.38) (2.47) (2.49) (0.99) (1.03)
ln(Age)i,t 1.5545*** 1.5633*** 0.7409*** 0.7426*** 1.5483*** 1.5485*** 0.7667*** 0.7639***
(6.82) (6.88) (6.95) (6.95) (6.70) (6.70) (6.29) (6.43)
Tracking Errori,t 0.7330*** 0.7155*** 0.9147* 0.9073* 0.7001*** 0.7021*** 0.9448 0.9461
(3.75) (4.00) (1.74) (1.88) (4.36) (4.33) (1.12) (1.08)
Net Feei,t 1.2633 1.2678* 1.5843*** 1.5818***
(1.63) (1.65) (4.60) (4.63)
High Net Feei,t 1.4850*** 1.4197*** 1.1266* 1.2096***
(3.91) (3.60) (1.71) (2.86)
Factor Index MVOi,t × Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t 0.9951 0.9917*
(0.81) (1.75)
Factor Index MVOi,t × High Neti,t 0.8955 1.1855***
(1.06) (3.25)
Market Index MVOi,t × Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t 1.0000 0.9963*
(0.00) (1.87)
Market Index MVOi,t × High Neti,t 0.8950 1.1518***
(1.32) (3.00)
Observations 94,803 94,803 94,803 94,803 94,803 94,803 94,803 94,803
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
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Table 6: Future Performance
This table presents pooled OLS regressions of active fund performance on the entry overlap measures,
a standard set of control variables, year-quarter and fund or style fixed effects. The dependent variable
is given by benchmark adjusted returns, peer benchmark adjusted returns or alpha compounded over
the 24 months after entry. Turnover and expense ratio are annual values as of quarter t. Tracking error
and the standard deviation of gross returns are calculated over the prior 24 months. ln(Age) is the
natural log of the age, in months, of a fund’s oldest share class and ln(AUM) is the natural log of a fund’s
total assets under management. Past performance is the compounded returns over the prior year and
is calculated using the same performance measure as the dependent variable. Regressions in Panel A
include fund fixed effects while regressions in Panel B include style fixed effects. Reported t-statistics,
shown in parentheses, use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that are double clustered by fund
and year. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Panel A: Future Performance
Dependent Variable: Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.t∶t+8 Bmk. Adj. Ret.t∶t+8 4F Alphat∶t+8
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.2930** -0.2565** -0.2908*** -0.2568** -0.3750*** -0.3382***
(2.52) (2.45) (2.89) (2.82) (4.16) (4.71)
Market Index MVOi,t -0.3814*** -0.2845*** -0.3145*** -0.2258** -0.2116** -0.1188
(4.46) (3.46) (3.39) (2.60) (2.86) (1.64)
Active MVOi,t -0.3467*** -0.3184*** -0.3418***
(3.30) (3.41) (3.74)
Past Performancei,t -0.1801** -0.1798** -0.1626*** -0.1623*** -0.0795** -0.0796**
(2.66) (2.66) (2.87) (2.87) (2.12) (2.13)
Turnoveri,t 0.0014 0.0013 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0026 -0.0026
(0.35) (0.34) (0.12) (0.12) (1.08) (1.09)
ln(AUM)i,t -3.3545*** -3.3973*** -3.2610*** -3.3006*** -2.4605*** -2.5014***
(7.78) (7.77) (8.06) (8.06) (11.32) (11.09)
Tracking Errori,t 0.7370** 0.7209** 1.0853** 1.0702** 0.0280 0.0130
(2.56) (2.52) (2.23) (2.22) (0.15) (0.07)
Net Feei,t 1.4366* 1.4267* 1.5841* 1.5744* 0.7720 0.7605
(1.91) (1.89) (2.01) (1.99) (1.37) (1.35)
%AUM Inst. Classi,t 1.7994* 1.8180* 1.5917 1.6084 0.4579 0.4738
(1.85) (1.87) (1.67) (1.69) (0.69) (0.71)
Net Flow (%)i,t -0.0136** -0.0131** -0.0143* -0.0138* -0.0135* -0.0129*
(2.19) (2.10) (2.05) (1.99) (1.93) (1.85)
Observations 96,865 96,865 97,302 97,302 93,839 93,839
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28
Panel B: Robustness
Dependent Variable: Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.t∶t+8 Bmk. Adj. Ret.t∶t+8 4F Alphat∶t+8
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.2439*** -0.2315*** -0.2569*** -0.2346*** -0.1720*** -0.1724***
(2.95) (2.78) (3.14) (2.83) (2.69) (2.69)
Market Index MVOi,t -0.2147*** -0.1716** -0.1193* -0.0448 0.0622 0.0607
(2.91) (2.36) (1.65) (0.63) (1.15) (1.14)
Active MVOi,t -0.1111** -0.1937*** 0.0040
(2.40) (4.07) (0.13)
Past Performancei,t -0.0482*** -0.0481*** -0.0505*** -0.0500*** 0.0795*** 0.0795***
(4.07) (4.06) (4.09) (4.05) (7.24) (7.24)
Turnoveri,t -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.40) (0.40) (0.63) (0.63) (0.93) (0.93)
ln(AUM)i,t -0.2801*** -0.2922*** -0.2255*** -0.2468*** -0.1861*** -0.1857***
(5.14) (5.27) (4.14) (4.47) (4.50) (4.40)
Tracking Errori,t 0.3896*** 0.3824** 0.2577* 0.2451 0.1843* 0.1846*
(2.59) (2.53) (1.65) (1.56) (1.77) (1.77)
Net Feei,t -0.4536* -0.4602* -0.4861* -0.4978* -0.3988** -0.3986**
(1.75) (1.78) (1.84) (1.89) (2.14) (2.14)
%AUM Inst. Classi,t -0.1355 -0.1378 -0.0860 -0.0897 -0.0704 -0.0703
(0.72) (0.74) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Net Flow (%)i,t -0.0204*** -0.0203*** -0.0182*** -0.0181*** -0.0119*** -0.0119***
(4.91) (4.89) (4.30) (4.27) (3.89) (3.89)
Observations 96,867 96,867 97,309 97,309 93,852 93,852


















i subscript denotes incumbent, e subscript denotes entrant, s denotes stocks held by both incum-
bent i and entrant e.
Pi,s,t (Pe,s,t) = the price of security s in quarter t.
Si,s,t = number of shares of security s in incumbent i’s portfolio in quarter t.
Se,s,t = number of shares of security s in entrant e’s portfolio in quarter t.
M = the number of overlapping securities held by incumbent i and entrant e.
N = the number of entrants in quarter t that have at least one overlapping security.
K = the number of securities in incumbent i’s portfolio in quarter t.
Factor Index MVOi,t
Aggregate holdings overlap measure for fund i in quarter t. Computed for all factor index funds
that enter in quarter t − 1.
Market Index MVOi,t
Aggregate holdings overlap measure for fund i in quarter t. Computed for all market index funds
that enter in quarter t − 1.
Performance Measures
Bmk. Adj. Ret.
Gross fund returns in excess of the funds’ benchmark return. I use the Morningstar US-equity
Category benchmarks.
Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.
Gross fund returns in excess of the funds’ equally weighted peer group return. I use Morningstar
US-equity Category to determine peer groups.
Alpha
CAPM, Fama and French 3-factor, Fama, French and Carhart 4-factor. Estimated using 36 months
of gross return data.
Fund Characteristics
ln(AUM) The natural log of fund assets under management.
ln(Age) The natural log of a fund’s age in months.
Tracking Error The standard deviation of the difference between gross fund returns and benchmark returns.
Turnover
The lesser of the dollar value of purchases or sales divided by previous period (year) assets under
management.
Net Fee
The percentage of fund assets used to pay for operating and management fees. This includes 12b-1
fees, administrative fees and all other asset-based costs incurred by the fund, excluding brokerage
costs.
Management Fee
The fee charged by manager(s) as given in the fund’s annual report. Expressed as a % of fund net
assets.
Distribution Fee The % of fund net assets used for marketing and distribution.
Operating Fee
Net fees minus management fees minus distribution fees. Expressed as a % of fund net assets.
These fees include: accounting, administration, auditing, compensating the board of directors, cus-
todial, legal, organizational, professional, registration, shareholder reporting and transfer agency
fees . Expressed as a % of fund net assets.
Expense Waiver
The difference between expenses incurred (gross expense ratio) and expenses charged to unit
holders (net expense ratio).
High Fee
Indicator variables that measure relative: management fees, operating fees, distribution fees and
and net fees. To be precise, high fee is equal to one if a fund charges a fee (as a % of net assets)
that is above the median fee for all other actively managed mutual funds in the same style category,
in the same year.
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Table A2: Strategic Fee Adjustment: Three- and Four-Year Fee Changes
This table presents regressions of post-entry changes in active fund fees on the set of overlap measures
and control variables. Dependent variables are given in column headers. Logistic regressions are used to
predict the probability that fund i uses a fee waiver in the next period (Pr.(Waiver)), all other columns
show pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates. The dependent variables are changes in active
incumbent fees over the three (t to t + 3) and four years (t to t + 4) after entry. The control variables
are the same as those from Table 3. All regressions include year and fund fixed effects. The dependent
variables in Panel A are three-year changes in fees and are four-year changes in Panel B. Reported t-
statistics, shown in parentheses, use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that cluster by fund and
year. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Panel A: Three-Year Fee Adjustments
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+3 ∆Mgmt. Feei,t∶t+3 ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+3 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+3
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.0167*** 0.0350*** -0.0525*** 0.0015
(6.30) (4.23) (5.88) (0.59)
Market Index MVOi,t 0.0019 0.0316*** -0.0350*** -0.0008
(0.75) (3.46) (3.69) (0.32)
Active MVOi,t 0.0013 -0.0096* 0.0115* 0.0022
(0.47) (1.80) (1.67) (0.77)
Turnoveri,t 0.0084** 0.0028 0.0087 -0.0059**
(2.55) (0.44) (1.07) (2.31)
std(Gross Ret.)i,t 0.0034 -0.0020 0.0106*** -0.0061***
(1.53) (0.66) (2.77) (3.32)
Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t -0.2029*** 0.0501 -0.2249*** 0.0094
(8.46) (1.11) (4.14) (0.46)
ln(Age)i,t -0.0237*** -0.0778*** 0.0327** 0.0201***
(4.12) (7.66) (2.60) (3.82)
Tracking Errori,t -0.0017 0.0015 -0.0106* 0.0055**
(0.57) (0.37) (1.81) (2.48)
ln(AUM)i,t 0.0139*** -0.0254*** 0.0362*** 0.0055***
(11.58) (6.66) (8.58) (4.55)
Observations 20,752 20,116 18,658 19,116
R-squared 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.16
Panel B: Four-Year Fee Adjustments
Dependent Variable: ∆Net Feei,t∶t+4 ∆Mgmt. Feei,t∶t+4 ∆Operating Feei,t∶t+4 ∆Dist. Feei,t∶t+4
Factor Index MVOi,t -0.0182*** 0.0325*** -0.0540*** 0.0030
(6.19) (3.51) (4.95) (1.08)
Market Index MVOi,t -0.0030 0.0435*** -0.0461*** -0.0032
(1.11) (3.82) (3.75) (1.00)
Active MVOi,t 0.0040 -0.0110 0.0187** 0.0009
(1.21) (1.64) (2.40) (0.31)
Turnoveri,t 0.0069* 0.0023 0.0112 -0.0078***
(1.72) (0.34) (1.12) (2.65)
std(Gross Ret.)i,t 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0066 -0.0043*
(0.86) (0.03) (1.32) (1.85)
Peer Bmk. Adj. Ret.i,t -0.2007*** -0.0320 -0.1651*** 0.0442*
(7.83) (0.66) (2.91) (1.85)
ln(Age)i,t -0.0237*** -0.0862*** 0.0293* 0.0229***
(3.22) (6.94) (1.78) (3.47)
Tracking Errori,t -0.0002 -0.0070 -0.0053 0.0083***
(0.07) (1.40) (0.80) (2.96)
ln(AUM)i,t 0.0168*** -0.0320*** 0.0440*** 0.0059***
(12.16) (8.27) (9.69) (3.67)
Observations 18,702 18,093 16,712 17,173
R-squared 0.36 0.29 0.30 0.23
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